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SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

itor: Leopold Labedz

Guest Editor: Iain Elliot

Gorbachev and Glasnost

ipes on Lenin
chöpflin on Stalin
eddaway on Psychology

erestroika • Pamyat
ultural Developments

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GORBACHEV AND GLASNOST

Edited and Introduced by
Iain Elliot
Guest Editor



Aspects of Glasnost

How Open is "Openness"? ..... *Iain Elliot* 1
Soviet Psychiatry:
An End to Political Abuse? ..... *Peter Reddaway* 25
Perestroika – The Polish Influence ..... *Elizabeth Teague* 39
When the Desert Blooms:
Cultural Developments under
Gorbachev ..... *G. D. G. Murrell* 59

Lifting the Lid

The Origins of Pamyat ..... *Julia Wishnevsky* 79
Homo Sovieticus: Can Attitudes Change? ..... *David Satter* 92

True or False?

The Role of Forgeries in
Soviet Active Measures ..... *Herbert Romerstein* 106
Glasnost: Fiction or Reality? ..... *Edward J. Rozek* 121

Leninism, Stalinism

The Stalinist Experience in
Eastern Europe ..... *George Schöpflin* 124
The Bolsheviks Dissolve the
Constituent Assembly ..... *Richard Pipes* 148

Our Contributors 176

Glimpses of Glasnost

The newspaper of the Minsk Komsomol (Communist Youth) Organization *Znamya Yunosti* (11 September 1988) printed the following letter from a reader:

YOUR PAPER DOESN'T EVEN HAVE THE SLIGHTEST WHIFF OF GLASNOST

I do not hide the fact that I am a regular listener not only to the Voice of America and the BBC, but also to such radio stations as Liberty, against which the Soviet mass media have repeatedly launched unfounded attacks. These transmissions are becoming more and more popular with the people. Yet this popularity is not won with gifts (or, as you call them, prezenty*) but with varied, truthful, interesting and thought-provoking programmes. The programmes put out by Voice of America, for example, are aimed at the broadest range of listeners, from lovers of literature and art to sports fans and devotees of rock music. Moreover, the programmes are all produced by competent and well-informed people. It is quite wrong to say that the Voice of America and other radio stations are involved in subversive activity. I can state this with complete certainty. The work of these "radio voices" is based on the classic principles of journalism: honesty, competence and objectivity.*

Excuse me for saying so, but from listening to broadcasts from Western radio stations I have learned about various aspects of science, technology, literature, art and so on, to a much greater extent than from all the reading of Soviet newspapers I have ever done in the course of my short life. Surely those who work in the mass media of the USSR are aware that radio stations like the Voice of America act in the interests of the free exchange of information, for such an exchange promotes the strengthening of peace and mutual understanding among peoples.

*Incidentally, I myself have written seven times "to them over there" (*tuda*), but have received no answer. I am sure all my letters are being "seized" over here [. . .* "perekhvatyvayut" u nas*]. So just where is this* perestroika*? By the way, your paper too is sidestepping many important problems. It doesn't even have the slightest whiff of* glasnost.

V. Leonidov.

From the editors:

By publishing this letter from an author who is unknown to us (though one cannot be sure that the surname is genuine, especially since the address shown on the letter does not correspond with the stamp on the envelope), we are fulfilling the promise we gave to readers to publish in this column the widest range of opinions. But just the same, this letter, advising openness for everyone and everything (but not for its author) seems to us worthy of separate serious discussion. What do you think?

ОПАСНОСТЬ = Danger
ГЛАСНОСТЬ = Openness

How Open Is "Openness"?

Iain Elliot

THE GORBACHEV POLICY of *glasnost* (openness) has reformed the Soviet media to such an extent that startling revelations and frank discussions are now the daily norm. Subjects which under Leonid Brezhnev were aired only in clandestine samizdat, or in Western publications, are now common fare for the Soviet newspaper reader or television viewer. *Glasnost* plays a central role in Gorbachev's efforts to push through his revolutionary *perestroika* (restructuring) of Soviet social and economic life in the hope that he can shock the USSR out of the "period of stagnation" into which it sank under Brezhnev and Chernenko. However, there is a fundamental contradiction in attempting to introduce even limited freedom of the press into a one-party political system which continues to depend on authoritarian methods for its survival. Either *glasnost* must go, or the Soviet state will be transformed into a radically different alignment of nations from the superpower that has been shaped by a succession of ruthless leaders over seven decades.

The stresses and strains of an empire in transition are now much in evidence. There was indeed much in this empire that was evil, and in the light of what the Soviet leaders themselves are now saying, President Reagan's phrase appears much less controversial. But the hard truths about the Soviet past which are now being openly discussed seem to offer some hope for genuine change towards a more democratic future—a future in which ordinary citizens will feel free to voice their opinion about the political processes affecting their lives. Rejecting the totalitarian past is the first step, but the path to democracy has not yet been clearly signposted by the present leadership; the pace and direction are still hotly disputed at the top. As Professor Richard Pipes points out in this issue of *Survey*, it was Lenin himself who crushed the incipient multiparty system when he

dispelled the Constituent Assembly in 1918. Can the present leaders of the CPSU take the risk of admitting that seventy years of Communist rule were in vain? A well-known Soviet anecdote has Lenin arising from his mausoleum, looking round Moscow, and immediately setting off for Switzerland "to begin all over again." As the bolder Soviet publications are now actually permitting criticisms of Lenin himself to appear in print, it would seem to follow that he should never have left Zurich in the first place. However, the Politburo number two, Egor Ligachev, appeared to have decided that revelations about the past had already gone too far, and that the political and economic changes now proposed should be severely restricted. But in the media, the reformists are presently to the fore.

Those in the West whose criticisms of the Soviet system—for its inhumanity and inefficiency—once earned them denunciatons in the media of the USSR for their "anti-Soviet" stance, now find that their arguments are being confirmed and developed by leading Soviet journalists and academics. However, concluding his stimulating study *Stalinism and After*, published in 1975, Professor Alec Nove speculated that Brezhnev himself was aware of the faults of the system, but saw it as the only possible way of governing Russia:

> "What if the only alternative is disintegration? If we relax and are hanged by an indignant mob, stirred up by those intellectual rebels whom you in the West foolishly tolerate in your midst, do you really think there would be freedom, democracy and prosperity in our country? I may not be a genius, but I am the best General Secretary we've got."

Professor Nove concluded: "Maybe he is, who knows."[1] Every day the Gorbachev press produces hard evidence as to why Brezhnev most certainly was not the best leader for the USSR; according to Roy Medvedev he was clinically dead in 1976, but continued to rule until 1982 when there was no doubt about his death. The possibility of disintegration, however, is indeed now very real. Richard Bassett, the Central Europe correspondent of *The Times*, argues:

> In its desperate need for Western technology, its crude courtship of liberal European opinion, and its lacklustre rhetoric, Mr Gorbachev's empire betrays all the signs of imperial decay. Like the sick man of Europe of an earlier century, parts of the Soviet empire threaten to break up from within when those who have endured for so long an alien way of life finally screw up their courage to expel their corrupt tyrants. As a means of accelerating this long overdue process, the West is right to encourage *glasnost* by offering in return disarmament

[1] *Stalinism and After*, Alec Nove, George Allen & Unwin, London 1975, p. 183.

> negotiations and technology. We are in a powerful position to preserve Mr Gorbachev. There are many hardliners in Moscow who realize that however detestable *glasnost* is, a return to the Cold War with its drying up of Western technology imports would consign the Soviet empire to economic oblivion by the next century.[2]

Of course the West in general wants to preserve Gorbachev if this means preserving and extending movement towards a free press and freer society. But what if the "hardliners" are right, and *glasnost* is merely a way of attracting the Western technology needed to preserve the Soviet empire? Even if this were the case, many leading intellectuals and some party officials appear nevertheless committed to "democratization" purely for its own sake. They are attempting to extend the limits of democratic debate, but in doing so clearly make the preservation of one-party rule more difficult.

Popular support for democratization has been manifested in a series of demonstrations. In Moscow 148 people from several cities attended the inaugural meeting of the Democratic Union from 7 to 9 May 1988. It declared itself an opposition party, and, in the months which followed, its members were repeatedly harassed and detained by police. In Leningrad on 28 May the Democratic Union organized a meeting at the Kazan Cathedral in support of a multiparty system; some 1500 people were dispersed by police and 33 were arrested. In Lvov on 7 July over 20,000 people were reported at a meeting of the Democratic Front to Further Perestroika, which declared itself ready to contest elections. A similar number attended a meeting of the Democratic Union in Riga on 16 July. A Democratic Union demonstration in Moscow on 21 August to commemorate the invasion of Czechoslovakia was brutally dispersed by new militia crowd-control units who made 96 arrests. Reports of arrests and the suppression of attempts to hold peaceful political meetings came from other cities also, and a Supreme Soviet decree banning unauthorized demonstrations was widely applied as an excuse for harassing Democratic Union members.[3] Their activities were repeatedly attacked in the official press.[4]

The decree setting up the paramilitary police force (*Spetsnaz*) was approved by the Supreme Soviet on 28 July, but was not published or discussed in the mass media until it appeared in the small circulation legislative digest at the end of August. Yet the issues involved were important enough for widespread discussion beforehand if *glasnost* were to earn the trust of the Soviet public. To maintain public order and repress unauthorized demonstrations, the special police were given permission to

---

[2] *The Spectator*, 27 August 1988.
[3] *The Times*, 29 August 1988.
[4] See, for example, *Moskovskaya Pravda*, 3 September 1988.

enter homes in pursuit of suspects, seize cars and use various weapons. Some debate appeared in the press later, but only after the units had already been seen in action.[5]

Without doubt there are many high-ranking officials who would happily support Ligachev or any other Politburo members who were prepared to take measures to stop the Gorbachev rot and restore discipline. By autumn 1988 the move towards openness in the media had gone much further than seemed possible even just one year before, and the process was accelerating. The backlash evident in the police suppression of demonstrations was not surprising, as progressives competed to break even more taboos. As the poet Andrei Voznesensky wrote in a poem about the architectural project to raise a monument to the victims of the Stalin repressions: "In one year the people's fear has lessened; what was forbidden then is almost reality now . . . ."[6]

Impact on East–West relations

GLASNOST MAY HAVE made Soviet society more open, but it has not made Soviet intentions any clearer. The 1987 British White Paper on defence was full of questions on the nature of the USSR under Gorbachev. Is it a country like our own, wishing "to live in freedom and prosperity and in harmony with its neighbours. . . . or is it an implacable opponent, bent only on increasing its influence at the expense of Western interests and values?"

In a monograph commissioned by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the author concluded his painstaking research on Soviet strategic intentions by underlining the changes he detected in Soviet military–political ideology, which, added to the economic weakness of the USSR, appeared to mean that the Soviet threat was receding: "Fears that we are heading for a Soviet-dominated world seem far-fetched." He continued:

> Paradoxically, the Western strategy most conducive to the expansion of Soviet power in the world might be that of ignoring or rejecting Soviet overtures for co-operation. The USSR would then become, by Western default, the main standard-bearer for "all-human values" and the salvation of humanity from the various catastrophes threatening it. Conditions would be optimal for building up a broad united front of "enlightened" world opinion looking to Moscow as its centre. Co-operation would expand anyway, but within the framework of institutions predominantly under Soviet influence.[7]

---

[5] See, for example, *Moskovskie novosti*, 4 September 1988.

[6] *Izvestia*, 2 September 1988.

[7] Stephen Shenfield, *The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology*, Chatham House Paper No. 37, 1987, p. 104.

Even observers more critical of the Soviet system than Shenfield would agree that the new image of the USSR has become a factor of considerable significance in East–West relations. If that image corresponds to genuine changes taking place in the USSR, well and good. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German foreign minister, seemed to have few doubts, as he backed a Soviet proposal for sharp reductions in conventional forces when speaking in Potsdam at a conference sponsored by the New York-based Institute for East–West Security Studies. Also acting under the benign influence of the Moscow summit, Nikolai Shishlin, deputy chief of the CPSU Information Department, wrote in the same issue of the *International Herald Tribune*,[8] which reported Genscher's speech, that it was time to say goodbye to the Cold War "with its bitterness, suspicion, accusations, and unpredictable extremes of temperature." Shishlin argued that the USSR was moving towards a "new model of genuinely democratic, socialist society."

Yet at the same time Nato experts insisted that Soviet military forces remained on an offensive, rather than defensive, footing, and that the era of *glasnost* had not fundamentally changed this posture. Perhaps it is unfair to expect immediate changes in the military confrontation which has developed over decades, but it is certainly a matter for concern that the remarkable turnaround in the Soviet media is not yet reflected to the same degree in other important elements of the system. Is the general trend towards greater democracy and improved relations with the rest of the world, or are there already indications of a slide back to Stalinist policies? The evidence is mixed.

The seven decades of Soviet power commemorated with widespread official celebrations in 1987 are relatively brief in comparison with the 1000 years of Russian Orthodoxy marked in 1988, or, indeed, in the general timescale of recorded Russian history. The Gorbachev phenomenon covers only a few of these Soviet years, yet it is already widely regarded as the beginning of a new era, both in the history of the USSR, and in East–West relations. Gorbachev has certainly made an impact, but when one attempts to assess the significance of the various twigs and leaves of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, one is in danger of losing sight of the forest.

In dealing with the Soviet Union, even "hard facts" tend to be subjective, while perceptions can materialize in the shape of nuclear missiles. Taxpayers aware of a Soviet threat will support a strong defence, but will object to a large budget when the rulers of the USSR seem benevolently disposed to the West. By fully recognizing the importance of perceptions at home and abroad, Gorbachev has proved adept at manipulating opinion to achieve his aims. In any system, he would gain recognition as a skilled politician, but it is far from clear who is to benefit from this undoubted

[8] 13 June 1988.

talent. Is he indeed "good for Russia, and for the rest of the world," as Schmidt-Hauer has argued?[9]

No doubt Mikhail Gorbachev himself believes his policies to be the surest path to peace and prosperity for all. Certainly he speaks with considerable conviction. Yet to succeed he must first persuade not only his compatriots, but also Western public opinion, to support his endeavours. However, the bitter experience of most of the seven decades of Soviet power—by his own admission—makes persuasion difficult. To be credible, he must separate himself in the public mind from the Soviet past, but the realities of power demand that he retain the support of many who have in fact risen to the top by successfully implementing the policies of his discredited predecessors.

Success depends on his ability to retain his position at the head of the ruling Communist Party, which is committed to certain aims that, to say the least, are not compatible with the survival of liberal democracy as we know it. To reach the top in the first place, Mikhail Gorbachev managed to convince the party hierarchy from Stalin to Chernenko that he shared their aims. Yet to stay at the top he must now avoid presenting potential rivals with any evidence that he is anything other than a loyal Marxist-Leninist.

And so the guessing continues. But let us for the moment assume that Mikhail Gorbachev wishes not only to remain head of the CPSU, but also to keep the Party in power, preserve the unity of the USSR, strengthen its economy and extend its influence in the rest of the world—none of these being a very controversial assumption. We could take it one step further, however; we could assume that what he actually believes is that the best way to end all war and ensure progress towards a prosperous future for all mankind is to work for a wholly Communist world under direction from Moscow.

To sustain the first set of assumptions from the available evidence would not be difficult, although many well informed students of the USSR would argue that it has become a country rather than a cause, and will in future pursue more traditional policies. The evidence in this respect is contradictory. We have been witnessing a learning process, on the part of both Western public opinion and Mikhail Gorbachev. What was true in 1985, though, is not necessarily the case now.

For example: in the course of an interview on French television on 30 September 1985 Gorbachev was asked about Sakharov, Shcharansky and Jewish emigration; the question of human rights was "damaging the reputation of the Soviet Union abroad." Gorbachev dismissed the suggestion that there was any violation of human rights in the USSR: "Shcharansky

[9] C. Schmidt-Hauer, *Gorbachev: the Path to Power*, London 1986, p. 169.

breached our laws and was sentenced by a court for that." But within months Sakharov was released from exile, Shcharansky was freed and allowed to leave for Israel, and the monthly rate of Jewish emigration increased substantially. In 1987 it was higher than at any time since 1979, although still well below that peak year. On 3 June 1988 Sakharov was actually permitted to give an official press conference in Moscow, and his views were published in the Soviet press. There is currently even a public debate on whether the works of Alexander Solzhenitsyn should be published in the USSR.

Gorbachev has learned how to pull the teeth of his critics in the West by making concessions in individual cases, while still holding fast to the principle of state control and still maintaining the ability to clamp down hard whenever he deems it necessary. The fair-minded public in Western countries may be told by experts that thousands of Soviet citizens remain in wretched conditions, subject to the arbitrary decisions of an authoritarian system, but they know from the facts reported in their newspapers that dozens of individuals regarded as test cases for Soviet behaviour on human rights are now free, reunited with their families, and, in the case of prominent refuseniks, allowed to emigrate to Israel. Under Brezhnev every week there seemed to be reports of arrests or harassment of dissidents; now, under Gorbachev, the reports have been about released human rights activists or demonstrations allowed to proceed rather than being immediately crushed. To Gorbachev's human face has been added the factor of Gorbachev's humane actions.

Limits

BUT GLASNOST HAS its limits. Before Gorbachev, dissidents were asking for more *glasnost*—by which they meant publicity for acts of repression that the régime did not want exposed. Now it is the servants of the régime who are also advocating more *glasnost*—by which *they* mean open discussion of issues that Gorbachev wants exposed. Some political prisoners released under Gorbachev have further confused matters by launching a journal called *Glasnost*, with the aim of debating questions of human rights. The editor, Sergei Grigoryants, however, has been subjected to police harassment, criticized in the press and attacked by Gorbachev himself in an interview with Western journalists.

So how genuine is *glasnost*? This question is not just for debate among academics: some Western politicians have argued that because of *glasnost* Gorbachev should be granted concessions on arms, trade, or cultural and scientific exchanges, which his predecessors have been denied for invading Afghanistan and exiling Sakharov to Gorky—though since Gorbachev was already in the leadership which took those decisions, this argument must

be treated with caution. Of course the West should respond positively to the release of prisoners of conscience, proposals for balanced missile reductions, or troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. And certainly greater openness is good for the USSR, and good for the West. But to ensure that the improvement we now see in relations continues, we need first to recognize that this is a process, not an irreversible achievement. While hoping for restrictions on free speech to loosen further, we should ask what Gorbachev himself wants from *glasnost*, and just how large the chinks in the iron curtain can grow before the system developed over seventy years breaks down.

The Soviet leader's probable priorities are first, to consolidate his own position, and second, to move the USSR from the economic stagnation of the later Brezhnev years, so that it is better able to compete with the West. Public criticism of those responsible for administrative shortcomings has helped Gorbachev to oust from the leadership men too set in their ways or too hostile to his methods to work with him. Their replacements are generally younger men with proven records as effective managers, likely to be loyal to the General Secretary who promoted them over more senior colleagues.

The exposure of corruption and incompetence in the Moscow administration facilitated the removal from the Politburo of Viktor Grishin, the old guard's favourite to succeed Chernenko. He was replaced by Boris Yeltsin, a Gorbachev protégé who won support and popularity among Muscovites by attempting to improve shopping and transport facilities, and by reversing decisions to destroy the capital's few surviving historic monuments to make room for ugly modern buildings or grandiose memorials. The manner in which Yeltsin was ousted from the Politburo and subjected to concerted attacks in *Pravda* (13 November 1987) made many supporters of Gorbachev reform see the need to proceed more cautiously. However, Yeltsin did not disappear completely from the political scene, being permitted to defend himself at the Party Conference in June 1988; some of his sharp comments were covered on Soviet television, and he also gained a limited forum for his views in progressive, small circulation Soviet publications. (See, for example, the Latvian youth newspaper, *Sovetskaya Molodezh*, 4 August 1988, in which he criticized Egor Ligachev for distorting his views in the conference debate).

Postponing the scheme to transfer water from the northern rivers south to irrigate the Central Asian republics was hailed as a victory for public opinion, but in fact not only saved resources from a project of doubtful economic value, it also won support from Russian nationalists, and, further, helped Gorbachev replace Dinmukhamed Kunaev, the Kazakh member of the Politburo, who had been a close friend of Brezhnev, and an ardent proponent of the water diversion plan.

When he was replaced by the Russian, Gennady Kolbin, in December 1986, there were riots in the streets of Alma Ata, which, unusually for nationalist demonstrations, received considerable coverage in the official press. However, the television news did not show film of street violence as it does when reporting similar events in South Africa or Brixton, for example, and no Western journalists were allowed to fly in to conduct independent investigations; clandestine samizdat accounts suggest that the casualties were probably higher than officially reported. Moreover, Gorbachev used the riots to justify extensive purges of the local leadership, with many warnings to the other non-Russian republics about the dangers of "national narrowmindedness" and "separatism."

The media coverage of the Azeri–Armenian clashes over the Nagorny Karabakh issue again demonstrated the limits of *glasnost*. Moreover, the Armenian nationalist, Paruir Airikyan, who spent most of his adult life in prison for promoting his nation's right to self-determination, was stripped of his citizenship and expelled from the USSR in July 1988. According to Airikyan, official Soviet claims that he had requested permission to leave for the United States were false, and he intends to return to his homeland at the first opportunity.

Apart from its value in helping consolidate his position, however, openness has won Gorbachev support from the intelligentsia, largely alienated from Marxist–Leninist ideology and the party's repressive methods of enforcing political and economic discipline; it is hoped to stimulate the individual initiative and enthusiasm which has been sadly lacking in Soviet society. The gap between what people were told, and what they knew from their own experience, had grown too wide for them to have any trust in the government. And how can a centrally planned economy function successfully when statistics are falsified at every level of administration? Without rapid and trustworthy information, the USSR simply cannot compete with other advanced economies.

Most of the worst cases of economic incompetence and corruption revealed in the Soviet press have occurred in the areas associated with the Brezhnev leadership, such as the Kazakh, Ukrainian, or Moldavian republics, rather than in the Siberian provinces or Stavropol territory associated with Gorbachev supporters. But apart from Gorbachev and his policies, few aspects of Soviet life are still immune from criticism. The franker discussion of social problems, from alcoholism to venereal diseases, may help to stimulate a much-needed moral and spiritual regeneration; unsatisfactory aspects of the welfare state, like housing and the health service, may also benefit from exposure.

Yet although the benefits of *glasnost* are clear, some scepticism is warranted in almost every example. In the case of Chernobyl, information came too late and was not independently corroborated. What was the real extent of

the damage, and how many actually died as a direct result of the disaster? Jamming of the BBC Russian service and of the Voice of America has stopped—but the jamming stations are now concentrated on Radio Liberty, which is regarded as the greatest threat to Party control of information, since it broadcasts in the main languages of the USSR, including 24 hours a day of Russian language programmes.

Nonetheless, although the media remain firmly under Party control, the Party is no longer monolithic. The régime is allowing a political debate which ranges more widely and deeply than at any time since the 1920s. The official media contain much material admitting what Communist Party rule has meant apart from the much-vaunted political, economic and military expansion of recent decades: the mass murders of the Stalin period; the disastrous agricultural policy, from forced collectivization to the need for American grain imports; the shocking waste of rich natural resources and terrible ecological damage; a privileged leadership and underprivileged population; a welfare state which failed individual citizens when they were most in need of care.

Pressure for pluralism

ONE EXAMPLE of this was the conference of unofficial socialist groups held from 20–23 August 1987 in premises provided by the Moscow city Party committee (headed by the candidate Politburo member mentioned above, Boris Yeltsin). Little was known of this meeting (which apparently had some 600 participants and was officially entitled "Public Initiatives for Restructuring") until the illustrated weekly *Ogonek* (No. 36, September 1987) published an account—without, however, giving full details of what was decided, or summarizing the manifesto agreed after so much heated discussion. An English translation of this "Declaration of the Federation of Socialist Clubs" appeared in *The Guardian* (12 September 1987).

According to the *Guardian* correspondent, Jonathan Steele, the manifesto was not acceptable to many participants, but was signed by representatives of 16 socialist groups including the Club of Social Initiatives (KSI), Perestroika (Restructuring), and Obshchina (Commune). The Club was formed in 1986 with the aim of turning Gorbachev's reforms from "theory from above into practice from below." Its moving lights include Gleb Pavlovsky, a journalist arrested under Brezhnev for editing the socialist samizdat journal *Poiski* (Searches); Boris Kagarlitsky, a young sociologist arrested with five others for propounding "Eurocommunist" views, but released under Andropov; Mikhail Malyutin, a philosophy teacher and Party member; and Grigory Pelman, a sociologist.

The manifesto advocated a socialist model of development, defined as

the "withering away of the state" through the growing influence of independent social groups and the elimination of administrative and bureaucratic structures.

> The success of the current reform movement depends on the level of mass support and participation which it encourages. The life and death of socialism in the USSR depend on whether the policy of restructuring succeeds.

The manifesto voiced determination to counter opposition to the reforms from privileged bureaucrats and to expose extremist movements with reactionary views, whether racist, fascist or Stalinist. Those who drafted it were clearly concerned at the wide support evident for groups like Pamyat. (See Julia Wishnevsky in this issue.) The founders of the Federation of Socialist Clubs declared that they were acting in full compliance with the Soviet Constitution which proclaims the freedom of association (Article 51), and that they intended to support *perestroika* by pursuing the following aims:

> *Ideological:* to define the nature of democracy in the USSR, solving the contradiction between administrative power and self-management by society.
>
> *Political:* to gain legal status for independent organizations, allowing them to make legislative proposals to reform the electoral system, giving non-party public organizations the right to propose candidates who should have free access to the mass media; to emphasize the distinction in law between criticizing shortcomings and anti-state activity.
>
> *Economic:* to redirect state planning organizations from administrative methods to economic ones; to extend commodity-money relations as the basic mechanism for regulating economic activity while protecting workers' benefit—full employment, minimum wage and guaranteed pension; to reduce the state bureaucracy, thereby releasing factories to be managed by the collective; to make the planning system more democratic.
>
> *Cultural:* to allow free creative associations on a self-financing basis; to provide a climate of artistic tolerance; to give open access to archives, libraries and museum collections, abolishing the *spetskhrany* (closed archives); to end pre-censorship; to ensure that independent organizations enjoy their constitutional rights such as freedom of speech, press, assembly and demonstration.
>
> *Ecological:* to improve conservation of the environment as well as of historical and cultural monuments.
>
> *International:* to support revolutionary, liberation and democratic movements in the capitalist world and in developing countries.

The manifesto acknowledged the constitutional role of the CPSU as the "leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system" (Article 6) but pointed out that "the party is not united":

> Its ranks include those who bear responsibility for the abuses and miscalculations of the past, and who formed the rows of bureaucrats and that mass of officials who cut themselves off from the hopes and needs of their people. We aim to support the healthy and progressive forces among the Party's leaders and members.

However, even left-wing socialist supporters of *perestroika* found progress much too slow.[10]

This theme of a divided CPSU is now heard from various sources. The émigré Russian language newspaper *Russkaya Mysl* published (issue of 7 August 1987) the transcript of a talk given on 15 May by Anatoly Ivanovich Strelyany, the journalist and writer who, as a member of the *Novy Mir* editorial board, helped influence the decision to publish in that literary monthly several controversial articles proposing radical solutions for the USSR's economic difficulties. Speaking to the Komsomol (Young Communist) activists among the students of Moscow University, Strelyany emphasized his support for reform:

> It is impossible to continue living like this. We need democracy. A well-known economist sent us a letter. He writes that history will not forgive us if we do not overcome the present situation in a single leap. You cannot cross an abyss in two hops. . . . Lenin made such a leap after Kronstadt, when he introduced the New Economic Policy. A revolutionary coup has to be made without looking about; it has to be done the way the Bolsheviks did it then. Gradualness is the greatest danger to *perestroika*. If we do not overcome it, it will bring down both Gorbachev and *perestroika*.

Asked in the course of discussing freedom of the press if the Party needed confrontation, Strelyany answered: "There are already two parties under the label of CPSU." Some Party members wanted to limit the reforms, while others, like Strelyany, wanted freedom—not as a means, but as the very goal of *perestroika*. Viktor Afanasev, for instance, chief editor of *Pravda*, a Central Committee member and chairman of the Union of Journalists, argued that "to give the full constructive truth in our newspapers, on our screens, and in our radio broadcasts, is the sacred task of Soviet journalism" (*Pravda*, 15 March 1987).

But, Strelyany argued, the truth was vital for reform, even when not regarded by the authorities as "constructive." He mentioned his part in

[10] See Boris Kagarlitsky in *The New York Times*, 8 September 1988.

publishing a controversial article ("Devious Numbers," *Novy Mir*, No. 2, 1987) in which two economists attacked the Central Statistical Administration, pointing out the damage caused to the economy by false statistics, and said:

> We don't write for the bosses. Seventy years of monstrous eye-wash, and it still hasn't been put right. Gorbachev criticized me for this article at a meeting. My friends got worried after this criticism and offered to help find me another job. But I'm still working and will publish what I consider to be necessary and important. This is our Russian misfortune—to look up to the bosses, to try and see whether they like it or not, how they'll react to this or that.

Those who opposed Gorbachev criticized him indirectly by attacking the press and *glasnost*. Strelyany argued: "We need a press that is independent of the party bureaucracy and the state apparatus." A free press would report honestly on the casualties in Afghanistan, on radioactivity at Chernobyl, on who says what at Politburo meetings. With an independent press to monitor events, the catastrophe at Chernobyl would never have happened. Agriculture would not have deteriorated to such an extent that the USSR had to import grain from America. But censorship still existed:

> Every publishing house has a political editor. They are nice people and they sympathize with us; they complain about how hard it is for them. But every single one of them has an enormous book of what is not allowed (*chego nelzya*), provided by the Council of Ministers and compiled on the basis of recommendations from ministries and departments, which use the pretext of "security" to cover up their slackness.

Strelyany insisted that Gorbachev was organizing a revolution from above. He hoped *Novy Mir* would publish a discussion of "revolutions from above, from Peter the Great to Stolypin"—the ruthless but efficient reforming minister under Nicholas II. He also hoped the journal would again publish Solzhenitsyn, and he himself was working on an account, based on first-hand recollections, of collectivization and the 1933 famine as they hit his own village.

He stressed the need to retain the momentum of change: "If we do nothing, if we don't make a great leap forward, then by the end of the 1990s we will have the same kind of devastation that we had after the Civil War." He said that Gorbachev was not expanding support for his reforms quickly enough:

> Gorbachev is being slow about expanding the social base for *perestroika*, and this will lead to the defeat of our cause and of Gorbachev himself. You have to show where you stand, wherever you come on the social ladder.

According to Strelyany, support for the reforms has come mainly from highly skilled workers, scientists and technologists, and other professionals and artistic workers, together with some lower-level Party officials and economic managers. There are certainly many journalists among them. Shortly after this statement appeared, however, Strelyany's name was dropped from the editorial board of *Novy Mir*.

There are in fact large numbers of groups already in existence which could well expand to offer wider political expression. In *Ogonek* (No. 36, September 1987) a report on the conference of socialist groups stated that there were "about a thousand different public associations in Moscow alone, and in Leningrad, more than two hundred." But when the leader of one group, *Spasenie* (Salvation), had attempted to stand for election to the city soviet, he had not been allowed to register for "purely formal reasons." And other would-be candidates who were considered unsuitable were called up for military service.

The *Ogonek* correspondent therefore concluded that it was easier to talk about democracy than to practise it:

> We have already understood, sensed, that democracy gives the opportunity to speak out. It is necessary also to learn how to listen, to learn how not to interrupt. Through arguments truth is born—one can only marvel at the degree to which this widespread phrase has lost its real meaning in past years. For the truth to emerge into broad daylight, arguments are necessary, as is divergence of opinion.

Economic reform needs political freedom

IN 1983 THE IDEAS of one of the foremost advocates of economic reform and improved labour practices in the USSR, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, were too sensitive to be openly published in the USSR; they circulated in samizdat and, as the "Novosibirsk Document," aroused considerable debate in the West.[11] Now her reformist ideas are widely covered by the Soviet media, and made freely available to those abroad fascinated by the Gorbachev changes. In a talk published in full in the May 1987 issue of *Nauka v SSSR*, Zaslavskaya discussed the danger that increasing incentives for the labour force might result in a return of "a petty-bourgeois stratum, NEPmen with a bent for the high life"—a reference to the period of Lenin's New Economic Policy, now much discussed in the Soviet press. She thought workers in the new "individual enterprise sector" could be allowed to earn up to four times the income attained in the public sector, but that if it were exceeded by, say, ten times, that would be too much, and would be "unjustified."

Among those who "clutched at the old and resisted the progressive

[11] See *Survey*, Vol. 28 No. 1, Spring 1984.

transformations" were the bureaucrats who enjoyed "socially unjustified privileges" and had a vested interest in preserving the former order. There was often a connection between corrupt managers and the world of the "black market operators, profiteers, bribe-takers and embezzlers of state property."

Academician Zaslavskaya, who is President of the Soviet Sociological Association, proposed a reform programme which included replacing taxation on wages, as now practised, with a system of taxes on the per capita incomes of families, taking account of all sources of income and exempting poorer families. She would like greater wage differentials, radical changes in the pricing system and new principles for state expenditure to guarantee minimum standards of such things as education, housing and medical services, while leaving everything else to the individual's budget. Zaslavskaya appeared to advocate moving towards a system more akin to the British welfare state.

> At present in the USSR the free distribution of scarce creature comforts leads to an artificial increase in their scarcity, to wasteful use of them and also to shady dealings, because the role of the human factor is of the greatest importance in the free distribution of creature comforts, and man often proves not to be sufficiently fair in this case.[12]

Academician Zaslavskaya pointed out that by spending thousands of millions of rubles subsidizing food prices, the Soviet government has encouraged consumption of scarce products by those in better supplied regions, thus depriving the rural population and inhabitants of small towns, where meat and milk supplies are worse. She criticized the "closed forms of distribution" of quality goods to privileged officials. She went even further in her later works, such as her contribution to that textbook of *perestroika*, *Inogo ne dano*. (Edited by the historian Yury Afanasev, and including Andrei Sakharov among its distinguished authors, it was published by Progress, Moscow in 1988, in a relatively tiny print run of 50,000 and was immediately unavailable in Soviet shops and libraries.)

A test for *glasnost*

"OPENNESS (GLASNOST) is the open portrayal for readers, viewers and radio listeners of what is happening in our country and abroad. It is the fairness and accuracy of what they are told. The aim of openness is to make Soviet people better informed, more erudite, more convinced and more confident of the rightness of our cause." This definition was provided by Viktor Afanasev, editor of *Pravda* and chairman of the USSR Union of

[12] *Moscow News*, No. 9, March 1987.

Journalists, in a speech to a Press Day meeting on 5 May 1987, attended by Gorbachev, Ligachev, Yeltsin, Yakovlev and Razumovsky.

Afanasev stressed that the role of the press was to assist in Gorbachev's "restructuring" policy: "It is the duty of *Pravda* journalists as well as all Soviet journalists to translate this policy successfully into reality." He concluded:

> This year the Party, the Soviet people, and the world's progressive public will mark the 70th anniversary of Great October. *Pravda* is seeking to show fully and comprehensively the heroic and complex path that our country has travelled in the past seven decades, its magnificent successes in all spheres, and its bright prospects. For us journalists there is no nobler mission, nothing we treasure more, than to convey Leninist ideas and Leninist principles to the masses and to be in the front ranks of the fighters for communism.[13]

This expresses very much the traditional view of the Soviet media as tool of the party leadership, and not the interpretation which some put on *glasnost* when they describe it as compensating for the absence of any opposition party and serving as a loyal critic of the government. In this respect one of the most striking items to have appeared in the Soviet press was an open letter from ten leading émigré dissidents in which they voiced great scepticism about the extent of the changes in the USSR, and challenged Gorbachev to print their letter in the Soviet press as "the most convincing proof of the sincerity of pronouncements about *glasnost*." Versions of the letter appeared in several major Western newspapers.[14] Someone in Moscow must have decided that such a widespread challenge could not be ignored; the version published in the French *Le Figaro* was reprinted in *Moscow News* (No. 13, 29 March 1987). The letter was published also in some local newspapers and was widely discussed.

Rather than the present talk of change, the dissidents called for concrete actions:

- A pardon for all prisoners of conscience;
- Renunciation of the abuse of psychiatry for political repression;
- Freer emigration policies;
- Immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan, with free elections under international supervision, as in Zimbabwe and El Salvador;
- Right to receive and impart information without reprisals;
- Free access to copying equipment;
- Independent publishing houses, not subject to party control;

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[13] *Pravda*, 6 May 1987.

[14] See, for example, *Le Figaro*, 8 March; *The Times*, 16 March; *New York Times*, 22 March, and *Daily Telegraph*, 25 March 1987.

- Reassessment of ideology, abandoning the "historic struggle between two worlds" with its warfare mentality, which means that emigration is regarded as high treason;
- Admission of crimes committed by the Soviet regime, including collectivization, crushing the Prague Spring;
- Ending of militarization of Soviet society, stopping military training in schools.

The *Moscow News* editor, Egor Yakovlev, took up rather more space when he responded with his attack on the letter. He accused the authors of "trying to reduce the changes to absurdity" and regretted that the writer Vasily Aksenov, together with the creator of the Taganka theatre Yury Lyubimov, and the sculptor Ernst Neizvestny, had now made it impossible for themselves to return. (Lyubimov, however, was asked to return to the USSR, and did so in summer 1988.) Yakovlev failed to answer the dissidents' points, and contradicted himself repeatedly. For instance, he mocked their demand for public discussion without reprisals, claiming that this was now possible in the USSR; yet he assumed that merely by having expressed their views they would forever be banned from returning to their homeland—wrongly, as it transpired in Lyubimov's case.

Not content with this, two weeks later *Moscow News* (no. 15, 12 April 1987) returned to the attack, publishing two pages of interviews and readers' letters denouncing the émigrés, under headings of "The Crisis of Conscience: They Chose to Leave Their Homes" and "A Return Ticket that has Expired Forever." Misleading and libellous potted biographies were provided for the ten (in addition to the three mentioned above, they were: Vladimir Bukovsky, Eduard Kuznetsov, Yury Orlov and Leonid Plyushch—former prisoners of conscience; Vladimir Maksimov, author and editor of *Kontinent*; and the philosopher and writer Alexander Zinoviev, with his wife Olga, formerly of the Moscow Institute of Philosophy). The newspaper's logic was primitive. Since restructuring (*perestroika*) was "essentially a revolutionary process" and the dissidents were criticizing it, they were clearly "siding with counter-revolution."

The playwright Mikhail Shatrov sensibly welcomed the publication of the letter, because to keep silent was "destructive," while publishing the letter "was an expression of confidence in our own people." But this was only true if the dissidents were given the right to reply to their critics, pointing out the fallacies in their arguments. Lyubimov had left the USSR with a return ticket, said *Moscow News*:

> But now the ticket has expired and forever so. Not only because its temporal term has expired, but because its owner has exhausted all the spiritual opportunities for returning.

One woman wrote in from Moscow, having taken the letter as a "personal

insult" and finding it difficult to control her emotions. The ten had "deliberately betrayed their Motherland. . . . they spit on our history. . . ." And according to *Moscow News*, the dissidents' letter "had come as convincing and irrefutable evidence of their moral degeneration." Yet for all the abuse and indignation, there was no attempt to answer the points raised by the dissidents. Sadly, it seemed that the letter of the ten was published in *Moscow News* in order to inoculate the Soviet public against critical ideas, not to stimulate genuine debate on the future development of Soviet society. The authors of the letter could reply to their critics only in Western publications, which included a short book on the affair published in Russian.[15]

The role of de-Stalinization

GORBACHEV QUICKLY made de-Stalinization the main feature in fulfilling his promise to leave "no blank pages" in the Soviet history books. But this policy too aroused much opposition. The hard-line ideologist Egor Ligachev argued that Khrushchev did more than enough to condemn the personality cult and the "tragic mistakes" of the 1930s; it was then, said Ligachev, that the USSR "reached second place in the world in industrial output, carried out the collectivization of agriculture, and scaled unprecedented heights in culture, education, literature and art."[16] He was reportedly behind the infamous Andreeva letter published in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (13 March 1988) demanding tighter limits on *glasnost*.

The KGB chief, Viktor Chebrikov, acknowledged that in fact under Stalin many of the security police themselves "shared the fate of Soviet people who suffered in innocence." But now, he went on, it was time to concentrate on *perestroika*, and Chebrikov warned citizens against co-operating with "imperialist subversive centres" by seeking "to discredit the Soviet state's historical path, drawing arguments for their insinuations from the arsenal of Trotskyism."[17]

The heated debate in the media ranged from the war veteran who wrote to *Pravda* (14 September 1987) condemning anti-Stalin revelations for spreading disillusionment and loss of faith in the Party, to articles in *Ogonek*, describing how famous figures of the 1930s fell from favour and disappeared. One article (*Ogonek*, No. 34, August 1987) was devoted to Mikhail Koltsov, the *Pravda* correspondent whose role in the Spanish civil war inspired the Hemingway character Karkov in *For Whom the Bell Tolls*; his brother described in harrowing detail how he had tried in vain to discover the

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[15] *Sprashivaete? Otvechaem!*, IS, 1987.
[16] *Uchitelskaya Gazeta*, 27 August 1987.
[17] *Pravda*, 11 September 1987; see too his interview in *Pravda*, 2 September 1988.

manner of his death, and had even been permitted a glimpse of the interrogation documents in the police archives.

By November de-Stalinization had progressed to such an extent that a special Politburo commission was established under Mikhail Solomentsev to investigate the repressions and to rehabilitate further victims. Solomentsev later reported that 639 people had been rehabilitated and 68 reinstated to Party membership.[18] But this was a mere drop in the ocean of the millions of victims of Stalinism by then being acknowledged in the Soviet press. Among the graphic horrors revealed were the mass executions at Kuropaty near Minsk.[19]

What does Gorbachev expect to gain from further revelations about the mass murderer who ruled the USSR for a quarter century, longer than any other leader? De-Stalinization, although unpopular with the more orthodox Party officials—and actively opposed by a great many who long for the clear-cut discipline of the Stalin years, or remember his crimes with the guilt of association—is strongly supported by the liberal intelligentsia, by the scientists, technologists, and other professionals whose enthusiastic participation is vital if the Gorbachev reforms are to have any chance of success.

Openly telling the truth about the past brings a warm response from the millions who remember the knock on the door in the middle of the night, the despairing search for a scrap of hope that a loved one was still alive in the wastes of the Gulag. There is a deep psychological need finally to see justice done to the memory of Stalin's countless victims; many prominent figures in cultural and political circles now talk openly of how their own father was "illegally repressed" and what it meant to be the child of an "enemy of the people". The much-discussed film *Repentance*, actually made several years ago in Stalin's native Georgia with the support of the present Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, has only rippled the surface of a deep pool of silence.

The widely respected Academician Dmitry Likhachev, himself a victim of the tyrant's whims, wrote in the intellectuals' weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (9 September 1987) that it is not enough to condemn the consequences of the cult: "The fear which it instilled in our minds and souls still puts people's consciousness in chains and paralyses it." Party historians who have made a comfortable career rewriting the past as instructed by each new régime, are now being publicly ridiculed, and are responding heatedly in print with Stalinist denunciations of the revisionists. But it is not just an academic debate. Unless the Russian soul can be shocked out of its paralysis, the economy will continue to stagnate, threatening the superpower status of the USSR.

[18] *Pravda*, 19 August 1988.
[19] See *Literatura i Mastatstva*, No. 23, June 1988; *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, 9 August 1988.

Among those rehabilitated in Gorbachev's *glasnost* campaign were fifteen agrarian economists who were purged in the 1930s for opposing collectivization; they were accused of belonging to the "Right Opposition" headed by Nikolai Bukharin, and arrested in 1931 as members of a non-existent "Working Peasants' Party." Now the writings of Alexander Chayanov are to be republished, since his advocacy of independent rural co-operatives is in line with Gorbachev's agricultural reforms. Similarly, Valery Mezhlauk, head of the state planning committee, commissar for heavy industry, and a deputy premier, who perished in 1938, is now praised in the Soviet press because his criticisms of superfluous centralism and bureaucracy "are relevant in the highest degree today."[20]

Nikolai Bukharin, the gifted theoretician described by Lenin as the "rightful favourite of the Party" but shot by Stalin in 1938, was at last politically rehabilitated for the same reason. His support for a mixed market economy and industrialization based on a prosperous peasantry was first interpreted more kindly in two stage plays,[21] and within a year it was possible to praise his ideas openly.

Stalin is still honoured as a war leader by many in the military leadership. But Gorbachev now wants them to surrender their priority in making claims on scarce economic resources, and in order to stop them becoming nostalgic about their days of glory under the Generalissimo, has finally allowed the figures for the prewar purge of the high command to be published: three of the five marshals, 13 of 15 army commanders, 50 of 57 corps commanders, 154 of 186 division commanders, and most of the top commissars.[22]

The risks for Gorbachev are great. Already Crimean Tatars and nationalists in the Baltic states are staging demonstrations to have Stalin's actions reversed. Poles are demanding public admission of Soviet guilt in the wartime Katyn massacre. Moreover, as Academician Likhachev pointed out,[23] people also want to know the truth about more contemporary removals, such as the arrest and suicide of MVD chief Shchelokov and the ousting of Gorbachev's Politburo rival, Romanov.

Yet apart from the clear domestic advantages, de-Stalinization again wins support for Gorbachev in the West, not only from sympathetic Sovietologists, but also from Western politicians who interpret this rejection of past crimes as a guarantee that under the more liberal Gorbachev, the Soviet system has totally rejected totalitarian methods.

When Mikhail Gorbachev returned from his six-week absence from the public eye in mid-September 1988, his tour of Siberia was guaranteed

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[20] *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 28, July 1987.
[21] See *Novy Mir*, No. 4, 1987; *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 22 July 1987.
[22] See *Ogonek*, No. 26, June 1987.
[23] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 9 September 1987.

maximum publicity in the Soviet and Western media. But it was far from the triumphant celebration of his *perestroika* policies that he might have wished for, as the fourth year of his rule drew to a close. Certainly *glasnost* now meant far fewer limits on the freedom of the press than anyone could have believed possible just four years before: writers, journalists, historians and social scientists, who for decades had suppressed their frustrations and kept rigidly to the Party line, now competed with each other in daring to loosen further the bonds of censorship. Yet while clearly promoting the cause of democracy, and making economic innovations easier to apply, this sudden frankness shocked the more orthodox among the Party bureaucracy, and was strongly opposed by many in the Communist establishment, who rightly saw the signs of disintegration in the Soviet empire as directly linked with the growing freedom in expressing deeply rooted discontents.

In Poland the opposition stepped up its struggle for pluralism, forcing the regime, through widespread strikes, to discuss popular participation in government. (For a discussion of the impact of the Solidarity movement on *perestroika* see Elizabeth Teague's article in this issue.) In Czechoslovakia the demonstrations marking the anniversary of the August 1968 invasion by Warsaw Pact forces showed that the memory of the Prague Spring was still a powerful force for democratic change. The Hungarian leadership too had to respond to growing popular pressure for greater pluralism, and, by establishing relations with South Korea and receiving the Israeli premier Yitzhak Shamir, showed increased initiative in foreign policy.

Nowhere, however, did the concept of a monolithic Soviet bloc take a greater hammering than in the Baltic States. Never reconciled to their loss of independence in 1940, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians demonstrated repeatedly for an official recognition of the crimes committed against their countries by Stalin and his heirs. They called for a reversal of the Russification and ecological damage which were direct consequences of dogmatic over-centralization under Moscow rule. The programmes launched by popular fronts in Estonia and Latvia received mass support and were published in official newspapers, although much of their content reads as an alternative to the Communist monopoly of political power. In Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh, strikes and mass demonstrations continued to challenge the party leadership's appeals for calm and maintenance of the status quo.

It was against this unfavourable background that Mikhail Gorbachev spoke to Soviet citizens in Krasnoyarsk and Norilsk about the progress of *perestroika*, and listened to their complaints about food shortages, empty shops, poor living and working conditions, and the general lack of improvement, despite all his talk of change.

Yet his lack of success in improving conditions for the Soviet population was not reflected in relations with the West, where in fact many politicians

and commentators were won over by his declared intentions. An argument which has been current since Stalin's days periodically reappears: the West must help the incumbent Soviet leader, because if he fails, the hard men will take over. Professor Stephen Cohen, for example, wrote in *The New York Times* (19 September 1988):

> Theological Cold Warriors see in Mr Gorbachev's concessions only Soviet weakness, to be exploited by an unrelenting military build-up and political ultimatums. Their course would create an even more perilous Cold War, gravely wound Mr Gorbachev's reform leadership, and perhaps bring to power his reactionary neo-Stalinist opponents.

This line overlooks the evidence that the "concessions" were either insubstantial, as with the Krasnoyarsk speech, or the direct result of a firm stand by Nato, as with the agreement on intermediate nuclear missiles.

It is certainly in the interests of the West to encourage the move to greater openness and individual liberty. However, it is in the best interests of neither the peoples of the USSR nor of the West to help preserve the Soviet empire with its authoritarian structure intact. Moreover, there is a clear economic imperative for reforms in the USSR, even without concessions from the United States or its allies. Gorbachev has become identified with the positive change now taking place in the USSR, and his role as an initiator of reform is indeed considerable. But the most desirable objective is the growth of democracy and self-determination in what is now the USSR, and not necessarily the preservation of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary, or the maintenance of the CPSU's monopoly of power. This is the promise that *glasnost* has held out, but it is a promise that is still far from fulfilment.

On 30 September, at a sudden plenum of the CPSU Central Committee lasting just one hour, Gorbachev pushed through a dramatic re-organization of the leadership, which was confirmed at a 40-minute session of the Supreme Soviet on 1 October 1988. He himself replaced Gromyko as President, while Ligachev's stock plunged with his transfer of responsibility from ideology to agriculture. So much for Gorbachev's "reactionary neo-Stalinist opponents." Perhaps in the future, Gorbachev might feel able to consult the people.

Glimpses of Glasnost

The dramatist Mikhail Shatrov and the historian Vladlen Loginov pointed out in *Sovetskaya Kultura* (10 September 1988) that:

The possibility for self-renewal of Party committees "from below" was lost when the new instructions for Party elections were published in Partiinaya zhizn*: the main parts merely repeated, word for word, the 1962 instructions again, but now they have just added on a few new, contemporary words.*

Glimpses of Glasnost

Among the statistics no longer banned are those concerning children born to unmarried mothers (see Semya, *No. 34, 24 August 1988). For the USSR as a whole the percentage rose from 8·8 in 1980 to 9·1 in 1985, and 9·8 in 1987. Highest were Estonia (22·1 in 1987), Latvia (15·5) and the RSFSR (12·7).*

The writer Vladimir Sangi wrote in Sovetskaya Rossiya *(11 September 1988) that the careless, inefficient exploitation of their natural resources by the Soviet government was destroying the small nations of Siberia, the Far North and Far East, of which there are some 26. For example, at the beginning of the 1960s, before they started exploiting the oil and gas resources of the Khanty-Mansiisk district, there were some 100,000 people living there, a fifth of whom were natives. By January 1988 the population had risen to 1,200,000 while the number of natives had dropped to 18,000—about one per cent. "In recent years in the Far North and Far East it has become fashionable to build amalgamated settlements. Beginning in the 1960s, in these areas and in district centres and ports, the Eskimo, Nivkhy, Selkupy, and Saamy peoples have been brought to settle sometimes by deception, sometimes by force." In virtually every province, territory and autonomous republic of the North, however, sham "Potemkin villages" have been erected so that foreign guests can be shown how well the native peoples are treated in the USSR.*

Where is Dinmukhamed Kunaev now? The 76-year-old pensioner lives at home, across from the park in which a bronze bust was erected in his honour.

Argumenty i fakty, No. 36, 1988

A pensioner writes in *Trud*, 20 August 1988:

I'm not the only one living on a pension of 50 rubles a month. Others get even less. Pensions barely cover the basic necessities. In general there's no meat in the shops, we eat it only on high days and holidays. After all, it costs 4–5 rubles a kilo in the markets [selling produce from personal plots]; butter costs 9 rubles, sour cream 2 rubles 60 kopecks, salami 7 rubles 70 kopecks. And fuel for my stove costs up to 100 rubles a year. Add to that payment for water, gas and electricity—87 rubles a year. And what remains for food—mere kopecks . . .

Glimpses of Glasnost

Smena (No. 15, 1988) carried a letter signed by V. Skvortsov of Kineshma, which gave explicit details on a formerly taboo subject:

Fate decreed that I should "tour" the Soviet Union in prisoner's garb. Thus I came to realize how widespread that shameful phenomenon is, homosexuality.

In the prison environment this sort of "payment in kind" flourishes as a means of punishment (for losing at cards and not paying up, or for insulting someone, or suchlike). In the prison camps there are whole barracks of pederasts (100–150 men in each). It is horrifying to think how many men through brute force have had to submit to becoming "women".

Does the administration know about this? Without a doubt it does. Moreover, for "educational" purposes the following threat is made: "If you don't do so-and-so, I'll move you in with the 'little girls.'"

I myself have seen it happen more than once . . .

Recently in Irkutsk an issue of Sovetskaya Molodezh *failed to appear. The reason was a ban imposed by the province committees of the CPSU and Komsomol on the reprinting from the Latvian youth newspaper of an interview with the delegate of the 19th Party Conference, Boris Yeltsin.*

Moskovskie novosti, No. 38, 18 September 1988

Readers have written to one of the most progressive of the glasnost era newspapers, *Argumenty i fakty* (No. 36, 1988), complaining of difficulty in obtaining it.

At the Soyuzpechat [subscription office] of our town they refused to take out a subscription to AiF for me, saying that the newspaper was forbidden . . .

A. Svizhsky, Krasnodar Territory

At the Soyuzpechat office I was informed that subscriptions to AiF could only be taken out at the district council executive committee and the local KGB headquarters . . .

I. Myuke, Stebnik, Lvov Province

Soviet Psychiatry: An End to Political Abuse?

Peter Reddaway

IT WAS NOT UNTIL early 1987 that the first tremors of *glasnost* began to disturb the complacent, deeply entrenched establishment of Soviet psychiatry. By the late summer, the media had revealed that profession and the branch of medicine it runs—which between them are responsible for the psychiatric care of more than five million citizens—to be in a profound material and, above all, moral crisis. The groundwork was apparently being laid for a badly needed programme of radical *perestroika*. In the autumn, with conservative winds blowing harder and producing the Yeltsin debacle for Gorbachev, the forces of the status quo took heart and rallied. From that point up to the time of writing, in summer 1988, a war, which from the outside is only semi-visible, has been raging within or, more often, around Soviet psychiatry. To date, the liberals have gained some positions, but the conservatives have been clinging tenaciously to the high ground, trying to go over to the offensive, although an official line of cautious, very partial reform has emerged. The ultimate outcome will probably depend on the fate of *perestroika* as a whole and of Gorbachev personally.

A central theme of the initial press campaign was neatly summed up by Moscow's "Medical Gazette":[1] "Time and again," it complained, "the same set of psychiatric experts has been 'manufacturing' schizophrenics out of normal people." But did this dramatic statement actually mean that the Soviet press was at last using *glasnost* to attack the practice of locking up dissidents in mental hospitals?

No—not quite. For the practice that came under assault was the straightforward, if insidious, corruption of psychiatrists by charged criminals. The assault came in a series of long articles in *Meditsinskaya gazeta* and *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*.[2] However, it was probably no coincidence that five of the 20 psychiatrists named in the articles had also been involved at various times in political abuses, as had five of the eight mental institutions

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[1] A. Mann, "The Price of Avoiding a Trial," part 3, *Meditsinskaya gazeta*, 27 May 1987.

[2] These appear in ibid., 20, 22, and 27 May 1987, and in *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, 31 January, 1 February, 24 March, 20 and 30 May 1987 (all, except the third and fifth, by V. Andriyanov). The earliest two articles were discussed by Julia Wishnevsky in the Radio Liberty *Research Bulletin*, RS 16/87, 9 February 1987. A mild foretaste of the anti-corruption campaign had come in 1985 with press criticism of Eduard Babayan, a former chief psychiatrist in the Ministry of Health. The criticism accused him of "lack of principle" and other failings, and led to his removal as head of the ministry's department on addiction problems. See *Pravda*, 30 October 1985, and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 24 November 1985.

referred to. Moreover, the two institutions which the articles most severely implicated in corruption come under the authority of key organizers of the political abuse.

This fact alone would have been enough to make those organizers fear that the ongoing purge of corrupt psychiatrists might eventually move up the official hierarchy and engulf them too. And additional evidence to be discussed below suggests that they do indeed fear this.

If the Kremlin were eventually to dismiss these top psychiatrists, the way might then be open for the curtailment or abolition of the whole system of political abuse. For this system is in no way essential to the Soviet system of repression: labour camps, prison, exile, dismissal from jobs, and a wide range of other sanctions are available to the authorities for dealing with dissidents. So, as Sidney Bloch and I have argued in our book *Soviet Psychiatric Abuse*,[3] political psychiatry damages the Soviet image abroad *unnecessarily*. This consideration, combined with the urgent need of the Gorbachev forces in the régime to bring about radical improvements in economic performance, probably explains the decision to initiate change in Soviet psychiatry.

The ostensible reason for the campaign against corrupt psychiatrists was summed up by Anatoly Potapov, the Health Minister of the Russian Republic, in these words:

> Bribe-taking and extortion have become the norm in a number of clinics . . . The time has come to tell the truth . . . For a sum of money, a healthy person can be turned into a sick one. Apparently there is nothing you cannot buy in the mental hospitals of Moscow region![4]

To put it more precisely, psychiatrists had been taking bribes from criminals in return for false diagnoses of mental illness. And this had created a "whole system whereby criminals could avoid punishment by being sent to mental hospitals instead of prison."[5]

Such a system could lead to the release of dangerous criminals after only two or three years and, worse still, has actually led to their committing the same crimes again soon after release. Among the psychiatrists responsible for such disasters have been two who have, on other occasions, contributed to political abuse. Tamara Pechernikova, for example, a senior doctor at Moscow's Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, has long been involved in diagnosing dissidents as insane. But in a recent case, she recommended

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[3] Subtitled "The Shadow over World Psychiatry" and published by Gollancz (UK, 1984) and Westview Press (USA, 1985). See especially pp. 231–2.

[4] *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, 20 May 1987.

[5] Ibid., 31 January 1987.

that a double murderer be discharged from a mental institution after only three years, as she found him "cured." The journalist investigating the case later discovered that the man was perfectly "sane," but had paid a hefty bribe so as to be ruled mad and thus avoid possible execution, yet had then, after release, committed two more murders.[6]

Since the late 1970s the Chief Psychiatrist of the USSR Ministry of Health has been Dr Aleksandr Churkin, who has used his position to cover up the misuse of psychiatry for political purposes, whilst dismissing Western charges on the subject as malicious propaganda. In 1985 he arranged for a big-time crook with many past convictions for serious crimes to be sent for compulsory treatment not to his home city of Gorky, but, "by way of exception," to the Kashchenko Mental Hospital in Moscow. There are, however, no facilities for compulsory treatment at that hospital, and the crook was even allowed out on holidays. During one of these releases he organized a gang and committed another major robbery.[7]

The articles also feature episodes that have more comic elements: one of them concerns a Kashchenko psychiatrist who carefully trained a bribe-giving criminal in the techniques required to imitate a genuine lunatic, reassuring the nervous trainee that since "the right people" would be on the psychiatric commission, absolutely nothing could go wrong: and in due course he was diagnosed as suffering from "sluggish schizophrenia."[8] Later on, the same diagnosis was organized for yet another crook by the top Party man at the Kashchenko hospital—in return for a bribe of 6,000 rubles. However when psychiatrists in a different city decided the diagnosis was false and revoked it, the crook involved felt so badly cheated that he went and spilt the beans on the Kashchenko bribe-takers.[9]

As regards criminal sanctions for these activities, the articles report that investigations began in spring 1985 with the arrest of psychiatrists at the Serbsky Institute and the All-Union Research Centre for Mental Health. Two years later, according to the chief official involved, the investigation was still going on: "The case unexpectedly sprouted additional cases, and new people came into the purview of our detectives. Some have already been sentenced." By January 1988, 20 people had been charged with receiving a total of 320,000 rubles in bribes.[10] One of those sentenced, Yury Massover of the Kashchenko, received nine years' hard labour. The activities of Massover, his associates, and the numerous colleagues who tried to cover up both for him and, the articles strongly suggest, for themselves, are described in vivid detail.[11]

[6] Ibid.
[7] *Meditsinskaya gazeta*, 27 May 1987.
[8] Ibid., 22 May 1987.
[9] Ibid., 27 May 1987.
[10] Ibid., 20 May 1987; *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 5, 30 January 1988, p. 7.
[11] *Med. gazeta*, 20, 22, and 27 May 1987; and *Sots. industriya*, 20 May 1987.

At the administrative level, a special commission was set up to investigate the Kashchenko situation, and it reported as follows:

> The present procedures for organizing and conducting forensic-psychiatric examinations in the Kashchenko Psychiatric Hospital do not correspond to the Directives of the USSR Ministry of Health; the professional level of the psychiatric experts is low, while no new personnel are being trained, the panels of experts do not come under review for long periods of time . . . and almost half the experts lack full qualifications.[12]

In the light of this report, the Health Ministry decided to dismiss three senior officials of the hospital for "gross administrative failings."[13] The three included the chief doctor, Valentin Morkovkin, who in 1978 blocked the efforts of a representative of Britain's Royal College of Psychiatrists to visit a dissident interned in the Kashchenko.[14] Earlier, in 1967, Dr Morkovkin had hosted a group of high-level American psychiatrists, whose subsequent report heaped approval on the Kashchenko.[15]

How, the author of one of the articles asks, could Soviet people have sunk to the depths he describes? His answer strikes a philosophical note:

> Probably lies, social injustice, and demagogy have simply gone unpunished for too long, and we've got used to it. Indifference has put down deep roots in many of us.[16]

What, then, in mid-1987, were the implications of all this for the psychiatric officials who had long been locking up dissidents, "treating" them with powerful drugs, or vigorously denying the existence of such practices to the outside world? One might have been tempted to argue as follows: it's true that out of these officials, five had been criticized in the press for a mixture of criminal or negligent acts, and the five included the head of the Serbsky Institute's notorious department for diagnosing dissidents—Margarita Taltse—as well as a senior Health Ministry psychiatrist—Eduard Babayan—who was, for a time, the chief Soviet denouncer of foreign critics.[17] But probably everything would soon blow over, and a little of substance would change.

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[12] *Sots. industriya*, 20 May 1987.

[13] *Med. gazeta*, 27 May 1987, *Sots. industriya*, 30 May 1987. The latter gave greater detail on both the ministerial and the Party measures taken, printing two formal statements and reporting that 200 readers' letters on the whole issue had been received.

[14] Bloch and Reddaway, *op. cit.*, p. 138. The British psychiatrist was Gerard Low-Beer and the dissident was Evgeny Nikolayev.

[15] See *The Report of the First US Mission on Mental Health to the USSR*, National Institute of Mental Health, Chevy Chase, Maryland, 1969 (Public Health Service Publication No. 1893). See also discussion of this book-length report in S. Bloch and P. Reddaway, *Russia's Political Hospitals*, London, 1977, pp. 289–90, 413–14.

[16] *Med. gazeta*, 22 May 1987.

[17] *Sots. industriya*, 31 January and 1 February 1987. On Babayan see also footnote 2.

And a year later, such an outcome is still just conceivable. But, on the other hand, the forces of change have, as we shall see, widened their attack, and the criminal investigations begun in 1985 are still continuing, with two of the institutions most implicated in the investigations being headed, directly or indirectly, by the central figures in the whole system of abuse—Georgy Morozov and Marat Vartanyan, successor to the deceased Andrei Snezhnevsky.[18] The latter—sometimes called the Lysenko of Soviet psychiatry—was the director of the All-Union Research Centre for Mental Health, of which the Kashchenko is a component part. And Morozov is director of the Serbsky Institute, as well as president of the All-Union Society of Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists, or AUSNP.

Already, as we have seen, the chief doctor of the Kashchenko has been disgraced and fired. So if, therefore, the investigators continue to reveal scandals, it could become easier for the Gorbachev leadership to sanction the removal of the top psychiatrists just mentioned and sanction also, perhaps, the dismantling of the system of abuse which has brought the USSR such publicity for many years.

The nervousness of Vartanyan in particular—who over a period of seventeen years has repeatedly lied to foreigners in defence of Soviet psychiatry[19]—became clear early on: he told a foreign visitor that if he had signed certain documents in the past, he had done so only "under pressure from my superiors."[20] And he began giving press interviews—to *Izvestia*[21], to a Party weekly[22] and to TASS[23]—in which he repeated his earlier protestations that the charges of abuse were malicious Western slander, and that the AUSNP felt compelled to resign from the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) in 1983 only because the WPA leadership was swayed by this slander. In the second interview, however, he revealed for the first time a new ploy in which Morozov and he are clearly investing considerable hope. He announced that he had been discussing with the President of the WPA, Costas Stefanis of Greece, the possibility of the AUSNP rejoining the world body. Since that time, Morozov and he have been pursuing this goal tenaciously. In the process, they have been so keen to broadcast to the Soviet establishment the fact that the WPA is even considering conferring respectability on the AUSNP again, that they have embarrassed Stefanis,

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[18] On these three see the extensive material in the books by Bloch and Reddaway referred to above. For an obituary of Snezhnevsky, who died aged 83, see *Meditsinskaya gazeta*, 17 July 1987, p. 3.

[19] See details in the books by Bloch and Reddaway.

[20] Quoted in an article by Alexandre Bruggmann, *Tribune de Genève*, 10 April 1987.

[21] 2 September 1986.

[22] *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 11, 21 March 1987, p. 5. See also the first part of this interview in the previous issue.

[23] Interview with TASS correspondent M. Svetlichny, 2 July 1987, translated in *Summary of World Broadcasts*, 8 July 1987, SU/8614/A1/10.

who has several times denied any discussions to be in progress.[24] If they could successfully pull off this feat, it is possible that the black marks the Kremlin gave them for the WPA disaster in 1983 might be erased. And if that were the case, not only the officials themselves, but also the system of abuse they direct, might manage to survive with neither major nor permanent damage.

Open attacks in the press

FROM THE START, however, the conservatives have been harassed by reformist pressure of another sort, to which they have found it difficult to make convincing replies. This harassment has taken the form of press attacks not on financial corruption, but on the callous contempt that many psychiatrists display towards their patients, and especially on their casual readiness to persecute people without medical cause, but for various other reasons, including the requests of policemen or politicians. According to the first article on such themes which achieved widespread publicity, the result of this tendency is that psychiatry is feared, and "not for nothing do people avoid psychiatrists. It is better to suffer, or to try private doctors—anything to avoid going to a clinic. Who wants to ruin his life!"[25]

To illustrate their powerfully argued case for legal checks to constrain psychiatrists, the *Izvestia* authors described two typical cases of innocent individuals being abused. The psychiatric persecution of one woman was organized by a group of people in various types of authority, including a Party official, Kirienkov, who summoned a psychiatrist and "unambiguously requested him to treat this Zoya Petrovna in a hospital." She was "making his life impossible" by her phone-calls (justifiably seeking justice in a domestic dispute, the authors say). "The Moscow health department then gave its sanction." In all, the result for the woman was "four years of life ruined." And one of the key psychiatrists involved was, sad to relate, V. Kozyrev—Morkovkin's newly installed successor as the chief doctor of the Kashchenko.

The authors then pointed out—for the first time in the Soviet press—that a major reason why such horrors thrived was that citizens have no legal redress against arbitrary hospitalization and treatment sanctioned by

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[24] On all this see the interview by Morozov and others in *Sovetskiy Soyuz*, No. 7, 1987, pp. 26–7 (this journal appears also in foreign-language editions); Radio Liberty dispatches by Wayne Brown from a psychiatric conference in Milan, 23–5 October 1987, and Brown's transcribed interview with Morozov of 24 October; a report by Danish law professor Erik Siesby on a Moscow meeting of Morozov and others with a delegation of the International Helsinki Federation on 26 January 1988; and Reuter and Agence France Presse reports on a Moscow press conference of 11 February 1988 by Aleksandr Churkin (and others), as printed in e.g. *Le Monde*, 13 February 1988.

[25] *Izvestia*, 11 July 1987, article entitled "Without Protection" by E. Maksimova and I. Martkovich.

administrative fiat. Both capitalist and socialist countries had laws to counter such abuse, they continued, and they spelt out the legal procedures used in Bulgaria. As for the USSR, they had a revelation: a law to this effect had eventually been drafted in Moscow in 1977. However, a "senior health official" had promptly killed it: with the "noble traditions of Russian psychiatry," it was, in the official's view, superfluous.

Now, the authors argued, the time for such a law had really come. The humane forces in psychiatry and the law, which, they suggested, included the new Health Minister, must push one through, and thus start the process of restoring public trust in psychiatry.

The *Izvestia* article did many things. To a wide audience it definitively demonstrated as false the many statements and interviews given over the years by Drs Babayan, Vartanyan and Morozov, who had always asserted that patients' rights were well protected and that the procedural weaknesses alleged by foreigners were slanderous inventions. Second, it implicitly heralded the new legislation on psychiatric services which eventually emerged in January 1988. Third, it provoked the conservatives into direct replies. And fourth, it raised the profile of the press campaign against callous, unethical psychiatry in the service of repressive authorities.

The last trend has found expression in a great variety of tragic stories, some with happy endings, others not. They all explore what a Lithuanian paper calls "a complex phenomenon of our life—a mechanism for getting rid of people who are inconvenient, 'unneeded,' and unable to defend themselves."[26] Such people are not always single women, such as those described above. The *Literaturnaya gazeta*, for example, implicitly attacked political psychiatry by publishing a letter from a police sergeant who had disturbed two of his colleagues in the act of robbing a wine factory. When, he recounts, he could not be dissuaded from pressing for their prosecution through various channels, he was sent by the protectors of the two men

> for a psychiatric examination. Here, the commission of doctors once again put the same questions: why had I written to the newspaper, why was I casting a shadow over my colleagues? and wasn't I suffering from the illness of "fighting for justice?"[27]

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[26] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, Vilnius (the Russian edition of *Komjaunimo Tiesa*), 17 December 1987, p. 2. The article on the case of V. R. Ruzgus is a follow-up to earlier articles in the same papers of 17 September and 30 October 1987. Other articles of this type appeared in (chronological order): *Ogonek*, No. 5, 1987, p. 25, by Valery Kadzhaya; *Vechernie novosti*, Vilnius, 30 January 1987; *Sovetskaya kultura*, 31 January 1987, p. 3, by Azat Abdullin; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 5 and 28 April 1987, by T. Bondarenko; *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 9 October and 11 December 1987, by Leonid Sharov (also 29 January 1988); *Moscow News*, No. 43, 25 October 1987, p. 13, and No. 48, 29 November 1987, p. 2, by Vladimir Shevelev; *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost*, No. 1, 1988, pp. 42–3, by N. Petrov; *Moscow News*, No. 16, 17 April 1988 (Avaliani case described during a round-table).

[27] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 17 June 1987, p. 12, letter from A. Kokhanovsky.

Such articles make a convincing case that, as one writer put it, "The abuse of psychiatry as a way of disposing of inconvenient people has become a widespread phenomenon."[28]

By coincidence, the first direct conservative response to the accelerating reformist attack on bribe-taking psychiatrists and callous psychiatry serving repressive, non-medical ends appeared almost simultaneously with the *Izvestia* article. Vartanyan and Petr Morozov, head of research development at Vartanyan's Centre, dealt simply, if mendaciously, with the first problem. The corrupt psychiatrists were an isolated case, Morozov said: "Now justice has been restored—all those guilty have been sentenced[29] and fresh psychiatric examinations have been conducted (on the bribe-giving criminals)." Vartanyan concurred, noting that it was "a unique and, precisely for this reason, such a stupid case for us," and adding, with characteristic venom, that "in the West there are far more of these problems, and they are all chronic in character."

The second charge—indicting callous, repressive psychiatry—was ignored as regards its substance, but Vartanyan took the chance to divert attention with a theme that he and his fellow-conservatives were to develop at length over the next year. This was the alleged irresponsibility of the Soviet press, which was seriously inciting and disorienting the patients in Soviet mental hospitals, who, "even without this, label us as retrogrades, orthodox, and so on." "Journalists' pursuit of cheap 'sensations' is," he said, "inflicting the cruellest harm on our common cause."[30] Thus Vartanyan's reply to the reformists was simply to smear them as cheap sensationalists.

But the *Izvestia* article had truly alarmed the conservatives. Wheeling out their trustiest journalistic ally, Eleanora Gorbunova, they gave their interviews and she duly produced a 2,000-word report:[31] whereas the just-quoted interview by Vartanyan and others was serious and responsible, the *Izvestia* authors, Gorbunova alleged, "had concealed from readers all the evidence that could destroy their 'concepts', had denied those accused of 'abuses' the chance to express their views on the events described," had hidden the fact that the two women in question were in fact mentally ill, and had pressured doctors into revealing information which should be confidential. According to Vartanyan, it was the authors themselves whose position was "anti-humanitarian," since they were naively calling on doctors not to rush into forcible hospitalization, but rather "to contemplate passively how the illness develops, and to wait until the 'symptoms of a danger to society' appear."

[28] Tatyana Ruslanova in *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 29 January 1988, p. 10.

[29] In reality, as indicated above, only a few had been.

[30] Interview by A. Novikov with Vartanyan, P. Morozov, V. Maksimov, and A. Mukhin, *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 15 July 1987, p. 3.

[31] Novosti Press Agency, 4 August 1987. Those interviewed were Drs Vartanyan, Vladimir Tikhonenko, Ruben Nadzharov, and Vyacheslav Kotov.

Gorbunova's peroration was eloquent: the *Izvestia* article—entitled "Without Protection"—had "provoked an explosion of aggression from mentally ill people" as they took up the authors' call to do away with locked doors. "Being sick people unable to answer for their actions, they are demanding of psychiatrists that they open the hospital doors, while accusing them of treating them incorrectly and to no effect," and writing violent letters to them. True, she went on, psychiatrists did receive letters of thanks as well. However,

> while the gratitude of patients will probably help ease the pain of the insults being borne by the doctors, it is not able to protect them from the acts of those patients whose aggression has been ignited by the article. "Death to psychiatrists"—leaflets containing this appeal and a list of the names of doctors referred to in the article—are circulating in Moscow. Who actually is in need of protection?

The next—and to date, last—broad-based attack by the reformist forces appeared in *Komsomolskaya pravda* on 11 November 1987[32]—the very day that Yeltsin's removal from his Moscow post was announced. It ignored Gorbunova's article (which may well not have been printed by any paper of importance), and took as its starting points the case of a young Leningrad woman and the above-quoted interview of Vartanyan and other conservatives on the psychiatric services, which *Komsomolskaya pravda* had published in July.[33] "According to the psychiatrists," the three authors wrote,

> there are no problems in this area (the psychiatric services): regulations are meticulously observed, and the number of abuses can be counted on the fingers of one hand. However, the letter from the young Leningrad woman did not fit into this cheerful pattern at all. So, to ascertain the truth, we began to make investigations.

What they found was that the woman had been harassed by a factory manager and a psychiatrist, then forcibly treated in a mental hospital. The reason was her high work standards and general conscientiousness.

The authors then ranged across the reformists' agenda, covering, among other things, questions of diagnostic criteria, legal and psychiatric procedure, collusion between psychiatrists and officials to prevent patients writing to official bodies, and the obsessive, often aggressive, secretiveness of psychiatric administrators about what goes on in mental hospitals. They also included revealing interviews with some of the detectives who had been investigating Moscow's corrupt psychiatrists since 1985. Their report gained

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[32] The authors were A. Novikov, S. Razin, and M. Mishin.

[33] See note 30.

in authority from the fact that one of the authors, M. Mishin, was a Doctor of Psychiatric Science, and that among their interviewees who took a liberal position were two psychiatrists, one senior (M. Bondarchik), the other relatively junior (R. Zaripov). The latter was fired, however, as soon as the chief doctor of his hospital learnt that he had spoken openly to journalists.

The writers tried to end their article on a positive note:

> Do not take offence, doctors, at what we are saying: we are not enemies, but allies. We have a common goal: the well-being of people—their moral, physical, and spiritual well-being—which is why, in calling on psychiatry to "cleanse itself of pollution" (a call that we join you in!), we are not censuring indiscriminately or pinning labels on people, we are only trying to define the symptoms in order to check the development of the disease.

There are many indications that the liberal tide was halted and reversed at about this time, in November 1987. First, as already noted, there have been no more broad-gauge liberal articles since then. Yet there have been two on the conservative side.[34] Second, in the wake of Yeltsin's being ousted, Vartanyan's candidacy for Snezhnevsky's position was approved by the Moscow city Party committee (now headed by Zaikov), and thus in December, Health Minister Chazov, Vartanyan's long-standing friend and co-author,[35] was able—after a five-month interregnum during which reformists had hoped a liberal would be chosen—to appoint him. This was a heavy blow to the reformists' cause.[36] And third, the one health official who had sided publicly, if somewhat cautiously, with the reformists, the Health Minister for the RSFSR, Anatoly Potapov, mentioned earlier, now

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[34] By S. Staroselskaya in *Meditsinskaya gazeta*, 13 January 1988, p. 4, and by E. Gorbunova in *Trud*, 16 February 1988, p. 4. Both authors described the murder of a Moscow psychiatrist by a patient in November 1987 and reported that 65 acts of aggression against officials at Moscow psychiatric clinics had been registered since February 1987. Gorbunova called for the doctors supposedly responsible for inciting all this to be brought before a special tribunal. But she named no names.

[35] In 1980 Chazov and the American cardiologist Bernard Lown founded the organization International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). Soon Chazov involved Vartanyan in its activities. In 1983 the two men co-authored a paper, "The Psychological Effects of Nuclear War," and presented it at IPPNW meetings. On the two men's relationship see the article by A. Wynn and P. Reddaway in *The Times*, 3 December 1985. On Chazov see the study by Peter Huebner, *E. Čazov – ein "ganz integrer Mann"? (E. Chazov – a "Man of Complete Integrity"?)*, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Köln, No. 48, 1985, 50 pp. (including an English summary of six pages).

[36] Personal communication from a Soviet psychiatrist known to me who prefers not to be named (hereafter "Personal communication"). In 1985–86 Vartanyan was investigated by the Party Control Commission regarding charges of dishonesty, plagiarism, financial irregularities, etc. Following intervention by Central Committee Secretary M. Zimyanin he escaped with only a Party censure.

moved firmly away from the reformists and into a centrist or even "centre-right" position.

Potapov deserves attention for further reasons too. He is a psychiatrist and a friend of the political leader Egor Ligachev, who brought him to Moscow in the mid-1980s from Tomsk,[37] where he had long headed a 3,000-bed mental hospital, and where Ligachev was the Party boss from 1965 to 1983. Thus, as Ligachev moved towards a more conservative position in the summer and autumn of 1987 in response to Gorbachev's growing radicalism, it is not surprising that Potapov should have followed his shift.

At first, though, in May 1987, Potapov had supported the liberal journalists in their campaign against corrupt psychiatrists. He expressed approval of their articles, provided them with materials from his ministry's investigation into psychiatric practice in Moscow and the Moscow Region, and allowed a journalist, Viktor I. Andriyanov, to attend a ministry board meeting to witness key figures being grilled and—in some cases, such as those of Drs Kaplin and Akopova—crumbling.[38]

When, however, Andriyanov interviewed Potapov in August 1987, some of the fire seemed to have gone out of his belly. True, he summed up the conclusions of his ministry's investigation quite forthrightly:

> Many hospitals are in a disastrous condition. Causes for anxiety are the quality of the leadership groups, the many violations of discipline and the cases of drunkenness. During the investigation, serious failings were uncovered in the quality and organization of mental patient treatment. Work with the socially dangerous has almost been abandoned.[39]

But he laced his approval of the press taking a monitoring role in psychiatry with a long-winded homily about the need for "particular caution, delicacy and tact" on the part of journalists or doctors who might want to write in the press about dishonest medical personnel. So far, he added sternly, "nowhere near everyone is prepared to behave appropriately." And when Andriyanov referred to letters from medical whistle-blowers in various parts of the country, Potapov hesitated to agree that the situation elsewhere might be as bad as in Moscow, whilst failing to express any appreciation of the whistle-blowers, and merely stating in bureaucratic tones that their reports would be looked into.

Potapov's next interview, however, printed on 20 November, revealed a much bigger shift.[40] He gave the interview not to the liberal Andriyanov,

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[37] Personal communication.
[38] See especially *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, 20 and 30 May 1987.
[39] Ibid., 1 September 1987.
[40] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 20 November 1987, p. 4.

but to the militantly conservative Gorbunova. Of the key liberal articles, discussed above, he was strongly critical—openly so of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*'s report of nine days earlier, and clearly critical of *Izvestia*'s of July (though without actually naming it). And he denounced at length Western accusations about Soviet abuse of psychiatry. On these topics his views were simply a more moderately expressed version of Vartanyan's.

Configurations for the future

FROM ABOUT THIS TIME ON, the different strands in Soviet policy on psychiatry, not all of which can be discussed here in detail, started coming together with some degree of coherence in a centrist (verging on centre-right) configuration. Potapov's new line has been more or less mirrored by that of other psychiatrists whose role has become more prominent,[41] while a non-disciple of Snezhnevsky has been appointed chief editor of the main psychiatric journal.[42] The desire of the foreign policy establishment to remove abuse of psychiatry as a thorn in the side of Soviet diplomacy, though without making radical concessions,[43] has meshed with the semi-liberalism of the KGB and MVD in how they have handled individual dissidents with regard to psychiatry. And the broad legislation on psychiatry promulgated on 5 January 1988, steered a middle course between what, on one side, the liberals and the dissidents would have liked, and, on the other, the status quo that the conservatives would have preferred.[44] The overall policy is still far from being unified and unambigu-

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[41] Aleksandr Churkin, chief psychiatrist of the Health Ministry, has been specially notable here, having apparently suffered not at all from the earlier-described account of his involvement in a corruption case. See his lengthy interviews with Andrea Bonanni in *Corriere della Sera*, 5 April 1988, in which he says that 30 per cent of the 5.5 million people currently on the state's psychiatric register will be removed from it; and with E. Maksimova in *Izvestia*, 27 April 1988. Modest Kabanov, head of Leningrad's Bekhterev Psychoneurological Research Institute, has become more visible both at home and in the AUSNP's foreign contacts. See his article in *Pravda*, 28 May 1988. And Vladimir Tikhonenko, chief psychiatrist of Moscow, has played an increasingly important role. See Novosti's article by Gorbunova of 4 August 1987, *Meditsinskaya gazeta*'s of 13 January 1988, and a report of his, calling a meeting of psychiatrists to urge increased caution over forcible hospitalization, *USSR News Brief: Human Rights*, Munich No. 22, November 30 1987, item 27. All three men spoke at a widely reported press briefing in Moscow on 11 February 1988 (see footnote 24).

[42] Levon Badalyan, a neuropathologist. See *Zhurnal nevropatologii i psikhiatrii im S. S. Korsakova*, No. 1, 1988. As N. Zharikov, a close ally of G. Morozov's, is the senior psychiatrist on the editorial board, Badalyan's ability to open the journal up to new ideas and authors may however be limited.

[43] Anatoly Adamishin, the Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for human rights, has put the line on abuse clearly. At a press conference, TASS reported, he "said that psychiatry had never been used and was not being used in the Soviet Union for political purposes." TASS in English, Moscow, 18 August 1987. However, his staff have been working hard to reduce the level of Western concern.

[44] See the full text in *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 2, 13 January 1988, pp. 22–27. Numerous briefings were given by Soviet officials to explain the changes. These concerned,

ous, because of the deep conflicts among the politicians and among the senior psychiatrists. In both cases the conflicts revolve around issues of both power and policy. In the case of the psychiatrists, however, power issues seem to be more highly charged than policy ones. In other words, in psychiatry, there is no faction of passionate reformers whereas there clearly is one in politics—Gorbachev's faction.

In virtually all professions, we should note, liberal reformists of authority have stepped forward since 1985–6 to lead reform movements, often doing so with passion. In psychiatry, a profession long demoralized by low status, poor quality leaders, and tight political control, no such reformists—with the temporary and partial exception of Potapov—have yet emerged, though some reformist pressures exist behind the scenes. Potential leaders of stature like Drs Anatoly Koryagin and Semyon Gluzman were imprisoned for many years as dissidents, and their political rehabilitation, if it occurs, will inevitably take longer than, say, that of Andrei Sakharov. New liberals have begun to appear, some of whom have been mentioned in this article,[45] but none of them has a position of authority. And while the non-psychiatric dissidents have kept up their lobbying against abuse and for reform, pressure from outside the profession has a limited effect if it cannot link up with pressure from professionals.

The forces which have had the greatest effect in producing the partial changes of policy described in this article are probably, in fact, (a) the steady pressures of foreign medical, humanitarian and political groups over many years, and (b) the will of those Soviet politicians who have powered the radical reformist programme of the Gorbachevites.[46]

In any case, the key elements in the overall policy on psychiatry as of mid-1988 seem to be as follows:

- *Stir up psychiatry* so as to reduce the dominant inertia and corruption, and so as to make it more open, humane, and efficient: this will help the economy by getting able workers back to work and saving state funds now being wasted on people who should not be in mental hospitals at all. The status quo forces are basically opposed to all of this.

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notably, the right to appeal against a diagnosis to the area chief psychiatrist and then perhaps to a court, the institution of a penalty of up to two years' imprisonment for doctors who wilfully make wrong diagnoses; and the transfer of the special psychiatric hospitals from the MVD to the Ministry of Health. Liberal critics have strongly criticized the many loopholes in the legislation. See the commentaries of exiled psychiatrist A. Koryagin and of Prof. Savitsky of Moscow's Institute of State and Law in the International Association on the Political Use of Psychiatry's *Information Bulletin*, No. 18, April 1988, pp. 1–4, 34; and of Aleksandr Podrabinek in *Russkaya mysl*, Paris, 19 February 1988.

[45] Another is Dr Mikhail Tsargorodtsev, whose radical article appeared in *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto, 30 June 1988.

[46] Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gorbachev's closest associate in the Politburo, has reportedly been the key figure responsible for the liberal articles discussed above which have appeared in the Soviet press. Personal communication.

- *Improve the regime's human rights image* at home and abroad by (a) letting many dissidents out of mental hospitals; (b) virtually stopping new psychiatric internments of dissidents; (c) introducing laws to allow patients and their relatives to appeal for release from compulsory hospitalization on grounds of wrong diagnosis, and to punish doctors who deliberately make wrong diagnoses; (d) transferring the high-security "special psychiatric hospitals" from the Interior to the Health Ministry; (e) ending the virtual monopoly of the Snezhnevsky school of psychiatric theory, which has been so helpful in locking up dissidents; (f) admitting past abuses in psychiatry, but *not* admitting that any *political* abuse has ever occurred. Conservatives are equally ill-disposed to all or most of this.
- *Try hard to get back into the World Psychiatric Association (WPA)*, so as to restore Soviet respectability in international psychiatry. The conservatives are vitally interested in this, as success could save their threatened positions; conversely, failure would probably induce the politicians to remove them from power, and, with more decent leaders installed, admit to past *political* abuses as the surest way of re-entering the WPA.

In conclusion, then, let us try to answer the question posed in the title of this article. If a radical, Gorbachevite, *perestroika* of the economy and the polity were to succeed, then political abuse of psychiatry would almost certainly come to an end. Short of this, however, such a result is less sure—and likely to be longer in coming about.

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Perestroika: The Polish Influence

Elizabeth Teague

A GROUP of unidentified Soviet citizens states in a *samizdat* document that the reforms being introduced in the USSR by Mikhail Gorbachev were directly influenced by the Polish worker unrest of 1980–81 and the rise of the Solidarity free trade union movement in Poland.[1] The document was apparently drafted in April 1987, two years after Gorbachev's election as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). Asserting that the new leader's reforms are motivated by an appreciation of the "economic, political and social bankruptcy" of the Soviet system, the document argues that

> the specific catalyst of the events taking place today in the USSR was the unprecedented revolutionary protest of Polish workers in 1980. The brief and turbulent time of Solidarity's legal existence is one of the more important reasons that caused the Kremlin leadership to look for solutions that would at least superficially humanize the system. . . . Gorbachev's reforms have Polish origins.

In describing the rise of Solidarity as the catalyst of Gorbachev's policies, the document is not claiming that the Polish events were the sole or even the major cause of the changes the new leader is trying to make in Soviet society. By the early 1980s, change of some sort or another had become not only desirable but virtually inevitable in the USSR. In the first place, the country was facing a major generational shift in its leadership. Secondly, social and economic problems had been allowed to accumulate to such an extent that nothing less than the USSR's status as a military superpower was coming under threat. Occurring when they did, however, the Polish

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* This article is adapted, with the permission of the publisher, from *Solidarity and the Soviet Worker*, published by Croom Helm Ltd. in January 1988. The book seeks to explore the relationship between the leaders and the led in modern Soviet society. Some of the material used here also appears in the author's contribution to the 1987 US Congress Joint Economic Committee compendium on the Soviet economy, *Gorbachev's Economic Plans*. The author is grateful for advice and encouragement from Iain Elliot, Philip Hanson, Nicholas Lampert, Werner Hahn, and colleagues at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Inc.

[1] The document appeared in the Polish underground publication, *Solidarnosc Walczaca*, 21 June–5 July 1987. Thanks are due to Anna Pomian for drawing the author's attention to this document. For details, see "Soviet Dissidents Write to a Polish Opposition Group," by Anna Pomian, Polish Independent Press Review, Radio Free Europe Research, 9 July 1987.

events acted as a stimulus to debate over political and economic reform within the Soviet Union; they also exerted an influence over its outcome. Let us examine what that influence was.

The Brezhnev Leadership and the Polish Events

FOLLOWING the death of Joseph Stalin and the easing of the terror with which he had ruled the Soviet population, an informal "social contract" evolved between the leaders and the led. The population was guaranteed security of employment and continuing growth of real incomes; the leadership tolerated lax supervision and low labour discipline. In return, the vast majority of the general public remained socially and politically quiescent.

This arrangement secured political stability but imposed heavy costs in the social sphere. Under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, Gorbachev has said, the public felt "degraded and insulted . . . The way we behaved in recent years meant keeping them out of politics."[2] The controversial weekly *Moscow News* describes the USSR as suffering from its own variety of AIDS: "Acquired Democracy Deficiency Syndrome."[3] Academician Dmitrii Likhachev likens the social system created by Stalin to "serfdom, which has continued to function even after it was abolished, spawning a slave mentality."[4] Another Soviet scholar, Academician Aleksandr Nikonov, says that "bureaucratic management of the economy has ruined a great deal. In the first place, it ruined people."[5]

As the Soviet population grew increasingly urbanized and educated, its exclusion from the political arena bred apathy and cynicism. Falling standards of labour discipline, rampant corruption, rising alcoholism and growing moral malaise led by the early 1980s to what Gorbachev later described as a situation of impending crisis.[6] From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, the most immediate cause for alarm was the steady decline in the rate of economic growth.

This seemingly inexorable economic slowdown represented a long-term threat to the social contract. If the decline was allowed to continue, it would sooner or later become impossible for the leaders to maintain their side of the bargain, that is, their unspoken pledge to keep popular living standards edging gradually upward. For the Soviet leaders, the Polish crisis turned the question "which way forward for the Soviet Union?" into an even more pressing one: how, granted that the living and working conditions of

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[2] Moscow television, 14 July 1987.
[3] *Moscow News*, 15 March 1987.
[4] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 9 Sept. 1987.
[5] Moscow television, 19 July 1987.
[6] *Pravda*, 28 Jan. 1987.

the Soviet workforce were as bad if not worse than those of their Polish counterparts, could a repetition of Poland's labour unrest be forestalled within the USSR? The Polish events focussed Soviet elite opinion into three main schools of thought.

"A Sensitive Ear to the Voice of the Masses"

THE FIRST SCHOOL, whose proponents were Brezhnev and his close associate Konstantin Chernenko, argued that Poland had got into difficulties because its leaders had lost touch with the masses. To guard against a repetition of the Polish events in the USSR, Soviet leaders should make greater efforts to foster public confidence in the Communist Party and its leadership. This could most easily be achieved, Brezhnev and Chernenko believed, not by increasing repression and control, nor by instituting radical changes in the economy, but simply by making ordinary people feel more involved in the process of government.

In the early months of the Polish crisis (that is, in late 1980 and early 1981) it was this school of thought that carried the day. The Soviet authorities adopted a number of short-term, stop-gap measures to "appease" a workforce perceived as likely to display a dangerous degree of volatility. For example:

—Increased attention was paid to public opinion. In particular, the official trade unions were enjoined to adopt a more active stance in defence of workers' rights.[7] Officials were exhorted to "lend a sensitive ear"—as Brezhnev put it in February 1981—to the grievances of working people. The holding of "Open Letter Days" was encouraged in towns and villages all over the country. At these, workers were given an opportunity to voice complaints over living and working conditions in the presence of local officials; television programmes along similar lines were introduced and proved very popular. The KGB reportedly conducted a number of unpublished sociological surveys in an attempt to gauge public opinion over the Polish events.[8]

—Plan priorities were revised to put increased emphasis on consumption. This was especially telling proof of the leaders' concern. The Polish crisis erupted at a moment when the ability of the Soviet economy to deliver the slow improvement in general living standards of the previous 20 years was coming under strain. The year 1981 marked a low point: the USSR was facing its third failed harvest in as many years, and the food situation in the provinces—particularly as regards meat and dairy products—was said to be the worst in recent memory. Rationing was in operation in cities all over the country, and food riots were reported from some areas. In an

[7] For details, see *Solidarity and the Soviet Worker*, Chapter 4.
[8] Ibid. Chapters 5 and 6.

effort to improve the situation, amendments were made to the 1981–85 Plan that favoured spending on consumption while cutting investment to the bone. These amendments were made, moreover, at a time of especially low economic growth, when allocation of additional resources to consumption entailed high opportunity cost in terms of investment and defence spending forgone.[9]

—A massive press campaign was introduced, aimed at blackening the image not only of Solidarity but also of free trade unionism in the eyes of the Soviet public.[10] Jamming of Western radio broadcasts to the USSR, lifted in 1973 as a gesture toward East–West *détente*, was reimposed by the Soviet authorities in August 1980, that is, within weeks of the out-break of strikes in Poland. Polish newspapers—the official publications of the Polish Communist Party included—were removed from news-stands and public libraries in the USSR. Travel between the two countries was cut back and mail was interfered with.[11]

The initial reaction of the Soviet leaders was one, therefore, if not of panic, then of obvious disquiet lest the "Polish disease" should spread to the USSR. The cause of this concern was simple: the Soviet leaders *did not know* how the Soviet public would respond to the Polish events, and their ignorance made them fearful and mistrustful of the population.

As things turned out, Brezhnev and his colleagues need not have been so anxious. In the final analysis, the Polish events evoked little sympathy among the Soviet population. Apart from a few isolated strikes, scattered leaflets, and a fair amount of *samizdat* commentary, Solidarity's impact in the USSR was small. (The only areas where this was not the case were, as will be seen below, the USSR's western borderlands.) By and large, the Soviet public lived up to its reputation for passivity and conservatism, and proved immune to liberalizing influences even from neighbouring, socialist Poland.

Given that Soviet workers suffer many of the difficulties that beset their Polish counterparts, why did the Soviet population show so little sympathy for the aspirations of the Polish workers? This question was raised in a number of the *samizdat* documents that circulated in the USSR in the wake of the Polish events.[12] The consensus was that the explanation lay in differences between the histories and political cultures of Poland and the USSR. Poland, with its deep Catholic faith, national cohesion and strong private agriculture, is the most pluralistic of the Soviet Union's East European neighbours. Virtually no-one in today's multinational USSR, on the other hand, has any experience of living under anything other than a

[9] Ibid. Chapter 7.
[10] Ibid. Chapter 4.
[11] Ibid. Chapter 8.
[12] Ibid. Chapter 9.

one-party system; nor did Russia's tsarist empire have any tradition of political pluralism. Unlike the Polish case, contacts between workers and dissident intellectuals have in the Soviet Union been few, and the human rights movement seems to have made almost no headway among the general population.

Indeed, the evidence suggests that by the time martial law was declared in Poland in December 1981 the majority of Soviet citizens, far from sympathizing with Solidarity's cause, had come to hold opinions strongly hostile to it.[13] One reason for this was the traditional ethnic antagonism between Russians and Poles, and the simple human envy felt by Soviet workers for Poles who, while materially better off than Soviet citizens, could still ask for more. Soviet propaganda was able, too, to play on the Soviet population's inherent distrust of disorder, anarchy and chaos. Most to the point, perhaps, was the sharp fear felt by many Soviet citizens lest Soviet aid to Poland should lead to a further worsening of food supplies in the USSR. That is, Soviet workers opposed Solidarity because they were afraid it would take the very bread from their mouths.

The "Disciplinarian" Option

As 1981 ran its course, a second school of thought gained the upper hand within the Soviet leadership. This school, whose representative was the "chief ideologist" of the CPSU, Mikhail Suslov, argued that Poland's troubles should be blamed on the failure of the Polish Communist Party to exercise strong leadership. Members of this group called for the introduction of tighter controls at all levels of society but, like the first, saw no pressing need for social or economic reforms.

It was clear by the summer of 1981 that the danger of spillover—if it ever really existed—had been averted. The Soviet leaders seemed to regain confidence in their ability to increase pressure from above without provoking unrest from below, and they began to abandon the "carrot" of appeasement in favour of the disciplinarian "stick." From the autumn of 1981, the official Soviet trade unions found themselves called upon once again to direct their energies to getting the workers to work harder,[14] and massive if ineffectual campaigns were launched to raise discipline in the workplace and to crack down on crime and corruption.[15]

The renewal of emphasis on production targets and labour discipline should doubtless be viewed against the background of the continued slowdown in the rate of Soviet economic growth which was leading at this time to stagnation, if not actual reduction, of popular living standards.

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[13] Ibid. Chapter 8.
[14] Ibid. Chapter 10.
[15] Ibid. Chapters 12 and 13.

Soviet leaders were unlikely to have forgotten that the Revolution of February 1917 was sparked by bread riots in Petrograd, or that the Polish strikes grew out of protests over food shortages and price rises. Uncomfortably aware that many of the conditions that led to the outbreak of strikes in Poland existed in an even more acute form among the Soviet workforce, Brezhnev and his colleagues appeared to conclude that any threat to their rule was at least as likely to arise out of domestic discontent over shortages of food and consumer goods as from any spillover from events outside Soviet borders. The scope for countering this risk by allocating more resources to the consumer was limited by the economic slowdown; what was needed was a sharp improvement in productivity. Tightening workplace discipline was one way of achieving this, at least in the short term.

The trend toward tighter social controls intensified from the spring of 1982 onward. It coincided, that is, with the transfer of Yurii Andropov from his post as chairman of the KGB to the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, which took place in May 1982. It was to become even clearer once Andropov was elected, after Brezhnev's death in November 1982, as General Secretary. It appears, in other words, that concern on the part of the leaders about the possibility of social unrest—sparked both by the Polish events and by the USSR's growing economic difficulties—provided Andropov with the platform from which he made his bid for supreme power.

The Reform Lobby

FEARS WERE expressed among the Soviet elite not only that Poland's unrest might spill over to the Soviet public. The debate over the "lessons of Poland" betrayed a deeper anxiety: that the Polish crisis might not merely be attributable to the peculiarities of Polish socialism, but be symptomatic of a general weakness afflicting all socialist societies of the Soviet type. Accordingly, a third school of thought could be discerned—though its members in the early 1980s were more likely to be academic economists and political theorists than members of the top leadership.

Members of this school of thought used the Polish example to press for radical political and economic reforms of the Soviet system. Reform-oriented writers argued that the primary causes of the Polish crisis were domestic, while conservatives placed greater emphasis on the instigatory role allegedly played by "Western subversion."[16] (It is notable that, since his election as Party leader, Gorbachev has identified himself with the reformist interpretation. In a speech in Warsaw in June 1986, Gorbachev

[16] Ibid. Chapter 14.

stated that the Polish crisis "was not a protest by workers against socialism; it was *above all* an expression of disagreement with those distortions of socialism in practice that pained the working class."[17])

As the struggle for the Brezhnev succession reached its height, members of the "discipline" and "reform" tendencies joined forces behind the candidacy of Andropov. In the words of Archie Brown, Andropov stood for "discipline *and* reform." One of Andropov's greatest strengths, Brown states,

> lay in the fact that he could be viewed in a positive light both by the "disciplinarians" and by those who felt that no more than tinkering adjustments had been made to the Soviet economy for some years, and that more radical reform was required.[18]

Gorbachev came to power in 1985 at the head of what appears to have been a very similar coalition, that is, an alliance between those (many of whom received advancement during Andropov's period in office) who favoured either tighter discipline and control, or some degree of structural reform, or both. Like Andropov, too, Gorbachev seemed to depend on the KGB as his main institutional support.

The power of the Soviet secret police is based not only on the methods of repression at its disposal for use against the population, but also on the reliability of its information. The assertion that "knowledge is power" is even truer in the USSR than in other, more open, societies. From its offices in every workplace of any size and its vast network of informers, the KGB channels information on all aspects of Soviet life to its Moscow headquarters. Regional and local Communist Party organizations are supposed to perform the same function, the aim being to enable the central authorities to keep abreast of developments throughout their vast empire. Under Brezhnev's leadership, however, the Party became so corrupt that links between the summit and the grassroots eroded and the Party ceased to act as a purveyor of accurate information. As a result, Brezhnev and his colleagues were ignorant of the general mood, and reacted in 1980 with undue alarm lest the Soviet population should seek to follow the example of the Polish workers. On the basis of its more reliable information channels, the KGB turned out to be a shrewder judge of public opinion than Brezhnev and Chernenko. There can be little doubt that Andropov exploited this advantage during his struggle with Chernenko for the position of Party leader, and that the information he received through the KGB shaped Andropov's policies before and after his appointment as general secretary. Andropov

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[17] TASS, 30 June 1986 (emphasis added).

[18] Archie Brown, "Andropov: Discipline *and* Reform?", *Problems of Communism*, Jan.–Feb. 1983, pp. 18–24 at p. 19.

appeared relatively sanguine about the immediate danger of popular revolt, but he was concerned about the depth of public apathy and alienation. Having a good idea of the real state of affairs within the country, Andropov did not flinch, once in office, from instituting a thorough-going crackdown on corruption and introducing tough punishments for infringements of labour discipline.

By the same token, Andropov appeared to appreciate the necessity for economic reform. He seems in retrospect to have been planning to introduce some degree of decentralization of economic decision-making in both industry and agriculture. Andropov lost no time on election as Party leader in calling for measures to "extend the independence of associations and enterprises, and of state and collective farms."[19] An experiment was launched under his leadership that gave enterprise directors in certain branches of the economy greater latitude in the use of investment and wage funds. (This was the forerunner of the "Law on the State Enterprise" adopted in the summer of 1987 under Gorbachev's leadership.) Under Andropov, too, encouragement was given to the use of small, independent work teams (brigades) in industry, construction and agriculture. This policy seemed aimed at increasing worker participation in decision-making in the workplace, as well as at boosting productivity by making workers' wages and bonuses more dependent on final results. (These trends have been followed and expanded since Gorbachev's rise to power.)

Whether or not Andropov harboured any intentions of political reform may never be known. His health began to fail a bare three months after he became General Secretary. The most that can be said is that his election was the result of a general recognition within the elite that the USSR needed strong and decisive leadership to check and reverse a long-standing process of social and economic disintegration. The example of Poland's unrest seems to have made the Soviet leaders more aware of the threat posed to the stability of their own system by the moral malaise in Soviet society.

Tension in the Western Borderlands

THERE WAS one striking exception to the apathy expressed by the Soviet population toward the Polish events. Alone among the Soviet Union's national groupings, the populations of the western borderlands—the western regions of Ukraine and Belorussia, and the Baltic states—proved consistently responsive to the Polish example. These are the most recently Sovietized areas of the USSR; in them, resentment of Russian political and cultural dominance has not infrequently taken on an anti-Soviet character. To give just two examples: leaflets were circulated in

[19] *Pravda*, 23 Nov. 1982.

Estonia at the end of 1981 calling for the holding of politically motivated strikes. The strike-organizers spoke of the encouragement they had received from Solidarity's example, and among the demands they voiced was a call for an end to Soviet interference in Polish affairs.[20] In 1984, a new *samizdat* journal appeared in western Ukraine, entitled "The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine." The publication of this unofficial journal testified to a resurgence of religious belief that, despite fierce repression by the regime, appeared to be directly encouraged by the Polish example.[21]

One of the most striking "lessons of Poland," therefore, was the fact that, while the Soviet public as a whole was less susceptible to external, liberalizing influences than its leaders feared, nationalist sentiment remained a significant force in certain areas.

Implications for the Gorbachev Leadership

THE IMPLICATIONS of worker passivity were far more serious for Mikhail Gorbachev than they had been for his predecessors. The apathy of the work force and the conservatism of many members of the population represented major obstacles to the new leader's plans for economic modernization. Following his election as General Secretary in March 1985, Gorbachev showed himself acutely aware that popular demoralization was a powerful brake on economic recovery. It was vital, Gorbachev stated over and over again, "to activate the human factor." People must learn "to think and work in a new way"; a means must be found to encourage creativity and reward initiative. Only when "a restructuring of people's thinking" had been achieved, Gorbachev asserted, "shall we be able to tackle our tasks."[22]

By "activating the human factor," Gorbachev meant mobilizing the enthusiasm and energy of the population or, in the words of the sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, bringing about a situation where "exactly the same people using exactly the same material resources learn to achieve a better result."[23] Exploitation of the human factor became an integral part of Gorbachev's policy of "intensification," that is, economic growth achieved by more efficient use of inputs and the application of modern technology.

Soviet Marxism proclaims as its goal the creation of the "new man," yet the Soviet work force of the 1980s conspicuously lacked the qualities of adaptability and creativity essential for the successful running of a complex economy. In a speech in 1984, Gorbachev said that modern production required "the thinking worker," one who was "well-organized, disciplined,

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[20] For details, see *Solidarity and the Soviet Worker*, Chapter 9.
[21] Ibid.
[22] *Pravda*, 19 Sept. 1986.
[23] T. I. Zaslavskaya, "Vybor strategii," *Izvestia*, 1 June 1985.

educated, and of a new technological calibre." He complained that automated production lines, robots and machine-tools with programmed controls were already being under-utilized because Soviet workers lacked the necessary qualifications.[24]

Early in his leadership, Gorbachev pledged to streamline the system of economic management. Central planning would be rationalized; the myriad ranks of the bureaucracy would be pruned; enterprises would be given more independence; wages would be tied more closely to effort. Gorbachev was well aware, however, that even partial decentralization of the economy would run into substantial opposition from the middle ranks of officialdom. His plan was to neutralize resistance by appealing to the population over the heads of the bureaucrats, who were to be discredited in the public eye by charges of corruption. "*Perestroika*," Gorbachev stated repeatedly, "must be carried out from below and from above."[25] As a first step, he resorted to the time-honoured method of mass mobilization.

Tightening Discipline

GORBACHEV lost no time in reviving the campaign for stricter labour discipline initiated by Andropov. However, his efforts to "mobilize the human factor" by strengthening discipline were not carbon-copies of Andropov's. Gorbachev seemed to appreciate the inherent weakness of the "campaigning" approach, for the discipline drives launched under Brezhnev in 1979 and under Andropov in 1983 had an initial impact but rapidly ran out of steam.

As far as the vast majority of Soviet citizens were concerned, the most tangible change introduced by the Gorbachev leadership was the widely unpopular campaign to reduce alcohol consumption.[26] The campaign fitted Gorbachev's attempt to boost economic growth by "activating the human factor," that is, by changing the behaviour of the work force. However, Gorbachev and his associates seemed well aware that drives to tighten discipline could yield only short-term benefits unless they were combined with further-reaching measures. In particular, Gorbachev realized that many of the Soviet Union's social and economic problems, of which the declining rate of labour productivity growth was only one, had been caused by longstanding neglect of the interests and needs of the general population.[27]

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[24] M. S. Gorbachev, "Zhivoe tvorchestvo naroda," Moscow, 1984, p. 23.

[25] For example, Moscow television, 18 Sept. 1986.

[26] Vladimir Treml, "Gorbachev's Anti-drinking Campaign: A Noble Experiment or a Costly Exercise in Futility?" Supplement to the Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (hereafter RL) No. 2/87, 18 March 1987.

[27] Speaking at the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev deplored the use of what he called "the residual principle" in allocating resources to social needs; Moscow television, 25 Feb. 1986. For assessments of Gorbachev's social policies, see Walter D. Connor, "Social Policy under

Following Gorbachev's election, for example, the mass media acknowledged for the first time that sickness, rather than fecklessness on the part of the workforce, was to blame for "the overwhelming majority" of losses of worktime in many branches of the economy.[28] This fact had previously been noted only in specialist journals. A major programme to improve the quality of Soviet health care was unveiled in August 1987.[29] Gorbachev returned, too, to the formulation Soviet leaders used in the "carrot" phase of their response to the Polish events, but which they subsequently abandoned. Addressing a meeting in May 1987, the General Secretary admitted that the needs of the population had been neglected. Everybody knows, Gorbachev stated, that "how people live depends on how they work." But, he went on, the equation operates both ways, and how people work also depends on how they live, that is, on how good their living and working conditions are.[30]

Black market activity came under attack in the course of the new leader's campaign to stamp out corruption and restore public confidence in "social justice." This included the adoption of new measures to crack down on "unearned incomes." The term was used to describe a multitude of ill-gotten gains—theft of state property, bribery, speculation, moonlighting—in short, any income not derived from employment in the official economy. Gorbachev's leadership announced the adoption of stiffer penalties for those found guilty of speculation and embezzlement, and sought to close existing loopholes by introducing fresh controls.[31]

At the same time, the new leadership encouraged the development of co-operatives and small family businesses, and legalized certain forms of private enterprise (officially known as "individual labour"). These moves were clearly controversial. Legislation regulating "individual labour activity" in the fields of domestic crafts, farming and consumer services came up for discussion by the Politburo in March 1986, at the same time as measures against "unearned income."[32] But while regulations clamping down on unearned income were announced shortly thereafter—in May 1986—and came into effect the following July, measures legalizing private economic activity were not announced until November 1986, and did not come into effect until May 1987.[33] Expansion of the legitimate non-state

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Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism*, July–Aug. 1986, pp. 31–46; Aaron Trehub, "Social and Economic Rights in the Soviet Union: Work, Health Care, Social Security, and Housing," RL Supplement No. 3/86, 29 Dec. 1986; Peter Hauslohner, "Gorbachev's Social Contract," *Soviet Economy*, Jan.–March 1987, pp. 54–89.

[28] *Izvestia*, 19 March 1985.

[29] *Pravda*, 15 Aug. 1987.

[30] Ibid., 27 May 1987.

[31] Ibid., 28 May 1986; *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No 22, 1986, pp. 369–73.

[32] *Pravda*, 28 March 1986.

[33] *Izvestia*, 20 Nov. 1986.

sector took a big step forward, however, in June 1988, when a law on co-operatives was finally adopted. The new law contained strong provisions to encourage individual initiative. Henceforth, co-operatives might engage in any legal activity; no limits were set on their size or earnings; they might issue shares; and they might employ hired labour, full-time workers included.[34] In the agricultural sphere, individual farmers, families and co-operatives were to be permitted to lease land and equipment under contract for periods up to fifty years. The state retained ownership of the land, but private farmers were to be allowed to use it as if they were its owners. In an important break from past practice, they were to be allowed to hire seasonal workers.

Reforming Wages and Incentives

WAGE-REFORM constituted the Gorbachev leadership's medium-term strategy to encourage harder work in return for higher benefits. The new leadership stated its intention of correcting the Brezhnev era's steady trend toward wage equalization by widening wage differentials and increasing managerial control over salaries and manning levels. Wage increases were to be paid for only out of enterprise profits. Gorbachev called, too, for wider application of the brigade system of labour organization, which raises the correlation between output and the pay workers receive for it.

Soviet economists had long argued that real income differentials did not adequately reflect productivity differentials. In other words, people whose work was especially valuable, or who did a particular job more efficiently than their fellow-workers, should be encouraged and rewarded with higher real incomes. This might at first seem redundant advice, for Soviet blue-collar workers were already paid on a piece-rate basis to a greater extent than blue-collar workers in most Western countries, and there was an array of skill grades, bonus payments, and other differentials.

However, several features of the Soviet wage structure were widely seen as discouraging workers from expending effort, improving their skills, and seeking promotion. One was the notoriously low relative pay for certain skilled and professional personnel: junior medical staff, design engineers, teachers, and so on. Another was the tendency of managers to practise wage-levelling in payments to their staff. The output norms on which piece-rate calculations were based were kept slack, and bonuses were distributed evenly among the staff, regardless of individual performance.

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[34] *Pravda*, 8 June 1988; for assessments see RL 111/88, "The Draft Law on Co-operatives," by Philip Hanson, 15 March 1988; and RL 246/88, "The New Law Co-operatives," by John Tedstrom, 10 June 1988.

Workers with low levels of skill were often promoted to higher skill grades so that they could be paid more.

Even when there were large differentials in people's money incomes from state employment, the incentive effect was often blunted by differences in access to goods and services and in earnings from the second economy, and in general by the element of rationing, influence and corruption in an individual's command over goods and services. One aspect of this was the lack of differentiation in prices for many items—with standard rental rates for state housing in more or less desirable locations, for example. Thus advocacy of greater incentive payments was accompanied by calls for wider differentials in state pricing. There were suggestions, too, that wage reform should be accompanied by the introduction of differentiated rental rates for housing, private plots and *dachas*, a progressive inheritance tax, a graduated income tax and also, perhaps, a wealth tax.[35]

The advocates of greater differentiation in pay and bonuses did not necessarily want greater inequality in real incomes (however that might be measured). But they did want more purposeful inequalities, more closely related to individuals' contributions to output. The economist Natalya Rimashevskaya, for example, argued that social consumption should be distributed according to need while incomes from work should become more unequal.[36]

Official endorsements of stronger incentives and denunciations of wage-levelling had been commonplace for years, but under Brezhnev's leadership little was done to correct the situation. After his death, rather more was done. An experiment conducted in 1983 in Leningrad introduced greater differentiation to the pay scales of research and development (R & D) staff with the aim of encouraging those research engineers who generated new technology and good designs. Judged a success in Leningrad, the scheme was extended more widely, though with mixed results. Gorbachev complained in September 1986:

> You know, we have already adopted a sound decision. Something is not quite working. . . . These matters are getting lost somewhere. We suddenly discovered that everything we had adopted on the basis of the experiment in Leningrad—where this matter had got off the ground well—was suddenly applied in such a way as to give engineers and technicians five to seven rubles more each. This was not the aim, not the aim at all.[37]

[35] V. Z. Rogovin, "Sotsialnaya spravedlivost i sotsialisticheskoe raspredelenie zhiznennykh blag," *Voprosy filosofii*, No 9, 1986, pp. 3–20 at pp. 17–18; idem, *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 12 Nov. 1985; A. Shokhin, "Otkuda berutsya netrudovye dokhody?", *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 1, 1986; L. Velikanova, "Kazhdoi seme—otdelnuyu kvartiru," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 24 Sept. 1986; T. I. Zaslavskaya, "Taktika peremen," *Izvestia*, 18 April 1986.

[36] N. Rimashevskaya, "Raspredelenie i spravedlivost," *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 40, 1986.

[37] Radio Moscow, 18 Sept. 1986.

Following Gorbachev's ascent to power, several other measures were introduced that were meant to create more purposeful income differentials. The most important pronouncement on wages was a decree adopted in September 1986.[38] This was followed by the adoption of temporary statutes to guide its implementation. Piece-rate norms were to be tightened and enterprises encouraged to shed surplus workers (to the benefit of the pay of those remaining). Procedures for retraining and reallocating redundant workers were also set out.[39]

These revised pay-scales were to affect 75 million workers. Increases were to be proportionately larger for highly-qualified staff than for others. Piece-rate payments were to vary proportionately with output, rather than less than proportionately, as was previously the case. Differentials between engineers and blue-collar workers were to be increased. Enterprise managers were to have more discretion over the allocation of bonuses, with enterprise directors allowed to receive bonuses of up to 75 per cent of their base pay.[40]

Renegotiating the "Social Contract"

INCREASED income differentials are not the only means of strengthening material incentives. Under Gorbachev's leadership, proposals were also heard for more effective differentiation in the pricing of consumer goods and services. A possible development on this front was the channelling of a larger part of total food supplies to the non-farm population through the peasant markets and contract selling by consumer co-operatives, at the expense of lower-priced state store sales. The reduction of state subsidies for food and consumer services;[41] the expansion of charges for medical care;[42] and the introduction of greater differentiation in state housing rents[43] were all proposed.

The tendency of such changes would be to enhance the role of personal incomes and to increase the responsibility of the individual to care for himself, while reducing the role of state subventions to that of providing basic protection for members of society unable to take care of themselves. If implemented, these changes would amount to a fundamental renegotiation of the terms of the existing "social contract." As such, they were a matter

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[38] *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 43, 1986; *Pravda*, 3 Nov. 1986; *Trud*, 19 Dec. 1986.

[39] *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 44, 1986.

[40] *Izvestia*, 26 Sept. 1986.

[41] G. Lisichkin, "Razmyshleniya u myasnogo prilavka," *Trud*, 22 Aug. 1986. The state subsidy on meat and dairy products alone in 1986 was projected to be about 50 billion rubles, that is, roughly $70 billion at the official rate of exchange, or more than double the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy total or the US farm subsidy; *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 21, 1986.

[42] "Platnaya poliklinika: za i protiv," *Izvestia*, 11 July 1986.

[43] T. Zaslavskaya, "Chelovechesky facktor razvitiya ekonomiki i sotsialnaya spravedlivost," *Kommunist*, No. 13, 1986, pp. 61–73 at pp. 72–3; Velikanova, op. cit.

of considerable political sensitivity, and have been approached by the Gorbachev leadership only with the very greatest caution.

A reduced role for state subsidies was not the only controversial proposal. Some writers began to question two other planks of the "social contract": full employment and job security. The social scientist Stanislav Shatalin, for example, argued that enhancing the incentive role of wages was not enough to motivate people to work well; it was also necessary to introduce the threat of dismissal. Calling for replacement of the traditional concept of "full employment" by what he termed "socially and economically effective rational full employment," Shatalin wrote:

> The principles of socialism are not principles of charity which automatically guarantee a job for everyone regardless of his ability to work at it. A person ought to have to wage a daily economic struggle to hold on to a job that suits his abilities.[44]

Other specialists pointed out that, as the economy modernized, workers would have to be ready to undergo retraining or even relocation. The economist Vladimir Kostakov predicted that between 13 and 19 million jobs would be eliminated in the manufacturing sector by the end of the century if targets for labour productivity growth were achieved, and he said that redundant workers should shoulder the responsibility of finding new jobs themselves:

> The need to look for a job—a necessity that many now working in manufacturing and services will certainly face—may also be new and unaccustomed for us. We are used to the exact opposite—work seeking the person. . . . Obviously, considerable psychological reorientation will be required. We consider it natural and necessary that if, through objective causes, a job slot becomes unnecessary, the worker must immediately be given another job. . . . Now we shall have to get used to the idea that finding employment is, to a considerable extent, the worker's own responsibility, and that the search may require a certain amount of time—a sufficient, but not an unlimited amount.[45]

Zaslavskaya warned that for some members of society this might prove a painful experience. She seemed to think this would not be a bad thing since it would lead to an overall improvement in labour discipline:

> There is no doubt that the necessity of transferring to branches of production where labour is scarce, and of moving to other areas and cities, will be faced primarily by workers who are the least valuable

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[44] S. Shatalin, "Sotsialnoe razvitie i ekonomichesky rost," *Kommunist*, No. 14, 1986, pp. 59–70 at p. 63.

[45] V. Kostakov, "Odin, kak semero," *Sovetskaya kultura*, 4 Jan. 1986.

> from the point of view of the work collective, who are indifferent to work and output quality, and who take an inactive part in social life, to say nothing of idlers, drunkards, rolling stones, and so on. Such a situation will lead to . . . stronger labour discipline and an increase in the quality of work.[46]

Widening Participation and Consultation

FOR THE FIRST year of his tenure, Gorbachev appeared to hope that measures such as tightening discipline and increasing incentives for hard work would prove enough to give at least an initial boost to the economy. The population, however, failed to respond or responded negatively. Gradually, the new leader became convinced that popular apathy was so strong that, until it was overcome, other changes would be impossible. "We must start the reorganization by reorganizing man himself," Gorbachev told a meeting in April 1986.[47] In his efforts to "activate the human factor," Gorbachev shifted the spotlight to political and social reform.

In a major speech delivered in Krasnodar in September 1986, Gorbachev for the first time described the "democratization" of Soviet society as his main priority. He said that when he was talking to crowds on the city streets earlier in the day,

> I thought of how much our people have grown up, of what intellectual potential they possess, creative potential, and of how, in resolving issues in the country, we still do not make use of this potential, relying on administrative injunction, giving orders, and issuing commands.

"We must," Gorbachev went on, "include the people in the process of restructuring via the democratization of society."[48] "Our people," he stated the following day, "have matured to the extent that they must be trusted to administer themselves."[49]

The prominent political commentator Fedor Burlatsky termed Gorbachev's call for democratization a "sensational" departure, because "previously we used only [the term] 'the further development of socialist democracy.'" What Gorbachev was saying, Burlatsky asserted, was that without democratization—that is, without political reform—the Soviet Union would be unable to attain its economic goals. Burlatsky admitted, however, that it was not clear exactly what "democratization" entailed in a

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[46] T. Zaslavskaya, "Chelovechesky. . . ," p. 70. For further details of the discussion, see Trehub, op. cit.

[47] Moscow television, 8 April 1986.

[48] Ibid., 18 Sept. 1986.

[49] Radio Moscow, 19 Sept. 1986.

single-party state. And, he added, "we don't want to change the one-party system."[50]

Gorbachev's "democratization" consisted of three main elements: (1) liberalization in the cultural sphere and greater openness (*glasnost*) in the mass media; (2) electoral reform; (3) increased worker participation in management.

The common theme in all these was that the leadership wanted to reduce the passivity and inertia of the population by encouraging popular participation—still, no doubt, guided from above—in the solution of economic and social problems. The Soviet leaders' approach to the relationship between the régime and the rank-and-file was being reformulated.

Cultural liberalization and the introduction of greater openness in the media appealed primarily to members of the intelligentsia, but participation was not restricted to this grouping. At a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in January 1987, Gorbachev made far-reaching proposals for electoral reform,[51] including the introduction of multiple candidacy in local government elections. Previously, Soviet voters had had no choice at all, being presented with a single, officially approved candidate in each constituency; the result was widespread indifference on the part of the electorate.[52] As a result of Gorbachev's proposals, multiple-candidacy was introduced on an experimental basis in some local government elections in June 1987 and, it is promised, will become the rule in elections to local and national governing bodies to be held in 1989. Multiple-candidacy and secret balloting are also to be made obligatory in elections to Party, trade union, and Komsomol posts. These innovations were of considerable potential significance. Some scepticism was nonetheless in order, for the CPSU showed absolutely no sign of relinquishing its cherished right to preselect candidates for positions of real power or influence. Indeed, Gorbachev proposed, and won acceptance of, a controversial proposal which would, in 1989, see local Party leaders standing for election as chairmen of local government bodies. Carried to its logical extreme, this proposal culminated earlier than expected, in October 1988, in Gorbachev's own election as Soviet State President.

Finally, Gorbachev called for the introduction of "self-management" in the workplace. "We want," he said in the summer of 1986, "to activate the human factor by going over to new ways of managing the economy."[53]

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[50] Quotations from RL 396/86, "Interview with Fedor Burlatsky," by Henry Hamman, 10 Oct. 1986; and from a talk delivered by Burlatsky at the University of Surrey on 9 Nov. 1986.

[51] *Pravda*, 28 Jan. 1987.

[52] V. Vasil'ev, "Vlast, otkrytaya dlya vsekh," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 17 Sept. 1986; idem, "Demokratiya i perestroika," *Pravda*, 31 Oct. 1986.

[53] Radio Moscow, 31 July 1986.

New legislation governing the activities of state-owned enterprises was adopted in June 1987.[54] It called for the workforce to be consulted when an enterprise director was appointed (though election by the workforce was still to be subject to approval by the enterprise's "superior organ," that is, a branch ministry or state committee). In addition, the workforce was given the power to recommend the dismissal of a manager whose performance proved unsatisfactory. The practice of allowing workers to elect their foremen and team-leaders was also extended. Further measures to expand worker participation called for the creation, at enterprise level, of "councils of the work collective," consisting of elected representatives of the workforce, management, trade unions and Party.

A National Time-Bomb?

GORBACHEV's encouragement of openness in the mass media struck a responsive chord in the non-Russian republics. Nationalist riots broke out in December 1986 in the Kazakh capital of Alma-Ata, and in the spring of 1988, tensions flared between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, but it was in the Western borderlands that intellectuals spoke out most openly. Writers and historians in Belorussia, Ukraine and the Baltic states seized on *glasnost* to express long-standing grievances about the loss of cultural identity among the national minorities and, in particular, about the way the teaching of Russian was promoted at the expense of the national languages.[55] In August 1988, hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, calling for greater political and economic autonomy for their countries.

In 1980–81, it was the populations of the Soviet Union's Western borderlands that proved most responsive to the Polish events. It is therefore not surprising that their response to Solidarity was echoed, only a few years later, in their use of *glasnost* to express bitterness at Russian political and cultural dominance. In Burlatsky's words, the nationalities issue still presents "a very serious problem."[56] How can Moscow loosen the reins in some sections of Soviet society without encouraging the growth of centrifugal forces in such sensitive areas as the non-Russian republics and the Soviet Union's East European neighbours? *Glasnost* is sparking demands and expectations that Kremlin leaders will be unable to satisfy without causing the territorial fragmentation of the Soviet empire, but this, Moscow has made clear, is an outcome it is resolutely determined not to permit.

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[54] *Izvestia*, 1 July 1987.

[55] Numerous articles have been devoted to this subject in the research publications of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

[56] Interview with Radio Prague, 8 Sept. 1987.

"The Postwar Generation"

WESTERN observers have described Gorbachev as a product of the Soviet system, but he and his colleagues differ from their predecessors in at least one significant respect: they are less burdened by direct experience of the Great Terror of the 1930s than the Brezhnev generation born between 1900 and 1906. This was the age-group, as Jerry Hough puts it, whose careers spanned the worst period of the Stalin era. Promoted at a young age into the posts of those who perished in the purges of 1937–38, leaders of the Brezhnev generation were the direct beneficiaries of Stalin's terror, and remained indelibly marked by the experience.[57] Gorbachev and his contemporaries, on the other hand, belong to what Hough has termed "the postwar generation" of Soviet leaders: those born in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Gorbachev was born in 1931). These are men who passed their adolescence during the Second World War; too young to see wartime military service, they received their college educations in the immediate postwar period.

The war years of 1941–45—when leaders and led found themselves united against the common enemy—were perhaps the only period in Soviet history when the authorities could feel reasonably confident that they enjoyed real popular support. For Gorbachev and his colleagues, who were too young to have experienced the full impact of the Great Terror at first hand, Khrushchev's revelation of Stalin's crimes at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 was a formative experience. The first Party Congress that Gorbachev attended as a delegate was the 22nd in 1961, at which Stalin's body was unceremoniously removed from Lenin's mausoleum. This combination of circumstances may perhaps explain why Gorbachev and his colleagues appear to have outgrown much of the fear and mistrust of the population that typified the Brezhnev generation. In other words, Gorbachev and those of his colleagues who are close to him in age may be more likely than their predecessors to believe that the advantages of increased participation by the people in decision-making could outweigh the risks.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV is making a serious and long overdue effort to modernize Soviet society. His purpose is to improve the Soviet Union's economic performance and maintain its superpower status. The worker unrest that broke out in Poland in 1980–81 brought home to the Soviet leadership what can happen in a single-party state when the rights and interests of the population are ignored by the elite. Gorbachev sees a modernized Soviet Union as a society in which the public can and must be

[57] Jerry F. Hough, "The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession," *Problems of Communism*, July–Aug. 1979, pp. 1–16 at pp. 5 and 15.

given more information and responsibility and in general be trusted by the leadership more than was previously the case. There is both logic and paradox in Gorbachev's attempt to build a more open society and in his choice of *glasnost* as the means whereby to do it. Paradox: because Gorbachev's main institutional backer seems to have been the security police. Logic: because information is the KGB's stock-in-trade. No Soviet institution (with the possible exception of the press, upon whose support Gorbachev is also dependent) is better placed than the KGB to give an honest evaluation of the seriousness of the Soviet Union's economic and social problems, and to appreciate the contribution made to those problems by the lies that past generations of Soviet leaders fed to the population.

The other side of the coin is that Gorbachev expects the population to work harder and with less economic security. Expressions of alarm can be heard from members of the public and from Party and government bureaucrats. It is clear that resistance to Gorbachev's policies is to be found at every level of Soviet society.

As was mentioned above, the average Soviet citizen seemed in 1980–81 to feel little sympathy for Solidarity's ideals. On the contrary: many Soviet workers disliked Poland's free trade union movement and all it stood for because they were afraid, quite literally, that it would take the bread out of their mouths. With certain exceptions (the creative intelligentsia, and the inhabitants of the Soviet Union's western borderlands), the Soviet population does not now seem particularly eager for democratic freedoms, not even for the rather limited freedoms Gorbachev is offering them. Work place reorganization, increased popular participation, freer access to controversial books and films, a more candid appraisal of Soviet history—such policies are not likely to shake the workforce out of its apathy. Only the prospect of better supplies of consumer goods will do that. This is perhaps the greatest lesson the Polish events hold for Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gorbachev's approach poses a fundamental challenge to the traditional Soviet pattern of leader-led relations, and it is still far from clear whether the existing system will be able or willing to accommodate the changes he is trying to make.

When the Desert Blooms: Cultural Developments Under Gorbachev

G. D. G. Murrell

THERE WAS, OF COURSE, cultural life before Gorbachev—the hundred flowers which have recently bloomed did not do so in a complete desert; nor was the current thaw preceded by a totally frozen landscape.

The Brezhnev period saw the publication of much mediocre literature, but also some very talented works by writers as different in theme and style as Rasputin, Trifonov, Aitmatov, Shukshin and Iskander. A few previously banned works were offered up even in those days—most notably, Bulgakov's *Master and Margarita*, collections of short stories by Platonov and early prose by Pasternak. In the theatre there were Lyubimov's productions at the Taganka. While many of Shatrov's plays gathered dust on the shelves, others were being produced: "Thus We Shall Win", for example, which had its premier in 1982 at the Moscow Arts Theatre. Although a bombastic propaganda play, it included what was in those days an electrifying scene of Lenin dictating in full the well-known characterization of Stalin in his testament. There was a remarkable production by Boris Pokrovsky of a 17th century religious play, *Rostovskoe Deistvo*, at the Kamerny Theatre. A few films by Tarkovsky and Paradzhanov were released with a very restricted distribution. Some canvases of Chagall and Kandinsky were shown at an exhibition at the Tretyakov Gallery in 1979 and 1980.

Censorship and the Party line could never fully stifle creative work. For some artists it even served as a kind of inspiration, producing, for example, allegories and legends in Aitmatov's novels and stories; delightful satire in Iskander's short stories; ingenious productions of classical plays by writers such as Ostrovsky and Chekhov to carry a modern political message. Other artists ignored or found ways round the official obstacles, retreating into the backwater of village prose or depicting universal problems of everyday life in a non-subversive but human and honest way which had little or nothing in common with socialist realism or Party precepts.

In 1983 and 1984 I visited local cinemas in Moscow at least once a week, watching any Soviet film available, and thus I tested a fairly large random

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The opinions and interpretations in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

sample of the 200 or more feature films released annually in the Soviet Union. I was struck by how apolitical they were. The most popular genre seemed to be the *bytovaya komediya* (the comedy of everyday life) which portrayed ordinary lives and problems and showed considerable irreverence for Soviet institutions insofar as they featured at all. Ideology seemed to be ignored, apart from the occasional overtly political propaganda film.

The system did not in general succeed in imposing its own values and stereotypes on Soviet cultural life, and it even occasionally let through some stimulating and original creative work. But the system did manage to suppress, emasculate or filter out a great deal of true originality and talent. It depressed aesthetic levels and promoted mediocre artists and mediocre works to artificial success by bureaucratic pressures. The apogee of this process was the award in 1979 of a Lenin Prize for Literature to Brezhnev. Some of the best creative minds were reduced to silence and in some cases to emigration or expulsion, including a number of the most talented avant garde artists such as Neizvestny, Rabin and Shemyakin; the writers Solzhenitsyn, Nekrasov, Aksenov and Brodsky; the theatre producer Lyubimov and the film director Tarkovsky. The term "stagnation", now applied to the Brezhnev period, was every bit as appropriate in the arts as in the economy.

Cultural policy

IT IS CURIOUS THAT the transformation in the Soviet cultural scene during the past two years has occurred without any overt change in Party policy on cultural affairs. There has been no major pronouncement by Gorbachev on cultural policy, no Central Committee Plenum on the subject, and no programmatic Central Committee decrees on cultural affairs. (Statements concerning culture have mostly dealt with nuts and bolts organizational matters.) The Party had a good deal more to say about cultural policy during the Andropov/Chernenko interregnum—there was the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum on ideology, which took a very conservative line on culture, and a major speech by Chernenko at the 50th anniversary meeting of the Union of Writers in September 1984, which was a little more permissive in tone. But at the 27th Party Congress (February/March 1986) Gorbachev barely touched on literature and the arts, and when he did refer to them it was in orthodox and conventional terms. There were conflicting signals in the other speeches at the Congress, but the overall message was familiar and rather depressing. The old guard of conservative cultural bureaucrats was re-elected en masse to the Central Committee—Chakovsky, Markov, Gribachev, Khrennikov, Kulidzhanov et al.

There has been neither a new Party line on culture nor an authoritative

restatement of the old line. The new "thaw" seems to be a largely spontaneous response to Gorbachev's call for frankness, *glasnost* and psychological restructuring. It has not been explicitly decreed from above and it has not been unambiguously encouraged by the Party leadership (with the notable exception of the remarkable editorial in *Kommunist* No. 15, 1987, to which I shall return later). Although in practice it seems that the functions of censorship in relation to literature have been significantly curtailed, there has never been any announcement to that effect. The Party line still appears to be cautious and ambivalent with the two major Politburo spokesmen on culture and ideology, Ligachev and Yakovlev, adopting very different tones in their public pronouncements. So where does the Party stand?

One theory current in Moscow in the early stages of the Gorbachev regime was that Gorbachev was too busy with urgent problems of the economy and political restructuring to focus on culture. He had decided to let the intelligentsia run its own affairs and put its own house in order. (According to one rumour he said as much to the director of the Moscow Arts Theatre, Efremov.) Had the Party really taken its ideological eye off the ball? This hardly seems likely. Gorbachev has demonstrated his close political interest in cultural affairs, for instance, during the series of meetings he held with editors, writers and theatre workers in June 1986. Ligachev also has involved himself closely with the organizational side of cultural developments, especially in theatre reform. Moreover there have been key changes in the ideological cultural apparatus with a virtually complete turnover in leading posts. Thus in the Politburo Ponomarev and Zimyanin were replaced by Ligachev and Yakovlev; the Minister of Culture, Demichev (11 years in the post), was replaced by Zakharov; the Head of the Central Committee Culture Department for 20 years, Shauro, was replaced by Voronov; the Chairman of Goskino, Ermash, was replaced by Kamshalov and so on. There has been no lack of interest from the Party. But it has chosen not to intervene overtly and not to lay down a clear line.

What can be said about Gorbachev's personal attitudes and interests in cultural matters? The evidence is fragmentary but rather significant. The summaries and unofficial records of his meetings with writers and editors do not give any clear line on his personal views. But some of his off-the-cuff remarks, for example during a walkabout in Krasnodar in the autumn of 1986, are interesting. He told the citizens of Krasnodar that during his recent vacation he and Raisa had been reading Dostoevsky together. They had been struck by Dostoevsky's view that "the Russian heart is more open to brotherhood and unity than any other." Later he told the Soviet and foreign writers attending the Issyk-Kul Conference that he had read virtually everything that Chingiz Aitmatov had written. This is significant if true, since Aitmatov's works are consistently liberal and humanistic.

Visits by Gorbachev have been recorded to the Moscow Arts Theatre

where he saw Misharin's play "Silver Wedding;" to the Taganka under Efros to see a Molière play (he is said to have asked Efros why Lyubimov's productions had been removed from the repertoire); and to the Vakhtangov Theatre to see two Shatrov plays, including the première of "The Peace of Brest-Litovsk." In the summer of last year Gorbachev made a very significant gesture when he donated 50,000 roubles from the royalties of his books published abroad to the fund for the erection of a monument to Vasily Terkin, the fictional hero of Tvardovsky's narrative poem. There was a clear symbolic meaning in this, since Tvardovsky is not only an accepted Soviet classic and author of the patriotic war poem but also, of course, the editor of *Novy Mir* in its heyday and champion of liberalism in Soviet literature. And Terkin is not only the hero of the patriotic war poem, but also featured in the sequel "Terkin in the Underworld" which, when it was published for the first and only time in *Izvestia* in 1963, was the most outspoken anti-Stalinist work of literature which had yet appeared.

As for Raisa, it is true that she is on close terms with Academician Likhachev who exerts considerable and benevolent intellectual and spiritual authority these days, and she is a member of the Presidium of the Cultural Fund which he heads. It is rumoured that she uses her influence in support of various liberal artistic causes. But her role in cultural affairs has been much exaggerated and there is certainly no question of her becoming Minister of Culture. As regards other Soviet leaders, the role of Shevardnadze in promoting the film *Pokayanie* (Repentance) was confirmed by the director Abuladze at a press conference in Vienna in July 1987. He revealed that Shevardnadze, then Party leader in Georgia, had given the go-ahead to the film in 1979, but advised Abuladze not to send the script to Goskino who would only ban it. Shevardnadze's attitude may owe something to the fact that his wife's parents were victims of Stalin's purges.

As already mentioned above, Ligachev and Yakovlev appear to be pulling in opposite directions. At the Party Congress Ligachev called for stable good weather in culture instead of thaws and freezes. He apparently has in mind a temperature not too far above zero. Ligachev's subsequent public statements on the arts—his article in the journal *Teatr*;[1] his speech in Saratov;[2] his remarks in the editorial offices of *Sovetskaya Kultura*[3]—consistently include the familiar orthodox rhetoric from earlier times, about the importance of Party control of the arts, ideological content, socialist realism, positive heroes. He frequently criticizes the excessive emphasis on the negative phenomena in the Soviet past and present. Ligachev seems incidentally to have a strong personal interest in Russian folk and classical

[1] *Teatr* issue No. 8, 1986.
[2] Speech published in *Pravda*, 6 March 1987.
[3] Reported in *Sovetskaya Kultura* on 7 July 1987.

music, and a strong antipathy to rock. The speeches and articles of Yakovlev on the other hand have a remarkably liberal flavour and are unusually sophisticated in expression.

It is not that Ligachev is totally opposed to the policy of liberalization of the arts; indeed in specific cases he has been credited with taking very liberal decisions, for instance on the release of *Pokayanie*. But Ligachev appears to see cultural relaxation in a much narrower framework than Gorbachev and Yakovlev. Ligachev's attitude is strictly utilitarian: he sees the arts as a weapon to be aimed at social and political ills identified and targeted by the Party. The purpose is to expose corruption, abuse and slackness; to awaken the conscience of officials and the vigilance of the public; as he put it in relation to the recent batch of political plays: "to help the Party overcome unfavourable trends in the country."

Gorbachev evidently sees the role of the cultural intelligentsia in a much broader perspective. Their role, in his eyes, is to galvanize Soviet society into a more critical, creative and enterprising frame of mind. Gorbachev appears to have perceived the link which does indeed exist between the stifling of intellectual and cultural freedom on the one hand, and stagnation in economic and scientific progress and the decline of moral standards on the other. The same link was identified in a slightly different perspective by a writer speaking at the USSR Writers' Congress in 1986, who observed that "hack literature and the Chernobyl disaster had grown from the same root system of incompetence and corruption". Gorbachev, moreover, regards the creative intelligentsia as a political ally—his shock troops in the battle against the Party bureaucrats. In one of his meetings with the intellectuals—according to an unofficial record—he spoke of his desperate need for the help of the intelligentsia.

The first crack in the ice of the cultural thaw came not at the Party Congress, but at the various congresses of the so-called creative unions in the course of 1986. There was, however, an important harbinger of change at the RSFSR Writers' Congress which took place before the Party Congress in December 1985. On that occasion the poet Yevtushenko—who has a remarkably keen nose for a change in the ideological weather—made probably the most outspoken public speech in the Soviet Union for two decades. He raised all the principal issues of *glasnost*—the "blank spots" in history, the purges, censorship, privileges, food shortages, rationing, the brutality of collectivization and so on. His principal theme was that intellectual freedom is an essential prerequisite for economic and scientific success. But at the first Congress to take place after the Party Congress, that of the Union of Composers, in April 1986, there was no sign of any wind of change and the First Secretary, Khrennikov, who had been in charge of the union since 1948, was duly re-elected.

The whole Congress appears to have passed off uneventfully. However,

the 8th Congress of Film-Makers held in May 1986 was a very different matter. Indeed it proved to be a turning-point in recent Soviet cultural history. This was the scene of one of the few democratic elections ever held in the Soviet Union. The stage was set by the Moscow Organization of Cinematographers who contrived (thanks to the film director Eldar Ryazanov who masterminded the operation) to exclude all the official candidates from the Moscow delegation to the Congress including Bondarchuk and about a dozen other luminaries. At the Congress itself almost the whole of the old guard of the union were voted off the secretariat including the First Secretary Kulidzhanov, who had spoken at the Party Congress and had been re-elected subsequently to the Central Committee. He was replaced by Elem Klimov—a Party member for 25 years but nonetheless a man of great integrity, who had personal experience of the suffocating effect of Goskino and censorship, since his most recent films, *Agoniya* and "Go and See" (*Idi i Smotri*), were held up for over a decade. The head of Goskino, Ermash, was subjected to a barrage of criticism in speeches at the Congress. His own address was sabotaged by prolonged ironic applause in the wrong places—a device which had been used to good effect at the RSFSR Writers' Congress and was to be employed again at the USSR Writers' Congress. The newly elected secretariat included a number of interesting and talented film directors such as Abdrashitov, Shakhnazarov, Shengalaya and Panfilov.

Although it was reported that the Central Committee Secretary Yakovlev had nominated Klimov, and there was no overt sign of Party displeasure at these extraordinary happenings, everyone held their breath in the wake of the Congress. A week before the 8th Writers' Congress of the USSR the following month, Gorbachev called for a meeting with a group of prominent writers. This was at first regarded as an ominous development: possibly a shot across the bows of the Writers' Congress. The *Pravda* summary of what Gorbachev said could certainly be read in that way; but liberal writers actually emerged encouraged, and reported that Gorbachev, throughout the four-and-a-half hours of the meeting, had been very relaxed and had asked many questions but had not laid down the line. Gorbachev apparently said that although perhaps they went a bit too far, the Film-Makers' Congress had turned out very well. In the event, although the changes in the leadership of the Writers' Union were less dramatic than those effected by the film makers, it was more lively and outspoken than any previous Writers' Congress, including the two held under Khrushchev, and the 1967 Congress when Solzhenitsyn circulated his celebrated attack on censorship, much of which was echoed in public statements at this Congress.

It was enlivened by some remarkable incidents. The arch-conservative First Secretary Markov had read only seven of the 70 pages of his boring and retrograde opening address when he portentously fainted and was carried bodily from the hall. Vladimir Karpov, recently appointed editor

of *Novy Mir*, was asked by Gorbachev himself to finish reading the speech and did so. During the debate, for once not a misnomer, there was a public row between the thriller writer Semenov and the First Secretary of the Moscow Writers' Organization, Kuznetsov—the latter seizing the microphone in order to rebut charges by Semenov. And there was the famous walk-out by the Georgian writers in response to what they took, probably rightly, to be a nationalist slur by the Russian writers Astafiev and Rasputin. Their departure was accompanied by cries from the audience of "get back to the markets" and similar chauvinistic abuse.

There was also a serious debate at the Congress about the pernicious effect on the quality of Soviet literature of censorship, interference by narrow-minded bureaucrats, the timidity of editors, and the way mediocrity and hackwork had flourished while talented writing had been suppressed or emasculated.

Other issues raised, often in outspoken terms, were the Northern Rivers scheme, the pollution of Lake Baikal, and the planned Victory Monument in Moscow, which was subjected to public attack for the first time by the poet Voznesensky and others. Speakers emphasized also the need for honesty about Soviet history. There were repeated calls for the rehabilitation and publication of the works of Russian and Soviet authors who had been neglected or suppressed. The name of Pasternak was repeatedly invoked and there were calls for the publication of all his works. At the end of the Congress, the moderate conservative Karpov was elected First Secretary while Markov was kicked upstairs to become Chairman of the Union. The newly elected Buro of the Secretariat was roughly evenly balanced between liberals and conservatives.

The spirit of reform was carried further forward at the inaugural Congress of the Union of Theatre Workers on 5 and 6 December 1986, which elected a liberal leadership in which the actors Kiril Lavrov and Mikhail Ulyanov were prominent. In the second half of 1986 the atmosphere in Soviet culture was transformed.

Dramatic changes

IT WAS IN THE THEATRE that, for the Russians, the first signs of the cultural thaw appeared: whereas the literature and some of the films of recent years have been accessible to people in the West, only those living in Moscow during this period could follow the developments in the theatre closely. The theatre season of 1985 to 1986 in Moscow and Leningrad was notable for a number of so-called "political" plays which varied considerably in quality and in theme, but had in common that they dealt honestly and outspokenly with the problems and abuses of Soviet society.

The first play to attract widespread public attention was Aleksandr

Misharin's play "Silver Wedding." This is about the return visit by an important Moscow official to his home town in Siberia, and the effect on a sorry group of venal and incompetent local Party and government officials whom he had installed in office earlier in his career. The local officials believe, wrongly as it turns out, that the Moscow boss is about to lose his job. Fearful for their own future, they start to engage in mutual recrimination, exposing each other's sins and misdeeds, presenting a remarkable portrait of a corrupt ruling class. Gorbachev and Ligachev are said to have seen and approved the play, and Ligachev stated in print that it was "a strong contribution to the cause of restructuring." At every performance the Moscow Arts Theatre was besieged by black Zil and Volga cars as senior officials went to the play apparently to do penance. One performance was reputedly reserved entirely for the Central Committee. The scenery and costumes depicted quite graphically the relative luxury which local Party bosses enjoyed; for example, the *obkom* secretary's wife was festooned with furs and diamonds. There were some sharp comments in the dialogue: "We sow seeds in spring and reap plenums in autumn." And much breast-beating: "What a debt we owe to the people!" The play depicts a kind of crisis of conscience of the ruling class and the overall impression is rather dispiriting and distasteful. Perhaps it did the officials some good—there were many well-dressed bureaucrats squirming in their seats who did not applaud—but as theatre it was disappointing.

Shatrov's "Dictatorship of Conscience" which opened at the Lenin Komsomol Theatre in February 1986 takes the form of a mock trial of Lenin staged as an agit-prop exercise by the young editors of a youth newspaper. In effect they purport to present the pros and cons of Soviet socialism, and the principal message of the play is to condemn Stalinism while upholding the alleged purity of Leninist ideals. The witnesses for the prosecution include Winston Churchill and Dostoevsky's character Verkhovensky from *The Devils*. Verkhovensky recites a monologue embodying Dostoevsky's prophetic vision of the logical outcome of extreme socialism—90 per cent of the population become slaves to the élite remainder; lying becomes a basic principle; all members of society spy on, and denounce, each other. All this, directly quoted from Dostoevsky's words, had the audience literally gasping. Another witness was a Soviet lorry driver, described as the grandson of a member of the Black Hundreds, who has a picture of Stalin in his cab. The star witness for the somewhat limp defence is General Karbyshev who died bravely in a German PoW camp still loyal to his socialist beliefs.

The actors from time to time comment on the issues raised in the play in supposedly improvised conversations. The discussion of corruption in the Party in the 1920s leads one actor for example to ask another what he thinks about the Rashidov scandal in Uzbekistan. This was not in the original text

but has become an established part of the performance. At the first performances the actors went into the stalls with microphones and solicited comments and opinions from the audience. This practice was however discontinued when one man said that his father, a Menshevik and a socialist, had been shot under Stalin. What sort of socialism shoots socialists? The weakness of the play is that it purports to debate the pros and cons of Soviet history while flirting with the central issue of Stalinism with which it never comes to grips. But one must remember that things have moved very fast since the beginning of 1986. At that time open criticism of Stalin was still taboo. Shatrov's latest play, "Onward, Onward, Onward," published in the first issue of *Znamya* for 1988, is openly critical of Stalin. It was subjected to a sharp, politically loaded attack in *Pravda* of 15 February but vigorously defended in a letter to the newspaper by a group of prominent actors and producers including Tovstonogov who subsequently confirmed that he intended to produce the play in Leningrad.

The play *Govori* ("Speak") at the Ermolova Theatre is based on short stories by Valentin Ovechkin, published in 1952–3, as well as episodes from Ovechkin's own life. It is set in the years before and after Stalin's death, but the topicality is obvious and undisguised. The play depicts the dire reality of Soviet rural life contrasted with upbeat official propaganda, illustrated by the newsreel from July 1952 with which the play begins, showing fields of waving corn and phalanxes of tractors manned by happy farmers. A new *raikom* First Secretary, Martynov, is appointed after Stalin's death. "At last a young and energetic leader," remarks one of the characters to appreciative laughter from the audience.

Martynov is determined to introduce reforms; he sacks official after official but nothing really changes and as he becomes increasingly frustrated he starts to fall into the ways of his predecessors. The final scene is a parody of a Party meeting or Congress, complete with banners, a huge portrait of Lenin and a red draped tribune. The stage audience nods off while the Party Secretary rattles off at comically high speed clichés about plan fulfilment and socialist obligations—to loud applause and laughter from the real audience. The Party Secretary then gives way to the honoured milkmaid who begins painfully reciting a prepared speech. Martynov then has a change of heart—he takes the script from the milkmaid and asks her to say what she really thinks. A crowd of shabby, down-trodden looking peasants standing at the back of the stage, where they had appeared from time to time throughout the play as a kind of mournful and silent Greek chorus, slowly advance towards the footlights chanting "*Govori!*" (speak out). With the milkmaid still groping for words the curtain falls. An effective climax made more poignant when I saw it, the week after the 27th Party Congress, by a cry from the back of the stalls of "*Pozdno!*" (too late)—reflecting the

general feeling in Moscow that the 27th Party Congress had disappointed liberal expectations.

The play *Statya* ("The Article") at the Red Army Theatre is distinguished from the other political plays by being funny as well as sharp. The plot concerns the persecution of an architect who wrote an article criticizing local authorities in Siberia for commissioning new housing which was still unfinished and of very bad quality, in order to report plan fulfilment. The director of the play Eremin apparently transformed a rather earnest and pedestrian play by Roman Solntsev on this worthy theme into a musical extravaganza with a great deal of satire and parody. The play is remarkably irreverent about Party and State institutions including the Party Control Committee, and there is a hilarious take-off of Brezhnev in the person of the somnolent and senile Second Party Secretary of the *obkom* who spends most of the first two acts dozing at his desk at the side of the auditorium, from time to time asking his secretary in the familiar slurred voice for glasses of tea. Occasionally he gets up and, with his mouth opening and closing like a goldfish, he waves limply at the audience—to delighted applause.

The staging is lively and inventive with lots of satirical devices. At the end of the first act a militia man clears the stage and shoos the audience out, complaining that "this is going too far" and that the actors had better do something classical instead. So at the beginning of the second act the director tells the actors to change into different costumes since they are going to do the *Inspector General* instead. He arranges the actors in the familiar frozen tableau for the arrival of the Party Control Inspector from Moscow. The latter is discovered smiling benignly and the actors ostentatiously adopt expressions of mock horror. I was told by a secretary of the Writers' Union that *Statya* had infuriated Party officials more than any of the other political plays.

"Brothers and Sisters" at the Maly Dramatichesky Theatre in Leningrad is based on two novels by Fedor Abramov and depicts life in a village near Arkhangelsk in the north of Russia from 1945–9. It lasts in all $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours and is shown in two parts on consecutive evenings. Some Russians say it is the best theatrical production in the Soviet Union since the war. It is certainly more impressive than any play I have seen in the Soviet Union, including the productions by Lyubimov at the Taganka.

There is no real plot, but a series of episodes which show with grim realism how the suffering and privation endured stoically by the peasants—especially the women—during the war continued and even grew worse as the result of Party policy after the war. The title "Brothers and Sisters" is an allusion to Stalin's notoriously belated speech at the beginning of the war when he made a successful appeal to feelings of patriotism and solidarity. The play shows that once the danger was over, the "brothers and sisters" were spurned and exploited mercilessly.

"Brothers and Sisters" and *Govori* present a devastating indictment of both agricultural policy and the idiocy of rural life under Stalin, which was strikingly at variance with the current line on Party history. These plays were put on before journalists and historians began to raise the issues of collectivization and the degeneration of rural life, and when they were first produced, had enormous social and political impact.

Among the other plays I saw during the 1985–6 season were the following:

- "Theatre in the time of Nero and Seneca" by Radzinsky (Mayakovsky Theatre), which uses classical history to convey a topical message about the way that high moral precepts can be exploited to establish tyranny, and about the weakness of intellectuals who compromise with dictators.
- "Burden of Decision" by Burlatsky (Satire Theatre), which gives a relatively objective and sympathetic account of the Washington handling of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
- "Supreme Court" by Vaksberg (Gogol Theatre); this is about a factory director who violates industrial safety in order to fulfil the plan, leading to a fatal accident.
- "Three Girls in Blue" by Petrushevskaya (Lenin Komsomol Theatre) is an unusual play in an experimental style about the loneliness of Soviet women with echoes of Chekhov's *Three Sisters*. It was finally put on after a four-year battle with the censors.
- "The Quotation" by Leonid Zorin (Mossovet Theatre) is a satirical comedy about the servility of Soviet bureaucracy, written entirely in rhyming couplets in the manner of Griboyedov.
- "Sporting Scenes of 1981" by Radzinsky (Ermolova Theatre) is a Soviet version of Albee's *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* in which the squabbling couples are related to the Party government élite. There is a lot about privileges, black official cars and access to foreign goods as well as some unusually frank language—for the Soviet stage—about sex and other things.
- "Tamada" by Galin (Moscow Arts Theatre) is an unambiguous allegory about the gulf between uplifting propaganda and the sordid reality of Soviet life demonstrated in the celebration of two weddings at a Moscow restaurant.
- "Sholom Aleikhem Street 40" by Stavitsky (Stanislavsky Drama Theatre) is a relatively sympathetic account of a family of Jews living in Odessa, some of whose members decide to emigrate.
- "Bird's Eye View" by Mikhail Zhvanetsky (Estrada Theatre) is a remarkably outspoken satirical review comprising a series of dialogues and monologues about the ills of the Soviet system. One of them ends with the memorable phrase "the history of Russia is the history of the struggle of ignorance against injustice".

Theatre reform

THE THEATRE EXPERIMENT was scheduled to last for two years, beginning in January 1987, and involved about 70 major Soviet theatres. The reform allowed theatres a degree of artistic and financial autonomy, as well as control over their own repertoires; and it provided for the election of directors by the whole company. The number of planning indicators imposed on theatres by higher organs was reduced from eleven to three—total audiences, wage fund and state subsidy. Russian artistic temperament being what it is, the introduction of democracy into the theatres had some fairly dramatic results. Efremov, the director of the Moscow Arts Theatre, in his attempts to reform the company, chose to divide it in two: his idea was to separate the active and talented actors from the elderly has-beens who drew full pay for rarely, if ever, appearing on stage. The conservative opposition to this move was led by the actress Tatyana Doronina. The theatre was in turmoil for months before the eventual victory of Efremov. But ironically this was achieved only because of the old-style administrative intervention of the Minister of Culture and the newly formed theatre union. Efremov is now in possession of the old Moscow Arts Theatre building which has recently been restored and re-opened.

The 1985–6 season marked a high point in the theatre. The following season was much less interesting as far as political theatre is concerned—largely because playwrights and directors could not keep pace with actual developments. One Soviet theatre critic made this point explicitly in an article in *Sovetskaya Kultura* and expressed tongue-in-cheek sympathy with a young playwright, Perekalin, who had produced a play in which he advanced what he thought was the daring idea of having more than one candidate for elections to Soviets, only to find that this had actually become official party policy. The pace of *glasnost* over those two years can be judged by the fact that a number of the most interesting political plays of that season, for which in 1986 people had scrambled for tickets, in 1987 were shown on television, such plays including "Dictatorship of the Conscience," "Silver Wedding," "*Govori*" and "Sholom Aleikhem Street." In one of his speeches, Ligachev made the point that one had to be particularly careful about television since an audience of tens of millions was involved. Not like the theatre, he added.

More recently the theatre has picked up again under *perestroika*. The burgeoning group of small independent theatre studios (more than a dozen in 1987) are well established and staging some lively and inventive productions. Aleksandr Galin has broken new ground with his play "Stars in the Morning Sky" about a group of prostitutes exiled from Moscow for the duration of the 1980 Olympic Games. Lev Dodin's Leningrad Maly

Dramatichesky Theatre production of this play was brought to Glasgow and London in May 1988. A new play by Roman Solntsev, "Brakes in the Sky" (*Tormozhenie v Nebesakh*), at the Mossovet Theatre, tells a remarkably outspoken story of opposition to Gorbachev and *perestroika* by provincial Party and KGB authorities. The satirist Zhvanetsky, whose caustic monologues were available only on tape until his first stage appearance in early 1987, is to have his own cabaret theatre on Pushkin Square. And the transformation of the theatre scene under Gorbachev was underlined when Yuri Lyubimov returned to the USSR in May 1988 to help with the Taganka Theatre production of *Boris Godunov*—the banning of which precipitated his exile five years earlier.

The new cinema

IN LATE 1986 the focus of interest shifted to the cinema with the first, closed, première of Abuladze's film *Pokayanie* ("Repentance"). This was the most important cultural political event in Soviet life since the publication in 1962 of Solzhenitsyn's story *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. The decision to release this film was instrumental in setting off the public debate on Stalinism and Soviet history, which has assumed such crucial political importance. The film had been completed in 1984, the closed première at the Dom Kino was in November 1986 and it was publicly released after a rather nervous hiatus at the end of January 1987. Indeed, it was not just released, but launched with a great deal of publicity and evidence of official approval. Within a few weeks it was showing at 26 Moscow cinemas and within two months it had been seen by half the adult population of Moscow and Leningrad. There was significantly less interest in the provinces and the total audience after ten months was ten million.

The film has been widely shown in the West. Some scenes will always remain in my memory: the queue at the prison when the artist's wife is told that her husband has been "exiled without right of correspondence" (i.e. shot); the scene at the saw-mill where the wives and children search for the logs with the names of prisoners carved on them; and the final scene in which an aged woman asks whether "this road leads to the church" and when told that it does not (the church had been blown up) asks: "What is the use of a road if there is no church at the end of it?" The phrase "the road to the church" has become a kind of slogan for journalists and intellectuals questioning in public debate the values of the Soviet system, e.g. the article in *Novy Mir* No. 12, 1987 by Klyamkin. The director of *Pokayanie*, Abuladze, received one of only two Lenin Prizes for the arts awarded in 1988.

A major development in the cinema was the decision of the new leadership of the film union in June 1986 to set up a disputes commission to re-

examine films which had been held up, banned or shelved by the censors or Goskino over the previous 20 years. They started with a list of some 32 films. In many cases they could not even understand why some of the films had been held up. The censorship had operated in an extraordinarily arbitrary and illogical way. The writer Aleksandr Borshchagovsky said at a public meeting in January 1987 that an innocuous comedy of rural life called "Only Three Nights", for which he wrote the script, had been banned about 20 years previously. Polyansky, then a Politburo member, had rung the Goskino head at that time, Romanov, and cursed him in unrepeatable language because, he said, the film showed a horse in private ownership—which was illegal. The film had been banned and was one of the 32 films now under review. The fate of many films hung on the views of wives of Politburo members who used to see them at special previews in their own dachas, and if they objected in any way, would telephone the appropriate officials. Mrs Grishin had a particularly bad reputation in this respect, whereas Mrs Chernenko was said to exert a benevolent influence.

Among the films taken off the shelf, dusted down and shown at last to the public were Klimov's "Go and See" (an horrific war film); *Agoniya*, about Rasputin and the last days of the Romanov dynasty; Panfilov's "The Theme," which touches on a Jewish writer who decides to emigrate to Israel because his works are not published; German's "Road Check," about the seamier sides of partisan warfare in Belorussia and a Soviet deserter who redeems himself; Kira Muratova's "Short Meetings;" Askoldov's "The Commissar," about a pregnant woman commissar forced to take refuge with a Jewish family during the Civil War. Askoldov was only 33 when he made this brilliant cinema debut 20 years ago and he gave up his film career when "The Commissar" was banned. The film director Sergei Paradzhanov has been more or less rehabilitated, as has, posthumously alas, Andrei Tarkovsky, whose films were re-released in Moscow or, in some cases, shown for the first time. His last film, "The Victim," was shown at an evening in his honour last year at the *Dom Kino*, at which a documentary about his life was also screened.

Of the relatively new films released in the last four years the most outstanding have been German's "My Friend Ivan Lapshin," an extraordinarily naturalistic evocation of the 1930s in a provincial town on the eve of the purges; "Parade of the Planets" by Abdrashitov and Mindadze, a brilliant, profoundly pessimistic allegory about the spiritual vacuum in Soviet society; and "Plyumbum" by the same team, about an odiously self-righteous adolescent who sets himself up as a kind of boy detective and sets about denouncing and betraying various local petty offenders, including his own father—a kind of latter day Pavlik Morozov.

Finally the film "Lermontov" by Burlyaev, which is a nasty aberration and should have been left on the shelf. This naive, over-blown, romantic,

nationalistic film with overtones of anti-semitism was supported in an aggressive campaign by members of the Pamyat Society. I attended the première of this film, and the atmosphere was quite unpleasant.

Soviet film studios and directors are making increasing use of this artistic independence—not without causing misgivings on the part of the authorities. The new head of Goskino, Kamshalov, published an open letter in *Sovetskaya Kultura* of 26 March 1988 under the heading "Independence and Responsibility," in which he appealed for restraint and discretion.

Literature revives

THE OUTSTANDING DEVELOPMENT in Soviet literature has been the rehabilitation and publication during the past two years of works of Soviet and Russian literature hitherto banned. Now literary journals seem to be competing with each other to publish the most sensational items. Among the works which have been published are: *Dr Zhivago*,[4] which led to Pasternak's expulsion from the Writers' Union in 1957; Bulgakov's "Heart of a Dog,"[5] for the mere possession of which people have spent years in the camps; Grossman's "Life and Fate,"[6] which the former chief Party ideologist Suslov told the author in 1961 could not possibly be published in the USSR for at least 200 years (Grossman's novel draws explicit parallels between the Nazi and Soviet regimes); and Platonov's "The Foundation Pit"[7] and "Chevengur,"[8] which Joseph Brodsky[9] stated three years ago "will never be published in the USSR, because they come closest to doing to the system what it has done to its subjects." Nadezhda Mandelshtam's profound and moving memoir *Hope against Hope* is to be published by the Leningrad journal *Neva*. The list of rediscovered works is almost endless: Bulgakov's "The Fateful Eggs"; the poems of Gumilev, who was executed in 1921 as a counter revolutionary and whose very name had been almost unmentionable; Nabokov's *Luzhin's Defence*, his essay on Gogol, his memoirs *Speak Memory* and many of his poems; Zamyatin's anti-utopian novel *We*; Platonov's *Juvenilian Sea*; and Pilnyak's *Tale of the Unextinguished Moon*; the poems of the exiled writer Joseph Brodsky (following the award to him of the Nobel Prize for literature).

Of particular political significance has been the publication of a number of works which dealt critically with Stalinism and other aspects of the Soviet past, most notably: Akhmatova's searing lament for the women-

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[4] *Doctor Zhivago* was published in *Novy Mir* Nos 1–4 1988.
[5] Bulgakov's "Heart of a Dog" was published in *Znamya* No. 6 1987.
[6] Grossman's "Life and Fate" was published in *Oktyabr* Nos 1–4 1988.
[7] Platonov's "The Foundation Pit" was published in *Novy Mir* No. 6 1987.
[8] His "Chevengur" in *Druzhba Narodov* No. 3 1988.
[9] Joseph Brodsky's statement about Platonov's works was in his collection of essays *Less than One* published by Viking in 1986.

folk of the purge victims, *Requiem*; Tvardovsky's *By Right of Memory*; Trifonov's *Disappearance*; Dudintsev's *White Clothes*; Granin's *The Aurochs*; Bek's *New Appointment*; Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat*; Nagibin's "Arise and Go Forth,"[10] and Pristavkin's "A Golden Cloud Passed the Night."[11] Pristavkin's remarkable, largely autobiographical story is set first in a wartime Moscow orphanage and then in the North Caucasus where Russian settlers are subjected to raids by the surviving remnants of the recently deported Chechens. Pristavkin's novel and Nagibin's painfully moving memoir about his father's imprisonment and exile have attracted less attention than the works by Dudintsev and Rybakov but are far superior to them in literary quality.

Among the works written more recently, the major landmarks have been a series of novels and stories which reflected the sense of spiritual crisis and moral decline in Soviet society: Rasputin's *Pozhar* (The Fire) published in *Nash Sovremennik*, No. 7, 1985, is a parable of moral disintegration set in a Siberian timber felling settlement on the Angara. When a fire breaks out in the local warehouse most of the villagers help themselves instead of cooperating to put out the fire. Astafiev's "The Sad Detective" (*Oktyabr*, No. 1, 1986) is about the life of a militia captain in a god-forsaken Russian provincial town. It includes a catalogue of horrific incidents of crime and degradation including the rape of an elderly half-wit, the casual murder of a young pregnant woman, and the death of a neglected baby devoured by rats.

Bykov's *Karer* ("The Quarry"), in *Druzhba Narodov* Nos 4 and 5, 1986, is about a retired war veteran who spends an entire summer digging in a quarry outside a small Belorussian town searching for the remains of a girl who he thinks may have been executed by the Germans and buried there, and for whose death he feels responsible. The real theme is the legacy of mutual suspicion, fear and guilt left by collectivization and the purges. Bykov's view hinted at here, and expressed more openly elsewhere, is that Soviet deserters and collaborators were bred by the cruelties of the Soviet régime itself. These works, to which could be added Aitmatov's complex novel *Plakha* (The Scaffold), belong to a genre which has sometimes been called in the Soviet press *Krik Dushi* (Cry from the Soul). They have played a considerable part in articulating that sense of moral and social crisis which has been responsible, even more than evidence of economic decline, for generating Gorbachev's reforms. The tendency of some of the writers to hint at religious solutions to the problem of the spiritual vacuum in Soviet society led to accusations in a major article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*[12] of "God-seeking" against Astafiev, Aitmatov and Bykov.

[10] Nagibin's "Arise and Go Forth" in *Yunost* No. 10 1987.
[11] Pristavkin's "A Golden Cloud Passed the Night" appeared in *Znamya* Nos 3 and 4 1987.
[12] Article dated 30 July 1986.

Breakthrough in art

IN THE AREA OF THE FINE ARTS, rather as with literature, the first breakthrough came with the gradual rehabilitation of the famous names of Russian avant garde art of the 1920s. In the autumn of 1986, 16 avant garde works were hung at an exhibition at the Tretyakov Gallery from the collection which George Costakis donated involuntarily to the state in 1977 in return for permission to leave the country with his family. Subsequently there were separate exhibitions in Moscow of the works of Kandinsky, Malevich, Chagall and others.

This was not immediately followed by the rehabilitation of contemporary practitioners of modern art. There was no change in official policy—a Central Committee Decree in September 1986[13] on the fine arts invoked socialist realism no fewer than seven times and condemned bourgeois aesthetic concepts in traditional language. Such a statement could have been published 10 or 20 years ago. However, the word was that while abstract art would continue to be disapproved of officially, there would no longer be any objection to public viewing. In 1987, exhibitions of unofficial abstract art sprang up like mushrooms all over Moscow. Almost anything seemed permissible, including surrealist, anti-Stalinist, overtly religious and even semi-pornographic, paintings.

There were occasional cases of administrative harassment and censorship, but it was sporadic and half-hearted. Ilya Kabakov, a leading abstract artist, who had been vilified in Stalinist language in an article in *Sovetskaya Kultura* (5 July 1986), published just over a year later (19 August 1987) an article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* in which he discussed the chequered history of modern art in the Soviet Union; he referred to Khrushchev's notorious visit to the Manege in 1962, the bulldozer exhibition of 1974, and the forced emigration of such artists as Neizvestny, Shemyakin and Kuperman. More recently the Ermitazh Group put on an exhibition which included paintings of Soviet artists who have emigrated to the West. *Literaturnaya Gazeta* has published a feature about the once-reviled Salvador Dali (6 April 1988) and Sotheby's were invited to hold an auction in Moscow in July 1988 of paintings by contemporary Soviet avant garde artists.

Prospects for change

THE OVERALL TREND in all the arts over the past two years has clearly been positive, but not without opposition and conflict. It is still uncertain how long the thaw will continue. The fact that there has been no overt change in basic party policy would make it easier to revert to the old

[13] Published in *Pravda* on 11 September 1986.

orthodoxies and administrative measures, should the authorities so choose. Institutional changes which might, if not guarantee, at least consolidate, recent advances are relatively few and not very firmly grounded. Censorship has been relaxed but not abolished; the theatres and film studios have gained a degree of autonomy (as far as theatres are concerned, on an experimental basis) and this could be reversed; the idea of independent publishing co-operatives has now been ruled out.

The danger comes not just from the possibility of a change of attitude in the Party leadership but from within the intellectual community itself. The conservatives are still well entrenched. The liberals are more or less in control of the cinema and theatre unions; in the USSR Writers' Union there is a stand-off. But the RSFSR Writers' Union and the RSFSR Artists' Union remain bastions of conservatism. The journals *Znamya*, *Novy Mir* and *Oktyabr* spearhead the liberal revival in literature; but *Molodaya Gvardiya*, *Nash Sovremennik* and *Moskva* take an unreconstructed reactionary/nationalist line. After going onto the defensive at the initial onslaught, the conservatives quickly realized that *glasnost* could work both ways, that there was a lot of antipathy in the Party to the liberal wave which they could exploit.

By early 1987 a strong conservative backlash was much in evidence. The counter attack was sounded by the novelist Bondarev at a meeting of the board of the Russian Writers' Union on 17 March 1987 when he made the notorious comment about "phoney democrats of literature having stolen the lamp of *glasnost* from truth and justice" and called for a "new Stalingrad" to repel the liberal tide. The following month an article in *Pravda* by the novelist Petr Proskurin[14] attacking the cult of works of literature from the past wrote of a "whiff of necrophilia." Similar sentiments were aired at a meeting of the board of the USSR Writers' Union[15] in April 1987, an occasion of some intolerant and extreme statements as well as some unseemly squabbling. Over a third of the speeches took a conservative/nationalist line in which almost frenzied attacks on Western rock music featured strongly. In a telegram from Academician Likhachev, read out by Voznesensky, Proskurin was magisterially rebuked for his talk of necrophilia, but the overall tone of the meeting was distinctly illiberal with echoes of Pamyat Society extremism. Proskurin evidently finds favour in high places. He was made a Hero of Socialist Labour on his 60th birthday in January 1988. He has also been made a member of the jury which will judge entries to the competition for a monument to Vasily Terkin, of Tvardovsky's famous poem. This has caused outraged protests from many people including Tvardovsky's family,[16] since Proskurin was one of the 11 conservative

[14] Article dated 26 April 1987.
[15] Meeting on 26–7 April 1987 was reported in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 6 May 1987.
[16] A protest from Tvardovsky's widow was published in *Ogonek*, No. 24 1988.

writers who signed the infamous letter to *Ogonek* in 1969 denouncing *Novy Mir*, which led to Tvardovsky's dismissal as Chief Editor.

The rationale for the conservative opposition is clear enough. The established hacks are resentful at the threat to their personal privileges and reputation. Writers like Bondarev—once, incidentally, a writer of good and honest novels about the war—are fearful of being put into the shade by better writers, past and present, who were previously disqualified for ideological reasons from competing with them.

Without wishing to exaggerate the dichotomy between Yakovlev and Ligachev, I think much will depend on the relative influence that they exert on ideological and cultural policies. The *Kommunist* editorial of October 1987, to which I alluded earlier, clearly reflects the hand of Yakovlev. It is certainly the most liberal and enlightened statement of Party policy on cultural affairs since the 1925 Central Committee Resolution drafted by Bukharin. It contrasts what it calls the intellectual breadth and tolerance of the 1920s not only with the abuses and persecution of the 1930s and the post-war Zhdanovshchina (it quotes at length from Zhdanov's abuse of Akhmatova and Zoshchenko to show what it means) but also with the "pragmatic, suspicious, arbitrary regulation of the arts and the whole cultural sphere" during the period of stagnation and earlier. There are a number of statements in the editorial which leap off the page at any long-term reader of the Soviet press as, for instance:

> Socialist society must learn to value and respect its artists who have the courage to speak the truth.

Or:

> The more varied artistic life becomes, the more natural its development will be.

The editorial calls for tolerance of competing trends in art and music, and even takes a swipe at Party cadres who are told to improve the level of their intellectual qualities, inner culture, education and tact in dealing with the intelligentsia. There is no mention of socialist realism in all its 11 pages. Compare this perspective on the history of Soviet cultural affairs with the observation by Ligachev in a speech in August 1987 that in the 1930s "unprecedented heights were reached in the development of culture, education, literature and the arts."

It may be too much to hope that definitive Party policy will be set by the enlightened approach of the *Kommunist* editorial and Gorbachev's declaration at the XIXth Party Conference on 28 June 1988 that "the administrative direction of culture and edifying lectures addressed to artists are things of the past." There will no doubt be further ups and downs as the intelligentsia seeks to push the boundaries of freedom further than the

Party finds comfortable. But it would be difficult to put the clock back entirely. Too much has been published and shown for it simply to be forgotten. Psychological barriers have been broken. Moreover, the costs—in terms of alienating the intelligentsia—which would be incurred by any renewed clamp-down on the arts, would be too high. Gorbachev is not alone in the leadership in realizing that the Party needs a freer creative intelligentsia if it is to produce a healthier and more efficient society. The other major question is whether, when the suppressed manuscripts finally run out, and when the last banned film has been taken from the shelf, younger writers and artists can respond to the relative freedom they now enjoy, pick up the torch and maintain the extraordinary momentum of the past two years.

Glimpses of Glasnost

SOLZHENITSYN

When Elena Chukovskaya published her appeal "Give Solzhenitsyn back his citizenship" in *Knizhnoe obozrenie* (No. 32, 5 August 1988), there was an instant response by telephone, telegram and letter; some readers came in person to voice their support. Among the letters published in the next issue (No. 33, 12 August 1988), was one from the writer Vyacheslav Kondratev, who said:

A. Solzhenitsyn is needed by Russia and by all of us not only as a writer of great talent, but also as a personality. It is enough just to imagine what strength, what courage the writer had to have to stand alone against a mighty, cruel administrative system which could crush a person with just a nod . . .

In the same issue Dr Ya. Etinger, historian and member of the Memorial association which is working for a monument to the victims of Stalinism, wrote:

*In the 1970s the writer A. I. Solzhenitsyn and the pre-eminint scientist and humanist Academician A. D. Sakharov personified the spirit of opposition presented by the healthy, democratic forces in Soviet society against Stalinism and Brezhnevism. Now A. D. Sakharov has returned to Moscow; he is among those who are struggling most actively in favour of new political thought in domestic and international affairs, for democratization and openness (*glasnost*), for the success of restructuring (*perestroika*) and its irreversibility.*

It is time to put right the injustice in the case of A. I. Solzhenitsyn also. In the whole civilized world he has long been rightly considered one of the greatest Russian writers of the twentieth century. One can agree or disagree with his ideological and philosophical views as a writer, but he belongs to Russia, of which he has been an ardent patriot all his complex, tragic life.

The Origins of Pamyat

Julia Wishnevsky

PAMYAT WAS FOUNDED in the early 1980s as a literary and historical society attached to the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry.[1] The society arranged meetings to which prominent writers, historians and artists were invited. At weekends, its members helped to restore historical and cultural monuments, but from the very outset, the Moscow correspondent of the émigré newspaper *Russkaya mysl* claims, many of the members expressed extreme Russian nationalist and anti-Semitic sentiments.[2]

Its concern for the preservation of national monuments won Pamyat (meaning "memory") hundreds, if not thousands, of supporters. As time went on, however, the leadership of the society became increasingly infiltrated by persons who were preoccupied with the idea of a "mythical enemy's" conspiracy against the Russian people and its culture.[3] A reader of the popular Soviet journal *Ogonek* recalls an early encounter with Pamyat at a meeting dedicated to the memory of Ivan Fedorov, the sixteenth-century founder of the first Russian and Ukrainian printing houses: in a letter to the editor, he states that never in eighteen years of scholarly work had he witnessed such "exaltation" as that shown by the members of Pamyat at this meeting.[4]

Apparently because of a disagreement with officials at the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, Pamyat left its original premises and moved to the Gorbunov House of Culture. Here, the society came to attract public attention, particularly after its members beat up and threw out of a meeting the young poet Andrei Chernov, a translator and specialist on ancient Russian literature. Chernov had taken issue with Pamyat over its attitude towards the Decembrists, the members of the old Russian nobility who attempted a coup against the Tsar in 1825. The Decembrists are usually held in high esteem by all Russian historians, but the members of Pamyat dislike the Decembrists because they were freemasons.[5]

By the autumn of 1985, Pamyat would appear to have developed a theory that there was a conspiracy of international Zionism and freemasonry against everything Russian. At a meeting in the Gorbunov House of Culture on 4 October 1985, every speech denouncing the destruction of architectural

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[1] *Ogonek*, No. 21, 1987, pp. 4–5.
[2] *Russkaya mysl*, 31 July 1987, p. 6.
[3] *Ogonek*, No. 21, 1987, pp. 4–5.
[4] Ibid., No. 28, 1987, p. 31.
[5] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 31 March 1987; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 17 July 1987; *Russkaya mysl*, 31 July 1987, p. 6.

landmarks in Moscow was followed by a promise from the moderator, Elena Degtyar, that the names of the perpetrators of these vile deeds would be revealed at the end of the evening. It turned out that the Zionists were to blame. To prove her point, Degtyar read out all the Jewish names in the telephone directory of the Main Administration for Architecture and Planning in Moscow.[6]

On 8 December 1985, Pamyat held a meeting under the slogan "Moscow: How Much This Word Tells a Russian Soul!"—a quotation from Pushkin. It proved an unfortunate occasion for the society because of a speech delivered by one of its prominent members, the journalist and photographer Dmitrii Vasilev, who read aloud excerpts from the notorious anti-Semitic forgery "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion," claiming that the subsequent course of history is proof of their authenticity. Quoting the passage in "The Protocols" which states that the Jews should sacrifice their own people in order to enslave the Gentiles, Vasilev said that Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi official responsible for the extermination of Jews during World War II, had been a Jew who acted in accordance with "The Protocols." Cassette recordings of the proceedings of the meeting circulated widely in Moscow, and some copies reached the West.[7] As a result of the meeting, Pamyat was officially disbanded at the beginning of 1986, and the local Party committee decided to eject it from the Gorbunov House of Culture.[8]

After the loss of its permanent home, the society began looking for other premises in which to hold its meetings. At least one meeting of Pamyat took place in the House of Culture at the Dynamo Works in Moscow. On that occasion, Vasilev proposed Kim Andreev, the chairman of Pamyat, as a candidate for election to the local soviet.[9]

In February 1987 an attempt was made to hold a Pamyat function in the conference hall of the Yunost Hotel in Moscow. In a letter to an official of the All Union Komsomol Central Committee, which owns the hotel, V. V. Egiazarov, the director of the Republican Trust of Monumental and Decorative Art of the RSFSR Art Foundation, guaranteed that the foundation would pay for the rental of the hall, but the meeting was cancelled at the last minute "for technical reasons." Nevertheless, a local Party official invited Pamyat to hold its next meeting in the Leninsky District Party Committee building in the centre of Moscow.[10]

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[6] *Jews and Jewish Topics in Soviet and East European Publications*, No. 4, Winter 1986–7, Jerusalem, Center for Research and Documentation of East European Jewry, p. 53.

[7] For an English translation of excerpts from this speech, see ibid., pp. 47–53. For the full Russian text, see *Kontinent*, No. 50, 1986, pp. 211–27.

[8] *Russkaya mysl*, 27 March 1987, p. 7; *Ogonek*, No. 21, 1987, pp. 4–5.

[9] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 22 May 1987.

[10] Ibid.; *Ogonek*, No. 21, 1987, pp. 4–5. The district committee first secretary claims that at this meeting he rebutted Pamyat activists "as a member of the Communist Party should." See *Sobesednik*, No. 32, 1987, pp. 4–5.

In the middle of the same month, the Moscow Pamyat society found a venue for further meetings in the Central House of Artists. According to *samizdat* accounts of three of these gatherings, each started with the showing of a film about the destruction of historical monuments and the environment in the USSR. The film showings were followed by discussions of "the Zionist threat."[11] At the meeting held on 18 February 1987, a speaker by the name of Lemeshev accused Zionists of displaying masonic symbols in the guise of designs for the projected victory monument on Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow.[12]

The behaviour of members of Pamyat in the Manege, where models of the proposed monument were on display, resulted in the appearance of the first reports critical of the society in the Soviet press.[13] Initially, Pamyat was not mentioned by name. At the end of March, Andrei Cherkizov described in *Sovetskaya kultura* how one group had tried to denigrate the designs for the monument by claiming that they all incorporated Zionist, masonic and Nazi symbols. This turned out to be an effort to influence the jury into selecting the design by the sculptor Klychkov, who is a favourite of Pamyat.[14] In the same article, Cherkizov remarked that rumours about freemasonry seemed to have become "an obsession in a certain section" of Soviet society. This had resulted in talk of there having been an excessive number of freemasons and Jews among the leaders of the October Revolution, a belief shared, according to Cherkizov, even by some Party officials.[15]

In April 1987, Pamyat seized control of the Moscow section of an official body, the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments (VOOPIiK). On the eve of a conference called to elect new officials, the leaders of the Moscow section of VOOPIiK, Viktor Vinogradov, S. V. Korolev and A. S. Onegov—all of whom happened also to be leaders of the Moscow branch of Pamyat—managed to get rid of any active members of the preservation society who disapproved of Pamyat, its leaders, or its obsessions. On 21 May, they were expelled from VOOPIiK *in absentia*, having not been invited to attend the relevant session.[16]

The campaign in the Soviet media against Pamyat was preceded by a number of demonstrations staged in May 1987 by members of the society. The first such demonstration, on 6 May, led to a meeting between representatives of the society with Boris Yeltsin, the first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee and a candidate member of the CPSU

[11] *Russkaya mysl*, 27 March and 15 May 1987.
[12] *Russkaya mysl*, 27 March 1987.
[13] See, for example, *Ogonek*, No. 6, 1987, p. 27.
[14] *Russkaya mysl*, 31 July 1987, pp. 6–7.
[15] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 31 March 1987.
[16] *Ogonek*, No. 28, 1987, p. 31.

Politburo. Subjects discussed with Yeltsin included the preservation of Poklonnaya Hill, measures to combat saboteurs of Gorbachev's restructuring of Soviet society, and the possibility of granting Pamyat official recognition.[17] The two-hour meeting with Yeltsin did not satisfy the Pamyat activists. On 9 May some 200 supporters of the society demonstrated against the destruction of Poklonnaya Hill near the proposed site of the monument.[18] Then, on 17 May, members of the society attended a meeting of the Moscow Temperance Society carrying placards demanding prohibition and showing photographs of defective children. (Pamyat sympathizers seem to believe that Jews and freemasons are responsible for the hard drinking of the Russian people.)[19]

Pamyat is said to be the largest and best known of the groups in Moscow that advocate the preservation of monuments and protection of the environment. Its relations with other such groups—Ekopolis, Moskva, and The Club of Social Initiatives—are reported to be extremely bad.[20]

Pamyat in Leningrad

AS EARLY AS JULY 1987, S. Filatov, a reader of *Sovetskaya kultura*, described, in a letter to the editor, a meeting of Pamyat that he had attended in Leningrad. He said that Vasilev's speech had reminded him of the leaflets by Dr Goebbels' staff which were distributed among Soviet soldiers during the war. In his speech, Vasilev had used a public rostrum to call on his audience to wage war on Jews and freemasons. People who had tried to argue with Vasilev were turned out of the hall by Vasilev's strongmen, Filatov related. When he complained to a police officer, Filatov was told that Pamyat enjoyed the backing of high-ranking Party officials.[21] On 1 August 1987, the Soviet government daily, *Izvestia*, reported that Pamyat in Leningrad was very active, and its members were trying to enlist in their ranks young men who had served in Afghanistan.

In August 1988, a number of Soviet newspapers published letters by Leningrad intellectuals expressing their concern about demonstrations staged in Rumyantsev Garden in central Leningrad on five successive Thursdays in June and July by the local branch of Pamyat, which at that stage termed itself the Russian "National Patriotic Front." According to these letters, the leader of Pamyat in Leningrad is Yurii Riverov, an assistant cinema

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[17] *RL* (Radio Liberty Research) 191/87, "Yeltsin Meets with Members of Pamyat," 19 May 1987.

[18] *Arkhiv Samizdata*, No. 5975.

[19] *Vechernyaya Moskva*, 18 May and 1 June 1987. Regarding their conspiracy theory, see reader's letter to Cherkizov in *Sovetskaya kultura*, 18 June 1987.

[20] *Russkaya mysl*, 31 July 1987. See also RL 220/87, "Informal Groups in the USSR," 11 June 1987.

[21] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 23 July 1987.

director, who suspects that a Judeo-Masonic plot must have been behind the refusal of the Leningrad film studio to allow him to shoot a film on his own.[22]

In *Moscow News*, the writer Valerii Voskoboinikov said that officials from both the local district and the Leningrad Province Committees of the CPSU, as well as "dozens" of policemen, had attended the meetings. None of them, however, had made any attempt to intervene as speakers called for marriages to be banned between Russians and non-Russians, and for immediate deportation of the Jews and other nationalities to "their places of historic origin." At a meeting on 7 July, the rally heard the infamous "Union of the Russian People," an organization that had set up anti-Jewish pogroms in pre-revolutionary Russia, described as "one of the most democratic organizations in Russia." On 21 July, the audience was told that the Chernobyl disaster had been brought about by "enemy forces" which had informed the world of their plans by placing "secret signs" in a Novosibirsk newspaper.

In a letter to the local newspaper, *Leningradskaya pravda*, one of its readers recalled that some of Pamyat's activists had shouted "Death to Yids!" at meetings in Rumyantsev Garden. Another letter-writer was told that Isaak Zaltsman, a Jew who served as the Soviet Minister of Tank Industry during the Second World War, "had organized a chorus of sixteen-year-old Russian virgins and thereupon seduced them." Both Voskoboinikov and M. Onikul, the third contributor to *Leningradskaya pravda*, said that everybody who had tried to argue with the speakers had been silenced and forcibly removed from the garden by Pamyat's blackshirted strongmen.

These accounts were reiterated in a letter by 59 Leningrad academics from the USSR Academy of Scientists' Institute of Oriental Studies. In their comments on the academics' letter, the editors of *Izvestia* quoted V. M. Borisov, a Leningrad official responsible for the district to which Rumyantsev Garden belonged, as saying that he had been obliged to issue the official permit for Pamyat meetings against his better judgement because of a certain phone call from the Leningrad Province Committee of the CPSU.

As far as is known, however, not one Soviet newspaper reported that the police had beaten up and detained a number of Leningrad citizens who tried to protest against Pamyat's activities. Aleksandr Bogdanov, one of those protesters and the editor of the *samizdat* journal, *Glasnost i konyuktura*, was arrested and sentenced to fifteen days of administrative detention twice in the space of less than a month—on 14 July and 9 August 1988.[23]

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[22] *Moscow News*, No. 32, 1988, p. 2; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 32, 1988, p. 2; *Leningradskaya pravda*, 12 and 28 August, 1988; *Izvestia*, 14 August 1988.

[23] *Vesti iz SSSR/USSR News Brief*, Nos 14–33 and 15–16.

Pamyat in Novosibirsk

THE PAMYAT SOCIETY in Novosibirsk, the home of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was, at least until very recently, an officially recognized society attached to the Academy's House of Culture. In mid-June 1987, it was reported that the board of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Sovetsky District CPSU Committee and the board of the House of Culture had decreed that the Novosibirsk branch of the society should be disbanded on the grounds that its activities were of "a scandalous nature" and that some of its members had attempted to usurp the prerogatives of soviets and other official bodies.[24]

At about the same time, Aleksandr Kazantsev, a scientist at the Novosibirsk Institute of the Physics of Semiconductors and a member of the board of Pamyat, was expelled from the CPSU by the City Party Committee for slandering "top Party and state officials and leading scholars." It later emerged that he had accused them of conspiring with Zionists and freemasons against the Russian people. He also appeared to have made use of "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion" in his speeches to public gatherings.[25]

Soviet press items about the activities of Pamyat in Novosibirsk suggest that the society does wield considerable influence in that city.[26]

Otechestvo in Sverdlovsk

IT APPEARS FROM VARIOUS source materials that supporters of Pamyat are to be found all over the Soviet Union—in such cities as Kalinin, Kursk, Taganrog on the Black Sea, Riga in Latvia, Ermak in Kazakhstan, and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in the Soviet Far East.[27] Sverdlovsk in the Urals seems, however, to be the only city that boasts a separate society of its own.

About a month before any Soviet newspaper mentioned Pamyat by name, Otechestvo ("fatherland") made its appearance in print, with the disclosure that an Otechestvo historical and cultural society had been set up by the executive committee of one of the Sverdlovsk city district soviets. Valerii Kichin, a theatre critic, writing in *Sovetskaya kultura*, described a meeting of the society held some time between 15 January and 21 March of this year. The target of the wrath of the members of Otechestvo was a production based on Aleksandr Pushkin's *Tale of Tsar Saltan* at the

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[24] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 18 June 1987.
[25] Ibid.; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 28 June 1987.
[26] See also the letter by A. Ermilov in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 24 June 1987.
[27] *Russkaya mysl*, 21 November 1986; *Sovetskaya kultura*, 18 June 1987; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 24 June 1987; *Sovetskaya kultura*, 23 July 1987.

Sverdlovsk Opera Theatre. They had managed to detect not only hidden Zionist and masonic symbols but also Nazi and anti-Russian ones in the scenery and costumes of this fairy-tale for children. Somebody, for example, had purloined a peasant woman's head-dress decorated with snowflakes from the theatre wardrobe, and the assembly was busy counting how many points each snowflake had. The number seemed to vary, but one was found with six points, and this resulted in the director and the chief conductor of the Opera Theatre being accused of using "foreign"—i.e. Zionist—symbols on the stage of a Soviet theatre.

Like their counterparts in Pamyat, members of Otechestvo hate rock music, which they claim is an attempt by foreign, Western forces to destroy the healthy Russian soul. Kichin found the argument used by one member of Otechestvo, who had used her position as radio broadcaster to criticize rock music through the medium of Radio Sverdlovsk, downright dishonest. Referring to a local rock-group whose name "Urfin Dzhyus" was derived from the well-known children's book *Urfin Dzhyus i ego derevyannye soldaty* by Aleksandr Volkov, she deliberately mistranslated the name as if it came from English and meant "Orphan Jews".[28]

According to one resident of Sverdlovsk, Pamyat and Otechestvo are very similar organizations.[29] A Muscovite, however, found his encounter with Otechestvo differed considerably from his experiences in Moscow with Pamyat because, as he put it, the audience in Sverdlovsk "contained a powerful counterforce to demagoguery," whereas in Moscow, readings from "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion" and similar literature were sure to be received rapturously by listeners.[30]

The beliefs of Pamyat and Otechestvo

THE IDEOLOGY of Pamyat and Otechestvo is totally irrational, combining as it does devotion to Leninism with certain convictions that would appear to be entirely incompatible with it. For members of Pamyat, tsarist Russia was an ideal state, and they are said now to be collecting money to erect a monument to the last tsar, Nicholas II.[31] Lenin, according to these same people, was a great man, but his entire entourage—in particular, Leon Trotsky and the other Jewish Old Bolsheviks—were Judeo-masonic conspirators.

Members of Pamyat believe that all dissidents are freemasons and that bureaucracy is a product of the international conspiracy of Zionism and freemasonry. The same applies to many prominent Russian cultural figures.

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[28] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 18 April 1987.
[29] See also *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 24 June 1987.
[30] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 17 July 1987.
[31] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 23 July 1987.

Academician Dmitrii Likhachev, the chairman of the USSR Cultural Foundation and the world's leading specialist on ancient Russian literature, has been accused by Pamyat of being a "Zionist accomplice,"[32] as too have Oleg Efremov, director of the Moscow Arts Theater,[33] and Alla Pugacheva, a pop-singer.[34] The poet Andrei Voznesensky, who happens to have been the first person to protest publicly against the destruction of Poklonnaya Hill, received a threatening letter which, he said, "looked as though it had come from Pamyat."[35]

During the meeting with Boris Yeltsin, one Pamyat speaker, Valerii Emelyanov, demanded that an end be put to "rotten liberalization," by which he meant the publication of books by Vladimir Nabokov and what he termed "eulogies" to the late film director Andrei Tarkovsky, who died an émigré.[36]

Some members of Pamyat are Russian Orthodox believers and churchgoers. Quite a number of them, however, regard the Christianization of Kievan Rus by Prince Vladimir at the end of the tenth century as part of an international Zionist plot to undermine the Slav race. In line with these views, and apart from its cult of the Russian nationalist painter Ilya Glazunov, Pamyat has created a cult of the artist Konstantin Vasilev, who painted a canvas portraying the victory of Ilya of Murom over "the Christian plague."[37]

Members of Pamyat believe in Satan. When they accuse their numerous enemies of serving the Devil, they mean it literally.[38] And, last but not least, the members of both Pamyat and Otechestvo are extremely anti-Western and anti-American.

Friends in Soviet society

UNLIKE OTHER RIGHT-WING extremist groups in the Soviet Union, Pamyat and Otechestvo have a membership that includes quite influential representatives of society,[39] a fact that is recognized by their Soviet critics. In an interview with the Komsomol weekly *Sobesednik*, Vladimir Klyuev, the first secretary of the Party committee in the Leninsky District of Moscow, where a meeting of Pamyat had been held, stated that the society counted among its members scientists, Party members, and even a Soviet Army general.[40]

The author of an article about Pamyat in *Russkaya mysl* asserts that Yeltsin

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[32] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 18 June 1987.
[33] *Russkaya mysl*, 27 March 1987, p. 7.
[34] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 23 July 1987.
[35] *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 June 1987.
[36] *Russkaya mysl*, 31 July 1987, pp. 6–7.
[37] Ibid.
[38] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 22 May 1987.
[39] See RL 312/87, "More about Neo-Nazis in Leningrad," 29 July 1987.
[40] *Sobesednik*, No. 32, 1987, pp. 4–5. The general that Klyuev had in mind was probably Lieutenant General Grigorii Fedorovich Samoilovich.

was more or less forced to meet with members of the society after their demonstration on 6 May. Had he not done so, the demonstrators would have burst into his office. Like many Western observers, the author of this article is convinced that the society enjoys support in influential quarters: in military circles, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the KGB, and in certain parts of the Party apparatus. Two of its alleged patrons named in the newspaper are Yurii Prokofev, a secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, and K. G. Levykin, the director of the State Historical Museum.[41]

The same article in *Russkaya mysl* pointed out that ideas very similar to those of Pamyat had been expressed by many members of the Soviet cultural establishment. The names of writers Vadim Kozhinov and Yurii Bondarev, film director Nikolai Burlyaev, and Moscow Arts Theatre actress Tatyana Doronina have been mentioned in this connection. On 11 August 1987, Petr Proskurin, a secretary of the RSFSR Writers' Union and chairman of the RSFSR Cultural Foundation, spoke out in defence of Pamyat in an interview on Soviet television, and Russian writer Valentin Rasputin did the same thing during a recent visit to Sweden.[42] *Samizdat* articles about Pamyat published in *Russkaya mysl* between November 1986 and July 1987 have stressed that leaders of the society are great personal friends of artist Ilya Glazunov. From what can be ascertained, people who hold views similar to those of Pamyat may represent a majority in the leadership of the Writers' Union, but they are clearly in a minority in the unions of cinema and theatre workers.

In the second of his articles in *Sovetskaya kultura*, Andrei Cherkizov points out that Pamyat has enjoyed the support of many official Soviet anti-Zionist propagandists. Vladimir Begun, Evgenii Evseev and Aleksandr Romanenko have been popular lecturers at meetings in Moscow and Novosibirsk. These and other professional Soviet anti-Zionists—Lev Korneev, Vladimir Bolshakov, Valerii Skurlatov and Dmitrii Zhukov—have written books and articles about the alleged conspiracy between Zionists and freemasons that have been printed by Soviet publishing houses and journals and—with one exception—have never been criticized in the Soviet media.[43]

In March 1987, the Komsomol literary monthly *Molodaya gvardiya* printed an article by its deputy chief editor, critic Vyacheslav Gorbachev, in which he claimed the existence of a conspiracy between Zionists and freemasons, whom he described as servants of the Devil. This conspiracy, he said, was responsible for the fact that the Russian people "does not compose or sing

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[41] *Russkaya mysl*, 31 July 1987, pp. 6–7.
[42] *Dagens Nyheter*, 21 August 1987.
[43] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 18 June 1987. See also RL 254/87, "*Glasnost* on Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union," 6 July 1987.

its own songs," and for "the destruction of the family and corruption by sex, alcohol and drugs."[44]

The campaign against Pamyat

AT THE SAME TIME, not surprisingly, Pamyat has a lot of high-ranking enemies. The most influential of them would seem to be Aleksandr Yakovlev, a member of the ruling Politburo, whom the society regularly attacks for the article he wrote in 1972 criticizing Russian nationalism.[45] The society's animosity towards Yakovlev may, among other things, account for the current propaganda campaign against Pamyat in the Soviet press.

The newspapers that have printed articles about Pamyat have received large numbers of letters both attacking and defending the society. Some authors of articles on the subject have referred to Pamyat in rather irrelevant contexts. A blue-collar Hero of Socialist Labour took issue with Pamyat in an article dealing with the January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.[46] Vladimir Tsvetov, the moderator of a round-table discussion about foreign policy on television, suddenly brought up Pamyat and drew a parallel between its activities and the efforts of the Japanese intelligence service to spread anti-Semitism in Russia on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.[47] In *Pravda*, Pamyat has been attacked by Fedor Burlatsky, who seems to be one of the more prominent proponents of Gorbachev's reforms.[48]

Pamyat was criticized during the summer 1987 plenum of the Council on Literary Criticism of the USSR Writers' Union.[49] In an interview, the poet Sergei Mikhalkov—that great time-server—made an attack on Pamyat, this possibly being retaliation against views very similar to those of Pamyat which had been expressed by members of the Secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union, of which Mikhalkov is himself chairman.[50]

At least three letters to the editors of newspapers have called for the prosecution of Pamyat under Article 74 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, which provides for a penalty of up to three years' deprivation of freedom for "Violation of the Equality of Rights of Nationalities and Races."[51] This article does indeed exist, but it has never been invoked.

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[44] *Molodaya gvardiya*, No. 3, 1987, pp. 250–77.
[45] See RL 191/87.
[46] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 6 June 1987.
[47] *Central Television*, 31 July 1987.
[48] *Pravda*, 18 July 1987.
[49] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 26, 1987, p. 7.
[50] *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 28, 1987, p. 3. See also RL 143/87, "Who's Afraid of Restructuring in Literature?" 15 April 1987.
[51] *Izvestia*, 15 July 1987; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 24 June 1987; *Sovetskaya kultura*, 23 July 1987.

There is a certain connection between the current reappraisal of the role of Lenin's Guard in the October Revolution and criticism of the irrational theories of Pamyat.[52] The society's theory that the revolution of 1917 was the result of an international conspiracy of Jews and freemasons has been cited as a reason to press for more objective treatment in school textbooks of the role played in the revolution by Old Bolsheviks who have not yet been rehabilitated.[53]

One of several articles calling for more to be written about the blank spots in the history of the October Revolution was published in the Belorussian Komsomol newspaper *Znamya yunosti*.[54] The author, P. Yakubovich, points out that the "fabrications" circulated by the propagandists of Pamyat (meaning "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion") were created by the Black Hundreds—the extreme right-wing groups that organized pogroms against Jews in tsarist Russia—and later used by the Nazi propaganda minister, Dr Goebbels. Yakubovich is of the opinion that Pamyat propagandists, whom he accuses of "corrupting the souls of their listeners with the poison of racism and obscurantism," are primarily responsible for the appearance in Soviet cities of the "National Socialist" groups of youths sporting swastikas and other Nazi emblems who are said to entertain themselves by beating up—and sometimes murdering—innocent passers-by.[55]

A second Pamyat emerges

A NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY report in November 1987 claimed that there were two distinct groups within the Pamyat preservation society and that only the smaller one was anti-Semitic.[56] On 9 November 1987, one of the groups staged a demonstration in Red Square in Moscow; this group, Novosti asserted, was not anti-Semitic.

According to Novosti, Pamyat was founded as long ago as 1953. The report quoted one of the leaders of Pamyat, the artist Igor Sychev, as saying that "a tiny group" of extremists has recently sprung up within the ranks of Pamyat; this group uses the same name and the same slogans as the larger group, but in fact it is "a branch of the movement that has broken away and is particularly strident." Other members of Pamyat were cited by Novosti as pointing out that the parent organization could not be anti-Semitic since it had Jewish members. The membership of the main Pamyat group included Colonel Erofei Levshov, who was one of the organizers of

[52] RS 47/87, "Starye bolsheviki nakanune 70-letiya revolyutsii," 13 April 1987.
[53] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 23 July 1987; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 17 July 1987.
[54] *Znamya yunosti*, 26 July 1987.
[55] RL 226/85, "Neo-Nazis in the Soviet Union," 11 July 1987; RL 312/87.
[56] *APN*, 12 November 1987.

an earlier demonstration by Pamyat in May 1987. Novosti says that the splinter-group was headed by Dmitrii Vasilev, the Moscow journalist who had denounced the influence of Zionists and freemasons in the Soviet Union at meetings of Pamyat.

The Novosti report seemed to be a follow-up to statements made in support of Pamyat by a number of Russian nationalist writers. As mentioned above, both Valentin Rasputin and Petr Proskurin have spoken in support of Pamyat in interviews,[57] and the well-known Russian nationalist literary critic Vadim Kozhinov, who is certainly a member of the society, published an article in defence of Pamyat in the October issue of the journal *Nash sovremennik*.[58] Kozhinov, some of whose work had been attacked in the Soviet press in connection with Pamyat, said that the society was, in general, a worthy organization, although he distanced himself from its more extremist elements, whom he referred to as "scum" on the surface of a noble movement.

Kozhinov's arguments were repeated by Sergei Vikulov, the chief editor of *Nash sovremennik*, in a speech at a meeting of the conservative Secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Union of Writers in which he lionized Pamyat.[59] As reported by Novosti, the speeches of Vikulov and Levshov seem to have been almost identical. Both of them, for example, referred to the novel *Pamyat* (Memory) by Vladimir Chivilikhin, the writer, now dead, who is said to have founded the society in 1953. This would suggest that the Pamyat with the "new" image untainted by anti-Semitism consists of the more respectable members of the old one and is closely affiliated with the journal *Nash sovremennik*.

Yet, as far as is known, *Nash sovremennik* appears to have been the only central journal to have published an article by that most infamous of Pamyat members, Valerii Emelyanov. In that article, Emelyanov wrote that the Zionists' proclaimed goal of gathering all Jews into Israel was a deception. According to him, the Zionists' only aim was "to achieve world domination."[60] It should also be added that, unlike Novosti, all of the above-mentioned writers avoided any reference to anti-Semitism when expressing their reservations about "scum" or even "agents provocateurs" in Pamyat groups.

Blackshirt komintern?

CONTRARY to the beliefs of some in the West, neither Pamyat nor other Russian ultra-nationalists are isolationist. As early as 1978, Valerii

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[57] Ibid.
[58] *Nash sovremennik*, No. 10, 1987, pp. 160–74.
[59] *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 42, 1987, p. 5.
[60] *Nash sovremennik*, No. 8, 1987, pp. 188–91.

Emelyanov distributed his *Draft Statutes of the World Anti-Zionist and Anti-Freemason Front*, the first sentence of which read: "We, the overwhelming majority of the population of every country . . ."[61] This document was included in Emelyanov's book *De-Zionization* which was published by a Palestinian Printing House in Paris in 1979. In December 1987, Kim Andreev, Dmitrii Vasilev and five other leaders of Pamyat, attempted to rouse the outside world with their *Appeal to the Russian People and to Patriots of All the Countries and Nations* which called on "the patriots of the whole world" to unite their ranks.[62] Subsequently, Vasilev reiterated this call in a number of his interviews with foreign journalists.

In both his written and oral appeals, Vasilev reveals familiarity with what has been published on Pamyat in the world press, including even Syrian and Kuwaiti newspapers, which would be quite astonishing for any ordinary Soviet citizen.[63] On one occasion, for example, he complained that Aleksandr Yakovlev had called him an "anti-Semite" in the latter's interview given to the Swiss journal *L'Illustré*, and threatened to sue the Politburo member for libel.[64] In the course of the same interview, Vasilev appealed to the "great German nation," urging the Germans "to stop bowing to Zion."

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[61] Valerii Emelyanov, *Desionizatsiya*, Paris, Free Palestine Press, 1979.
[62] *Arkhiv Samizdata*, No. 6138.
[63] Ibid.
[64] *Veche*, No. 30, 1988, p. 215. In the course of his talk to representatives of the Latvian mass media, Yakovlev confirmed that Pamyat indeed had tried to bring a legal action against him, but claimed that he had never spoken publicly about the society. (See the Latvian Komsomol newspaper, *Sovetskaya molodezh*, 12 August 1988.)

Homo Sovieticus: Can Attitudes Change?

David Satter

THE Soviet Union claims to have created a new man, and, I believe, unfortunately, that there is truth in their claim. A new type of man has emerged as a result of 70 years of totalitarian rule and there is justice in using the term *homo sovieticus*.

The first characteristic that I think distinguishes Soviet citizens from Americans is a tendency to live, to a certain extent, in a world of abstractions. Let me read from notes that I made shortly before I left the Soviet Union. They are based on a conversation I had with an elderly woman who asked to see me because she had something that she wanted to say to someone from the West. I think that her words reflect the tendency in the Soviet Union to value a world of ideas over the world of day-to-day reality which provides the frame of reference for most Americans. The woman gave me this piece of advice:

> You have to analyze, you have to analyze deeply or you will never understand the spirituality of Russia. I deeply respect England for the involuntary decency of the English people . . . [This comment was inspired by the fact that I represented the *Financial Times* of London. When I explained that I was an American, she said that she respected America too.] But you cannot understand what we understand in Russia. You may know that five or 10 million people died in collectivization, that yet another 20 million people died in the war, and yet another 20 million people were people we killed ourselves. But you can only look on in amazement. You can't understand what this means because the West—not England, not America—does not have the spirituality to understand what happened here. You devote yourself so completely to material enrichment that you only guarantee your spiritual impoverishment.
>
> People here have suffered and we have very little, but, in our suffering has come understanding, and this is something you Western people will never understand because you haven't lived as we've had to live.

What was striking to me about this person and why I selected her reproach

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This piece is based on an address given in October 1982 to the State Department Open Forum in Washington.

as an illustration of the Soviet preference for living in a world of ideas was the fact that she was a dissident who rejected the Soviet system, even as she demonstrated the fundamental quality of the Soviet mentality, the desire to forsake the tangible world and to live for something which transcends the petty egoism of daily life.

It is this quality, more than any other, which makes of *homo sovieticus* the perfect raw material for totalitarianism.

The man who is ready to live not for himself but for an idea and understands that idea as a tangible political goal easily becomes part of a political movement which is dedicated to its realization and shows the qualities which are expected of a member of a movement: in particular, patience and deference to authority.

I SAW MANY examples of Soviet citizens' extraordinary patience. In October 1981, I made a trip to the town of Vologda, which is 350 miles north of Moscow. Vologda is known throughout the Soviet Union for its butter, considered to be the finest in the country. But when I was there, there was no Vologda butter on sale in Vologda. In fact, it was impossible to find butter of any kind in the city—only a certain type of margarine.

This situation did not inspire discontent. What angered people in Vologda was not the shortage of butter but the fact that Andrew Nagorski, of *Newsweek*, and I had come to Vologda to find out about it. The shortage of butter that had been added to the long-standing shortages of meat and fruit, vegetables and other products, were explained to us as the necessary consequence of America's aggressive policies toward the Soviet Union, and the fact that the Soviet Union had to defend itself in the face of American plans to build the neutron bomb.

I also saw many signs of Soviet citizens' instinctive respect for authority. In the United States, it is common for citizens, even if they are painfully uninformed, to imagine that they are better qualified to make policy decisions than those who are responsible for making them. To some extent, this attitude is essential in a democracy. But in the Soviet Union the rule is widespread deference. Unlike Americans, Soviet citizens take it for granted that they do not know the secrets of the state. If a conversation begins on a policy question—for example, the invasion of Afghanistan—it will usually end with someone replying to criticism by saying, "You don't have all the facts. Only the government has all the facts. You're just offering your subjective opinion." This mentality is encouraged by a situation in which every Soviet citizen is well aware that the information at his disposal is limited. But what he does not know, or what does not occur to him, is that he lives in a system which is specifically designed to limit his access to information.

BELIEVING that the world of their ideological imagination is just as real as the real world, Soviet citizens display not only the political characteristics of members of a movement but also an important personal characteristic: a tendency to lie.

We saw an example of the Soviet tendency to lie at the time of the invasion of Afghanistan. President Carter was struck by the brazenness of Soviet lying when he called President Brezhnev after Soviet troops began moving into Afghanistan and was told that they were going into Afghanistan to prevent a foreign invasion, when, of course, they *were* the foreign invasion. But this lie would not have surprised a Soviet citizen. It was consistent with the imaginary world described by the official ideology.

Lying is not just the way in which the Soviets deal with Americans. It is the way they deal with each other. And not just at the highest levels, but at every level. Regardless of whether it is a question of distributing flats, approving exit visas or considering labour grievances, the response of officials is always to lie, because telling the truth and feeling an obligation to tell the truth imposes a limit on the exercise of power.[1]

In the early 1970s, several leaders of the hippy movement approached the Moscow city authorities for permission to hold a demonstration. The officials replied: "In our country, demonstrations are organized by the Komsomol." The hippy leaders said, "Well, we have come to inform you of the fact that there is a new movement in this country. It is called the hippy movement, and you are going to have to take account of it." The city officials asked them to describe the demonstration, then decided to allow it. They asked only for a list of the organizers in case there was property damage. The hippies gave the Soviet authorities the list and went home, feeling satisfied. That night, everyone on the list was arrested.

At one point, I made serious efforts to locate Aleksei Nikitin, a coal miner from Donetsk, who as a result of contacting Western correspondents had been put in a mental hospital. I made a formal request to the Soviet Health Ministry for information about him and, a short time later, called the head of protocol at the ministry. He read me a statement which said: "Citizen Aleksei Vasilyevich Nikitin is not in any hospital in either the Donetsk *oblast* or the Dnepropetrovsk *oblast*." Three days later, I learned that the Health Ministry's notification notwithstanding, Nikitin was being held at a special psychiatric hospital in the Dnepropetrovsk *oblast*.

The result of pervasive lying is that words in the Soviet Union become meaningless. When the waitresses in a café grow tired of serving, they may put a sign on the door saying, "Closed for technical reasons." A letter to the United Nations may be returned with the explanation: "No such organization."

[1] This situation has not changed with the advent of *glasnost* which has done nothing to alter the mendacious context in which Soviet power is exercised.—*D.S.*

The characteristics of *homo sovieticus* are underpinned by a final trait which, in fact, makes all his other characteristics possible. This is deeply ingrained fear.

THE average Soviet citizen is caught up in a movement over which he has no control, but social automatism alone would not be enough to guarantee against the possibility of defection if the attractiveness of the movement and the sense of identity it proffers were not also reinforced by fear of acting on one's own.

In 1980, I reported that workers at the automobile factories in Togliatti and Gorky had gone on strike. A Soviet friend said the report was incredible because, "Soviet workers are incapable of going on strike." When I asked him why, he said:

> If there had been a strike in Gorky, they [the authorities] would have killed all the people, burned down the entire town and created a lake. And if the American embassy had then asked what happened to the city of Gorky, they would have said, "What city of Gorky? There is no city of Gorky. There is only Lake Gorky. There was never a city there. It was always a lake."

The psychology of fear in the Soviet Union prevents Soviet citizens from acting in ways which are predictable by us as long as we operate from our frame of reference.

In Lithuania, I was talking to an elderly woman and I noticed that a six-year-old girl in the flat was upset. The girl ran into another room and closed the door. Later the woman explained to me that the child had become hysterical and—crying uncontrollably—had said after I left, "Grandmother, you are going to be arrested and I'll never see you again." The grandmother was not arrested but that child will live in fear for the rest of her life. She was born in the middle of the *détente* era.

Leonid Borodin, a Russian nationalist, explained the difference between Soviet citizens and Americans to me one night with the help of an illustration.

He asked me to imagine a line of 20 persons tied to each other with ropes or chains, climbing up the face of a mountain. To an American, he said, these people are prisoners. Only compulsion would force them to accept such terrible discipline. But in the eyes of a Soviet citizen, they are mountaineers. Ahead of them is Mount Everest. They accept a discipline that others would find intolerable because they will make any sacrifice to achieve their goal.

The determination to subordinate all aspects of life to the pursuit of a "radiant goal" creates a genuinely new type of man, a man understood not as an unrepeatable individual but as a replaceable part in an ideological

movement who is under the complete control of the régime. And it is this new man who sees himself as the wave of the future.

Borodin explained:

> People in this country feel colossal righteousness in their behaviour. Did you ever watch Gromyko when he speaks, for example, at the United Nations? His expressions—there is not a trace of self doubt. People live badly in this country but we are sure that we are stronger. If it becomes necessary, we'll eat the leather off our shoes. Americans won't eat the leather off their shoes—if Reagan asked them to, he wouldn't be re-elected.
>
> Capitalism is the exploitation of man by man. And that is evil, and you have to fight that evil. If America builds 100 tanks, we'll tighten our belts and build 102.
>
> This regime doesn't want territorial supremacy or economic supremacy. It wants the ideological supremacy of socialism over the whole world. And that is why when you in the West stand on the sidelines and shout, "You are slaves bound together, following like animals, why don't you free yourselves," the only answer is an ironic laugh because we are ascending Everest. Before us is the great goal, and nothing will stop us.

The observations that Soviet citizens make about us and about themselves are worth bearing in mind because the victory of socialism would threaten the future of man's free spirit. It would mean the incorporation of all of humanity into a movement which reduces the individual to an interchangeable cog in a bureaucratic-political machine.

The formation of an adequate response to the challenge of the mentality of *homo sovieticus* is therefore one of the most important tasks facing the United States for the rest of our lifetimes.

Thank you.

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Questions following speech

Question: Accepting what you say as probably very accurate, I wonder how it is possible for you as a foreign reporter in the Soviet Union ever to get access to anybody who feels free enough to express their mind to you. Surely you must be one of the most surveyed and one of the most suspected types of foreigners within the Soviet Union.

David Satter: Yes. This is certainly true. I don't exclude the possibility that I and other foreign correspondents were under 24-hour-a-day surveillance, but we have to bear in mind some of the subtleties of the Soviet legal and political situation. Every Soviet citizen has the legal right to speak about his personal experiences and to express his views. Every Soviet citizen has the legal right to meet with any foreigner, including foreign correspondents. It's the tremendous fear that has been engendered which prevents many people from doing so, and I think it is true to say that it is also the lack of desire on the part of many foreign correspondents to speak to Soviet citizens which prevents there being wider contact. A Soviet citizen who meets with a foreigner risks various forms of bureaucratic revenge, but there are many who are ready to take that risk in order to have contact with Western representatives or whose lives have been so terrible that they are beyond the point of worrying any longer—what the régime thinks, what the régime plans to do. They have what the Russians call a *naplevatelsky* attitude toward life—which means they are ready to spit on everything. And those people often times have had the most interesting experiences of all. But the short answer to your question is that despite the repressiveness of the situation—despite the fear—and despite the fact that the "legal" protection that people have is unreliable—there are many people who are willing to talk to foreigners. For the most part, it is the foreigners who don't want to talk to them.

Question: Would you talk about the place of nationalism—Soviet nationalism—in this particular thing you are talking about because it seems, judging from your comments about *homo sovieticus*, that ideology plays a tremendous part in the average Russian's feelings toward his government in the situation he is faced with. How ideologically committed are people, and what role does nationalism play?

David Satter: I think that in order to answer that question, which is a very difficult one to answer, I'm going to ask if I can use a brief illustration from American life. We've all known people who have—or many of us have known people—who have a great deal of money and are intent on making more and whose desire to make money far exceeds their capacity to spend that money and who in fact show no desire to spend what they earn—but simply to accumulate. What this reflects is a certain social automatism which is peculiar to a commercial society—a society in which people are encouraged to pursue their individual material self-interest and realize themselves through material success. Well, social automatism is not the exclusive prerogative of societies like ours. It exists in the Soviet Union as well. It's just that in the Soviet Union, people realize themselves ideologically.

Just as the person who is intent on accumulating wealth in a commercial society may not reflect on why he is doing it, and may not be able to

explain why he is doing it, so many people in the Soviet Union are so psychologically mortgaged to the ideology of the country, so committed to the way their lives have been lived up until that point, that they see no alternative to working for mankind's radiant future. Even if they begin thinking about the ideology, they are incapable of divesting themselves of it.

For those who do divest themselves of the ideology, and in this category I would put many of the people we meet—the people of the American Institute, many of the Soviet diplomats serving in Washington, people like Georgy Arbatov and Anatoliy Dobrynin, people who understand perfectly well the true value of their ideology—the situation is not easy. They may understand that Marxism-Leninism is worthless, but they also understand they have no life outside of that ideology, and therefore they haven't the slightest incentive to act on their beliefs. So whether people believe in this ideology or not, they are going to continue to behave as if they believe in it, and ultimately what you have is a system which operates outside of human intentions.

Question: How aware are the Soviet people of the conventional and nuclear arms race between our two countries? And what is their attitude and how do they express it, if they are?

David Satter: They believe that all of the troubles in the Soviet Union are directly or indirectly connected to aggressive American policies, that the Soviet Union is forced to arm itself in order to defend against Imperialist aggressiveness as evidenced by the fact that the Soviet Union is surrounded by American bases. This is something which is fed to people day after day. On the eleventh floor of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, where the employees are well aware of how non-aggressive the West really is, there are signs on the walls warning people what to do in case of a chemical or bacteriological attack. [This despite the fact that it is the Soviet Union and not the West which is stockpiling vast quantities of chemical and bacteriological arms.]

The Soviets are always belittling and ridiculing anyone in the West who speaks of the Soviet threat. But inside the country, they constantly propagandize about the American threat, and this is used to justify every repressive measure. In fact, the Soviet authorities could not do without this American threat. It justifies the régime of secrecy in which a fifth of the country is closed to foreigners and much of the country is closed to Soviet citizens without special clearances. The whole elaborate system of passes, closed institutes, grades of secrecy, and signed pledges not to speak to foreigners depends on this fiction and it is secrecy which maintains the totalitarian state.

No matter how peaceable the behaviour of the United States, the Soviet Union will continue to harp on an American threat. They have no alternative because this is a necessary justification for the Soviet Union's totalitarian structure.

Question: Could you explain why Americans don't want to talk to Soviets, and give something of your observations of the official and unofficial American community in the Soviet Union and their behaviour. Why don't they talk to the Soviets?

David Satter: Well, everyone is different. Many Americans do talk to the Soviets. In the case of journalists, we've got a real problem in that only a handful of the resident journalists speak Russian. If any of you have ever had the experience of being in a foreign country where you couldn't speak a word of the language—you know how that undermines a person's self-confidence. The journalist has to be able to speak freely to people, to understand what they are saying—to understand nuances. He doesn't want to be ridiculous. He doesn't want to be caught in a crowd where everyone knows what is going on yet he must rely on others for protection. And it is perfectly understandable that in a confusing situation, a non-Russian-speaking journalist might be inclined to develop sources in the American Institute, at Novosti, among Soviet journalists who speak fluent English. And he will, of course, be forced by the logic of his own behaviour to over-value his contacts and to attach credence to information which he gets from them. And then to add the credibility of his publication to the disinformation which he is thoughtlessly transmitting.

The life of foreigners in the Soviet Union is organized in such a way as to render the foreigner passive. Even the contacts with unofficial Soviets tend to follow predictable lines with people passing on generations of contacts. Many of these contacts are dissidents and Jewish refuseniks. These people are wonderful friends but relationships with them tend to give the diplomat or resident correspondent in the Soviet Union the impression that the Soviet Union is a more normal society than it really is. Even if the dissidents tell you that "this country is an outdoor lunatic asylum," your day-to-day experience, including your experience with them, tells you that this is not true. If you are talking to normal people who are well informed, you see other Soviet citizens in their image.

It is only through a real act of will, of going out and seeking people, realizing that it is more important to talk to someone who has just gotten out of a mental hospital than it is to talk to the Canadian Ambassador, for example, that you begin to find out what is really going on in that society. You have to overlook the fact that the people who are talking to you may not be the most prepossessing in the world. You may not like the way they look or the way they smell. They may talk non-stop for 12 hours and never let you get a word in edgewise. They may berate you with how stupid you are and how little you know.

It takes a tremendous effort of will to operate outside of the context which the Soviets attempt to impose on you—and the Soviets are adept at creating layers of the truth. Foreigners who work in Moscow must go

from one layer of truth to the next deeper layer to the next deeper layer if they want to uncover the factors which shape Soviet society; this is the challenge that every foreigner who works in Moscow faces. Some have met that challenge. Others have tried. Many of the journalists have not tried—not because they did not want to and not because they aren't good people and talented people—but because they did not have the language. But, in general, I think our effort at understanding the Soviet Union both journalistically and diplomatically—I've told this to my fellow journalists and to my friends in the Embassy—leaves something to be desired. It does not help us understand what we need to understand—at least in my opinion.

Question: I would like to know what is your assessment—what the Soviet people know and understand about the West—about America in particular, but also about some of the values that are in the West. And the reason I ask is that I wonder whether your analysis of the *homo sovieticus* brings with it scepticism regarding the ability of the Soviet people to live in a democracy or is it rather that at present, given your observations, they seem to do what they can with what they see to be their choices.

David Satter: I think that at the present time it is very hard to see how the Soviet Union could transform itself into a democracy, given the mentality of the Soviet people. A democracy presupposes a certain capacity for self-restraint, and that implies values, and values need a foundation. All of that has been ripped up and destroyed there. Individual Soviet citizens who come to the West show themselves to be perfectly capable of living in a democracy, but this is because they come to a society in which democratic values are already rooted.

I think that we should do everything we can to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union to liberalize internally because I do believe that this would blunt the Soviet Union's imperialistic tendencies to some extent. Internal liberalization always serves as a kind of break, even if it is only a marginal break, on the expansionist tendencies of the régime. But to hope for democracy in Russia under foreseeable circumstances is unrealistic. I think the human destruction is simply too great. On the contrary, if that régime begins to disintegrate, as it someday must, it may one day be in the national interest of the United States to prop it up. They have destroyed the basis for an alternative development, and if the Soviet Union were to explode, if the kind of emotional explosion which takes place in an individual when he learns the truth—and there are various ways to learn the truth—were to be replicated on a mass scale, we would see the worst blood-bath in history. That also is not in our interest.

Question: I wanted to follow up a little bit on that by asking what you think have been the effects, and what might be the potential effects, of international broadcasts into the Soviet Union in light of the fact that the control of information has really been the key to the whole internal security

system in that country, and that therefore international broadcasts are just about the only thing that penetrates on a mass scale.

David Satter: I think you have asked a very important question. I think that our broadcasts can have a marginal effect. But you have to try to envisage, if you can, the position of a typical Soviet citizen living in a provincial Soviet city far away from Moscow. He has never met a foreigner. His ideas about the West are confused. The information that is distributed becomes more fantastic the further away you get from the centre. There is a certain hesitation about the scale of lying in Moscow—and that hesitation isn't great—but in the provinces they will invent any kind of nonsense.

This person in the provinces has lived his entire life in a totalitarian society which is organized on the basis of the false reality of the Soviet régime. He operates in a world of complete disinformation with one exception—a foreign radio broadcast which comes to him from a country which he has never seen. He hears the voice of a Soviet émigré, who he has been taught to think of as a traitor. This voice tells him tales about the material luxury in the West, which he may be prepared to believe. But to accept the factual information in the broadcast puts him in the position of having to accept that everything he is told by his own official Soviet information is mendacious. Let's say he takes the step of accepting that his whole world is based on lies. He then asks himself: "What am I supposed to do about it?" He can't leave the city because he can't register in another city. He can't leave the region because the city he is living in is probably more desirable than the collective farm that he left. He can't go to a big city. He has no hope ever of leaving the country. What is he supposed to do about it? If he is brave enough to face the truth of the situation—and most people just assume that what they are hearing is Western propaganda—he may be pushed to the point where he simply refuses to listen anymore because listening subjects him to undue mental strain.

The short answer to your question is that in fact the Western radio broadcasts are effective at the margin. But that doesn't mean that they aren't of some use. If the emotional explosion that I described takes place in a person, all of the Western information which has stayed in his subconscious mind is assimilated instantly and the person immediately understands everything. From our point of view, if we understand the very real possibility that within a generation or within two generations there could be a terrible catastrophe in the Soviet Union, then it is obviously in our interest that the information that is accumulating somewhere—at some subconscious level in people's minds—be highly accurate information and that it show the best about this country and the best about democracy. Unfortunately, I don't think our foreign Russian language radio broadcasts always do that. I think that their most useful part is the news broadcasting, but I think that the features sometimes only aid Soviet propaganda by

reinforcing the view which is widespread in Russia that the United States is a country without any ideas—that it is purely materialistic—and based on nothing but individual greed. I don't think it does us any good whatever, except to titillate people momentarily, to start broadcasting in Russian how well we live, how the plumber can afford two cars and a house in the suburbs, etc. And it is really undignified for the United States to be making this type of appeal.

Question: While you were in the Soviet Union, you saw both the waning days of *détente* and the advent of the Reagan Administration. What approach do you think is most likely to mellow the Soviet leadership?

David Satter: Well, I don't think the Soviet leadership is going to mellow in either case. I think the Soviet leadership operates according to its own imperatives. I think that there is a tendency in this country to be overly ambitious. We always tend to think of what effect we can have on the Soviet Union. I'm worried about what effect they can have on us.

Generally speaking, I think that Reagan did a great thing when he removed the self-censor. In his first press conference, he said frankly and absolutely truthfully that the Soviet Union is ready to commit any crime, to tell any lie. This is the absolute truth. The wonderful thing about the Soviet authorities is that they can be insulted indefinitely. Anything you can call them will be less than they deserve and it will not have the slightest adverse effect, because this is a country without genuine values, and a person who reacts to insults as a matter of principle, instead of just calculating his advantage, is already a person with a value structure. In any confrontation, the Soviet leaders will only calculate their short-term advantage. And I think it is important for the United States that we call things by their proper names. So, I was very encouraged when Reagan removed the self-censor.

The whole philosophy of *détente* was miscast in my view and it seems to me that whoever put it together could not have known anything about the Soviet Union. No web of interlocking relationships is going to restrain the Soviet Union from pursuing its vital interests. And ideological expansion is its vital interest. It is necessary to its progress, its future and even its survival. The Soviet Union does not exist to create a better life for its citizens. It exists to expand.

I came to Moscow in 1976, shortly before President Carter took office, and I was astonished by some of the things that were done. I had only a journalist's superficial view of events, but it seemed to me that there were actions taken that could have been possible only if they were getting no reliable advice whatever about the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, I think that Carter some day will be remembered for what I think is his enduring contribution, the Human Rights Crusade. I never, during my years in the Soviet Union, saw the Soviets so discomfited, so on the defensive, and so

really afraid of a step the American Government had taken. I think that the most valuable thing that we could do is to understand that, where ideas are concerned, you cannot beat something with nothing. If the Soviet Union is competing with us militarily, strategically, politically, economically and ideologically, and first and foremost ideologically, we cannot fail to compete with them ideologically. We have the means to do that, once we identify what our values are. We need to have an articulate analysis of what communism is; not because we are going to reform the Soviet Union, I am not that hopeful; but in order to unify ourselves, to make it clear to ourselves and to people who are choosing these various paths what is at stake in the world. If we allow people to assume that what is at stake is a conflict between socialism and capitalism, capitalism will lose, because capitalism is designed for people who are capable of making money and who desire to be rich. People who are not capable of acquiring wealth—they outnumber those who are capable—are not going to be inspired by capitalism.

What is at stake in the East–West conflict is really a more fundamental question, the question of the traditional values of humanity that the United States is now entrusted to defend. Facing these values is Soviet double-think, an ideology which has no independent value of its own, a reaction to capitalism which is a very effective instrument for destroying both it and the all-important ethical framework which regulates it and keeps it under control.

Question: On this question of Soviet disinformation and the gullibility of foreigners to it—just recently some dear friends of mine went over there. They are Harvard PhDs. They are wonderful, brilliant, bright, knowledgeable, professional people, both of them. They came back—they were completely melted by Dr Arbatov, by everything they saw. And so if this happens to the best and the brightest that we have in this country, what about the simple ordinary foreign service officer? And what about Billy Graham? He said there is no hunger in the Soviet Union: "We had three-hour meals at lunch."

David Satter: That reminds me of what George Bernard Shaw said when he came back from the Soviet Union. He said: "Famine? What famine? I never ate so well in my life."

Question: But people swallow this disinformation.

David Satter: First of all, I disagree with the idea that Harvard PhDs are the best and the brightest, and I don't think that it is a question of being bright. The Soviets are adept at deceiving visiting foreigners. The Soviets understand that the fatal flaw of Americans, and Westerners in general, is our superficiality. They understand that the American—and we are Americans so we should speak this way—is someone who assumes that what he sees on the surface, to a great extent, reflects the essence of a situation. Therefore,

he is not prepared for situations in which what exists on the surface not only doesn't reflect the essence of a situation, but in fact directly contradicts it. And it is the Soviet success in creating appearances, in creating the appearance of normality, particularly for the casual visitor to the Soviet Union, which is responsible for this flood of disinformation.

The Soviets don't want to be like China during the Cultural Revolution. They know that people distrust a society about which they know nothing. They want us to have information about them, but they want us to have information which serves their purposes. To a great extent, the flow of information in this country is shaped by the Soviet authorities themselves. And the challenge is to free ourselves of the information provided for us by the Soviet authorities. Real information is one of the greatest weapons that this country has against the Soviet Union.

There is an idea in this administration, that it is possible to defeat communism with weapons. In fact, weapons are not enough. Communism is an idea, and the only way that an idea can be beaten is with a better idea. We can arm to the teeth and still lose—if we don't understand what it is that confronts us.

Question: From your prospective, does it make any sense to support an embargo on grain, oil and gas equipment sales to the Soviet Union and should there be a consistent pattern against such sales?

David Satter: I think consistency in dealing with the Soviet Union is very important. But on the subject of the grain sales and the oil and gas sales—I think I'll have to refer to the psychological relationship between East and West. This is not a relationship between two competing value systems. This is a relationship between bandits and the sheriff. The Soviet Union reacts to the limits which are placed on it externally. If the United States embargoes grain, and embargoes oil and gas sales, and if Western Europe does the same in reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan, this affixes in the Soviet mentality a sense of a limit. Psychologically it is devastating for us—irrespective of the practical arguments, but looking just at the psychological dimension—it is disastrous for us and it weakens our overall deterrent *vis à vis* the Soviet Union and increases the sense of weakness, when we first embargo something and then, caving in to political pressure in this country, lift the embargo.

Deeply engrained in the minds of Soviet people and a fundamental tenet of their ideology is that capitalism will sell the rope with which they hang us. And to my astonishment, people keep repeating this as if it is somehow meaningless, this phrase of Lenin's, and assume that he was just joking when he said that. And then we go ahead and we sell them whatever they need. I think that it is very important for our security to convince the Soviets that we will not sell them the rope, no matter what the economic cost to ourselves. Remember that the Soviet régime was willing to destroy

its entire economy in the service of political goals. So, when they see that we, for what is at best a very marginal economic advantage, are willing to sell out our fundamental political interests, they convince themselves that we have no principles of any kind.

Question: I'd like to ask you who you think will lead the Soviet Union in the next decade?

David Satter: You mean which individual?

Question: Or which type of person?

David Satter: I see you don't read the *Wall Street Journal*. It appears that Andropov will be the next leader or he and some other people. But I think that all that is beside the point. I think that what will be reflected in any new Soviet leader will be not his personal preferences but the needs of the system. It is an American weakness to think that we are dealing with individuals. We are not. Whoever leads the Soviet system, the possibilities for policy adaptation are limited. One of the characteristics of IBM or General Motors at the highest corporate levels is standardization of personalities. In a totalitarian system and in the communist party bureaucracy, in which the condition for entry really is prostituting yourself by taking part in obligatory lying, thereby undermining the value structure which can give a person individuality, you have a terrible standardization of personalities. It is depressing to witness this at close quarters, and therefore I believe that whoever leads the Soviet Union, it won't make much difference for us. We will still be facing the same régime.

Question: If everyone lies in the Soviet Union, that must mean that everyone assumes that everyone else is lying. If so, how does anything get done?

David Satter: I think you would be surprised at how little truthfulness is in fact required in life, particularly in a society where the only thing that matters is power. Don't overestimate the extent to which a functioning system needs truthfulness, any kind of moral values, whatever—or any kind of thought or analysis. If the Soviet Union can be said to have made a contribution to our knowledge, it was the fact that all of these things can be done without.

Question: How necessary do you think it is to achieve a Western cohesion regarding various embargoes against the Soviet Union?

David Satter: That is fundamental of course, and I think that we can only do this on the basis of an articulated set of common values. And that's got to come from the top. We've got to show that we know what the Soviet Union is, what's going on internally in the Soviet Union. We have to show that we analyze communism outside of the secular intellectual framework that gave it to us in the first place, and that would be sufficient, I think, to rally countries to our common cause.

The Role of Forgeries in Soviet Active Measures

Herbert Romerstein

POLITICAL forgeries are not new. They have been used for centuries by a variety of movements to discredit their adversaries and promote their own ideas. The Soviet Union, however, has developed the use of political forgeries to a level unparalleled in previous times.

The Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, was responsible for the infamous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a forgery that has cost untold numbers of lives since it was first introduced in the early part of this century. The Nazis used this forgery as a justification for genocide against the Jews, and even today anti-semitic groups continue to reprint it. The Soviet anti-semitic organization, Pamyat, uses this forgery to "prove" a Jewish conspiracy exists to undermine the Soviet régime and cause its shortcomings. Some Pamyat leaders are members of the CPSU.[1]

In the USSR forgeries are used as a weapon of "active measures" (i.e. to influence operations). The KGB has the responsibility for carrying out these active measures and producing forgeries. Describing the role of the KGB in influencing attitudes in the West, Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB, said in 1967:

> The state security bodies are also actively participating in the fulfilment of this task. The workers of these bodies are aware that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle; that it is a bitter and stubborn battle on all fronts—economic, political, and ideological. In this fight, the state security bodies are obliged to carry out their specific duties efficiently and faultlessly.[2]

Drawing on the experience of their Tsarist predecessors, the Soviet KGB (known formerly as the Cheka, OGPU, GPU and NKVD) has used forgeries since the early days of the Bolshevik régime. Six months after seizing power, the Bolsheviks were concerned about continuing accusations labelling Lenin and his comrades as German agents. There was some logic to this accusation as the Germans had helped send Lenin back into Russia to undermine their wartime enemy, but the Bolsheviks denied that they

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[1] *Izvestia*, 3 June 1987, p. 3; *Sovetskaya Kultura*, 18 June 1987, p. 3; *New Republic*, N.Y., 3 August 1987, pp. 13–14.

[2] Y. V. Andropov, "Fifty Years of Guarding the Soviet Land's Security", *Pravda*, 21 Dec. 1967 translated in *Novosti Daily Review*, 21 Dec. 1967.

were in the pay of the Germans. On 15 September 1918 the United States government released to the press a collection of documents that purported to show that the Bolsheviks had received money both before and after the Russian Revolution. In October 1918, the Committee on Public Information, the predecessor of USIA, released a pamphlet to the press entitled *The German–Bolshevik Conspiracy*. The pamphlet contained translations of 68 documents and reproductions of many of them. In addition, the pamphlet contained an analysis of the documents prepared for the National Board for Historical Service by two distinguished scholars. The report concluded that most of the documents were genuine. Some were questioned. The documents had been obtained in Russia by Edgar Sisson, the representative of the Committee on Public Information, and came to be known as the "Sisson Documents."

The release of the Sisson Documents was reported in the American press on 16 September 1918. On 21 September the New York *Evening Post* challenged their authenticity, citing as their source Santeri Nuorteva, who was described by them as "head of the Finnish Information Bureau in New York." They neglected to say that he was a notorious Soviet propagandist. He had been a representative of the short-lived Communist government established in Finland by the Red Army, and was later to become an employee of the pseudo embassy established by the Soviets in New York. (The supposed embassy was closed in 1920, and the "ambassador" deported. The US government did not recognize Soviet Russia until 1933.) Nuorteva revealed that the first American to see the documents was Colonel Raymond Robins, the Red Cross administrator in Russia who was later identified as a Bolshevik sympathizer.

The Sisson Documents continue to be controversial to this day, but they are consistent with documents proving German financing of the Bolsheviks that were found in the German Foreign Office after the Second World War.[3] It is possible that the Bolsheviks created a set of forgeries which were then mixed with authentic documents and passed to the American government by Robins for the purpose of discrediting the thesis that Lenin and company were on the German pay-roll. In fact, the exposure of the Sisson Documents created an atmosphere in which any allegation of German financial support to the Bolsheviks was treated with distrust. It was only decades later that the German Foreign Office documents became available and proved the point.

ON 25 October 1924, the British Foreign Office released to the press the text of an alleged document of the Communist International

[3] George Katkov, "German Foreign Office Documents On Financial Support to the Bolsheviks in 1917," *International Affairs*, April 1956.

ordering the British Communist Party to carry out activities against the Labour government and to organize cells in the army. The document, signed with the name of the head of the Communist International, Grigory Zinoviev, is credited with bringing down the British Labour government, which was perceived as being too soft on the Soviet Union.

The Soviet government and Zinoviev denied the authenticity of the letter. It was, however, quite consistent with instructions given to the British and other Communist parties by the 5th World Congress of the Communist International held in Moscow in the summer of 1924. The instructions had been printed in the 5 September 1924 issue of the official Comintern publication *International Press Correspondence*, published in German and English in Vienna.

Ruth Fischer, who later broke with communism, was an alternate member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and had been a German delegate to the 5th Congress. In her history of the German Communist Party, she claimed that Zinoviev had told her that the letter had indeed been a forgery but that he believed that it had been produced by the GPU, the Soviet secret police, to undermine his position in the Party.

The conventional wisdom on the origin of the Zinoviev letter is found in a 1968 book written by three British authors. They quote Mme Irina Bellegarde, the widow of a prominent White Russian émigré who had fought against the Bolsheviks. According to her, the forgery was created by her husband and two other White Russians, one of whom, Druzhelovsky, had allegedly stolen a sheet of Communist International letterhead stationery from the Soviet embassy in Berlin. Another White émigré forged Zinoviev's signature.[4]

This story does not stand up to scrutiny. While the British government did not release a photographic copy of the original letter, only a translation, such a photographic copy was found in the US National Archives and was declassified in 1960. It is handwritten in Russian on a sheet of paper with no printed letterhead and does not carry the actual signature of Zinoviev. Mme Bellegarde's Zinoviev letter may have existed but it was not the one released by the British Foreign Office.[5]

Druzhelovsky, the man who supposedly obtained the Comintern letterhead, was well known to the Soviets as a notorious forger of alleged Soviet documents. His activities were exposed in the Soviet book *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* published in Russian in 1926 and in English in 1927.[6] For some

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[4] Lewis Chester, Stephen Fay, and Hugo Young, *The Zinoviev Letter* (J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia and New York, 1968).

[5] US National Archives file 861.00B/259 to State Department from Paris, 28 Nov. 1924.

[6] *Antisovetskie Podlogi* (NKID Moscow, 1926) and *Anti Soviet forgeries* (Workers' Publications Ltd., London, 1927).

reason, he went back to the Soviet Union in June 1926. He was supposedly tried, convicted and executed in 1927.[7]

The 1926 Soviet book identifies a number of Druzhelovsky's forgeries. One of these was a supposed letter from the Comintern to the Communist Party of Bulgaria ordering them to organize an insurrection on 15 April 1924. The document had fallen into the hands of the police weeks earlier, and translations and a facsimile of it appeared in Bulgarian newspapers on 4 April. The document was clearly a forgery and was soon exposed as such. No one therefore expected the Communists to move on 15 April. However, on that day General K. Gheorghieff was murdered. The next day, during a memorial service at the Sofia Cathedral, an explosion killed more than 200 people and at least 500 were injured. The police cracked down on the Communist Party. The Comintern responded: "It is not the work of a Party. The whole population is conducting the struggle against bloody reaction."[8]

Georgi Dimitrov was then head of the Bulgarian Communist Party. He later became General Secretary of the Comintern and after the Second World War the dictator of Communist Bulgaria. In 1934, Dimitrov was on trial in Nazi Germany, accused of setting fire to the Reichstag. He argued in court that a Communist would not do such a thing, saying:

> I would also remind you of the outrage at the Sofia Cathedral. This incident was not organized by the Bulgarian Communist Party, but the Bulgarian Communist Party was persecuted on account of it.[9]

Fourteen years later, Dimitrov, as ruler of Bulgaria and head of the Communist Party, made a report to the 5th Congress of the Communist Party. Apparently forgetting his 1934 denial, Dimitrov's description in 1948 of the history of his party said:

> The fascist government continued with even greater fierceness its terroristic course. Exploiting the desperate acts of the leaders of the Party's military organization, culminating in the attempt at the Sofia Cathedral, it started a mass slaughter of active Communist, worker and peasant activists. The terror following the attempt in the Sofia Cathedral on 16 April 1925 dealt a very serious blow to the Party.[10]

How could a White Russian forger know the date that the Bulgarian Communist Party was planning terrorist acts to trigger an insurrection? The Bulgarian Communist Party and Comintern official, Kolarov, testified

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[7] *Izvestia*, 3, 12 and 13 July 1927.
[8] *International Press Correspondence*, 23 April 1925, pp. 475–476.
[9] John Lane, *The Reichstag Fire Trial* (The Bodley Head Limited, London, 1934), p. 227.
[10] Georgi Dimitrov, *Political Report* (Sofia, 1949), pp. 21 and 22.

at Druzhelovsky's trial. He pointed out that the forger must have known the date of the terrorist acts in advance. The reverse is also true. Since the Bulgarian Communist Party committed the acts, they must also have been involved in the forgery.[11] There is some reason to believe that Druzhelovsky was actually a GPU agent. His return to the Soviet Union may have been the end of his career as a forger, but there is only the Soviet claim that he was executed.

The liberal American journalist, George Seldes, sheds light on Druzhelovsky's possible true allegiances. He had been taken in by a Druzhelovsky forgery in the 1920s. Writing in 1929, Seldes said:

> I had been offered documents and when the agent was approved by the American consulate, I bought them. One was a letter about $25,000 sent by the Third International for Bolshevik work in Buenos Aires. The man who sold me this document confessed to forgery (according to the Moscow press), but American newspaper men in Russia say Drushieowsky (*sic:* Druzhelovsky), always was and is now a secret agent of the Chekah (*sic:* Cheka). I suppose the documents were his forgeries but I cannot understand the excitement in the radical press about them because in open sessions of the 3rd International Congress of 1922 I heard announcements about the sending of money for Bolshevik enterprises in South America. The document may have been a forgery; the forged words, however, relate historical facts.[12]

Druzhelovsky apparently created forgeries that could be easily exposed. But because what they described was indeed true, they tended to discredit acceptance of the truth by the target audience.

IN 1929, a different form of Soviet forgery appeared on the scene. A document purporting to be a memorandum from the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka to the Emperor found its way into the Western press. This document laid out a Japanese plan for world conquest. According to the introduction to a 1941 publication of the document by the American Communist Party,

> The Tanaka Memorial . . . was written in 1927 as a confidential document. It first came to light in 1929 after it had been purchased from a Japanese by Chang Hsueh-liang, then the Young Marshal of Manchuria.[13]

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[11] *Izvestia*, 12 July 1927.

[12] George Seldes, *You Can't Print That!* (Garden City Publishing Company, New York, 1929), p. 336.

[13] *Japanese Imperialism Exposed—The Secret Tanaka Document* (International Publishers, New York, 1941). For a detailed evaluation of the role of the Tanaka forgery in Soviet policy see "Deception, a Tool of Soviet Foreign Policy" by Natalie Grant, Nathan Hale Institute, Washington D.C., 1987, pp. 14–20.

The "Young Marshal" was a warlord who frequently collaborated with the Chinese Communists. In late 1936, he kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek and demanded that he cooperate with the Communists in the war against Japan.

The Tanaka document was clearly a forgery. It contained errors of fact about Japan and even about Baron Tanaka. Nevertheless, it was widely circulated until the end of the Second World War. An insight into its Soviet origin was provided in 1941 by Leon Trotsky, who argued that it was authentic. According to an article by Trotsky written shortly before his death, Felix Dzerzhinsky, the head of Cheka, secured the document in 1925 through a spy in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The document was photographed and then translated for Trotsky, who was still an important Soviet official. Trotsky, of course, did not explain how the Soviets came into possession in 1925 of a document not written until 1927. (Tanaka did not become Prime Minister until 1927.) It is possible that the Soviets created the forgery using as an exemplar an authentic document stolen in 1925.

According to Trotsky, the Soviets had a problem in surfacing the document:

> The publication of this document in Moscow would be tantamount to saying openly to the Japanese that we were seeking a conflict. The scales would immediately tip in favour of the most bellicose circles in the Japanese army and navy. It was absolutely irrational to provoke Japan by publishing this document which, moreover, might not gain credence abroad.
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> Zinoviev at first made the proposal that the document be published in the periodical *Communist International*. This method of publication would still leave the government itself on the side-lines. But no one would hear of it, nor did Zinoviev insist on his hasty proposal.
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> I offered a plan which I had elaborated before coming to the session of the Political Bureau. It was necessary to publish the document abroad, and avoid any link whatever between the document and Moscow, without lessening its effect, without arousing mistrust, without compromising the GPU agents in Japan. But where? The place of publication literally offered itself, namely, the United States. I proposed that, after the document was translated into English, it should be transmitted to the press by a trustworthy and authoritative friend of the Soviet Republic in the United States. At that time the calling of a friend of the Soviet Union had not yet become a profession. The number of friends was not large; important and influential personalities were all too scarce. In any case the task turned out much more difficult than I had presumed.
>
> We were under the impression that the document would literally be

> torn from our hands. Dzerzhinsky had hopes of easily recouping the expenses of our Japanese agency. But things did not turn out that way at all. It was not easy to provide a credible version of how the document was obtained from Tokyo. Any reference to the real source, i.e. the GPU, would arouse additional mistrust. In America the suspicion would naturally arise that the GPU itself had simply manufactured the document in order to poison relations between Japan and the United States.
>
> The English translation was painstakingly made in Moscow. The photostats together with the English text were forwarded to New York, and in this way any trace of a connection between this document and Moscow was eliminated.[14]

Trotsky revealed that the document was put into circulation in the United States through Amtorg, the Soviet trading corporation, headed by Bogdanov. Since Bogdanov did not arrive in the United States until 1930, Trotsky's knowledge of the method of surfacing could only have come through his contacts in the GPU, which he maintained after being ousted from the Soviet leadership. This date would be consistent with the forgery's original surfacing in China in 1929 and its replay in the United States in 1930.

The most recent replay of the Tanaka forgery was a reference to it in a newspaper in Kuwait in January 1987. The unsigned article, in Arabic, which showed substantial evidence of Soviet authorship, accused the United States of developing an "ethnic weapon," a biological weapon that would supposedly affect only black- or brown-skinned people. This bizarre allegation has been repeated in both official Soviet media and in publications influenced by the Soviets for years. The article was also accompanied by a picture purporting to be of the "ethnic weapon" being fired which carried the caption, "The germ bomb is fired from regular tanks looking like regular bombs and spreading the germs." The opening paragraphs of the article accused the United States of taking over such biological weapons research from the Japanese, who were supposedly carrying out the plans revealed by Tanaka in his letter to the Emperor.[15] Clearly, old forgeries never die—they don't even fade away.

IN 1930, the US Congress was planning to establish a committee to investigate Communist propaganda. Shortly before it was formed, the New York City police department received copies of a set of documents puporting to be letters from the Communist International instructing Amtorg to carry out Communist propaganda in the United States.

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[14] Leon Trotsky, "The 'Tanaka Memorial'," *Fourth International* (June 1941).
[15] *Al-Qabas*, Kuwait, 29 Jan. 1987.

Amtorg was indeed deeply involved in Soviet espionage in the United States. The documents were released to the press on 2 May 1930 and appeared in print the next day. They were released by Police Commissioner Grover Whalen and came to be known as the Whalen Documents. But an examination of the documents reveals clearly that they are forgeries. For example, the letterhead reads "Ispolkom Kominterna" (Excom Comintern). An authentic document would spell out "Communist International," rather than use the nickname Comintern.

The forgeries were exposed by a journalist named John L. Spivak, who provided the evidence to Congressman LaGuardia and wrote about the case in the New York *Evening Graphic*. Spivak claimed that his editor gave him the assignment to trace the documents on 3 May. After investigating type foundries and print shops, he said he discovered the identity of the printer of the letterheads on 8 May. It thus took him four days to trace the printing. Spivak's story does not stand up to investigation. When the printer testified before a congressional committee he revealed that he recognized the letterhead when he saw it reprinted on the front page of the Yiddish language daily newspaper *The Jewish Daily Forward*. The same day Spivak came into his store and accused him of being the printer of the letterheads.[16] The printer, Max Wagner, signed an affidavit for Spivak acknowledging that he had printed the letterheads. The statement, read into the *Congressional Record* by Congressman LaGuardia, reads:

> I printed this about four months ago and submitted two copies as a proof, but the man did not come back for the order. Signed, M. Wagner, printer.[17]

The photostat of the letterheads appeared on the front page of *The Jewish Daily Forward* on 3 May 1930, the date that Spivak began his investigation, not four days later. It is clear that Spivak knew who the printer was as soon as he began his investigation.

The Communist Party newspaper the *Daily Worker* of 13 May 1930 reproduced a photostat of the Wagner affidavit with a slightly different text leaving out the word "printer" and inserting the words "8 May 1930". This appears to have been concocted to authenticate Spivak's claim that he confronted Wagner on 8 May rather than on 3 May when the incident actually took place.

In 1945, Elizabeth Bentley revealed to the FBI that she had worked as

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[16] *Investigation Of Communist Propaganda, Hearings Before A Special Committee To Investigate Communist Activities In The United States House Of Representatives*, July 1930 (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1930) p. 287. See also, John L. Spivak, *A Man In His Time* (Horizon Press, New York, 1967), chapter 9.

[17] *Congressional Record - House*, 12 May 1930, pp. 8760–8770.

courier for a Soviet spy ring. She identified John L. Spivak as a member of the ring.[18]

The use made by the Communists of the forgeries indicates that their purpose was to discredit the Congressional committee established to investigate Communist propaganda. The committee, headed by Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York, never authenticated the Whalen Documents. However, Earl Browder, then head of the Communist Party USA reported to a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International held in Moscow in April 1931 that:

> The notorious forged "Whalen Documents," produced by the Tsarist "General" Djamgaroff, became the occasion for the US Congress to set up the Fish Committee to investigate Communist activities in the US. Behind the actions of this committee, which were the most vulgar farce considered in themselves, was the sinister and serious purpose of preparing "public opinion" for the war of intervention against the USSR.[19]

Writing in the theoretical organ of the Communist Party USA, Max Bedacht said:

> Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr., is a blunderer and a bungler . . . Mr Fish tried to use his committee to stamp as genuine some clumsy forgeries that not even the most loyal capitalist protagonist could accept as genuine.[20]

Bedacht was revealed years later by Whittaker Chambers as the man who recruited him as a Soviet spy. Bedacht was the contact between the leadership of the American Communist Party and the Soviet intelligence service.[21]

In 1961 Richard Helms, Assistant Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified before the US Senate. He said:

> Long before 1957, the Communists were as skilful as the Nazis in the production and exploitation of forgeries. But in that year they first began to aim them frequently against American targets, to turn them out in volume, and to exploit them through a wide-flung international network. Then the CIA put these fakes under the microscope.
>
> We found that each Soviet forgery is manufactured and spread

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[18] Comprehensive Statement Made to The FBI by Elizabeth Bentley, 30 Nov. 1945, pp. 28, 29, and 67. Released under the Freedom of Information Act.

[19] Earl Browder, *War against Workers' Russia!* (Communist Party USA, 1931), p. 13.

[20] *The Communist*, New York, Oct. 1930, p. 881.

[21] Comprehensive Statement Made to The FBI by Whittaker Chambers (Jan. to March 1949), pp. 26 and 27. Released under the Freedom of Information Act.

according to a plan. Each is devised and timed to mesh with other techniques of psychological warfare in support of Soviet strategy. Our analysis shows three main purposes:

The first is to discredit the West generally, and the United States and its Government specifically, in the eyes of the rest of the world. Bloc audiences are often presented with forgeries seemingly validated by the West-to-East replay technique that appeared in the Chale hoax.

The second purpose is to sow suspicion and discord among the Western allies, and especially between this country and our friends.

The third purpose is to drive a wedge between the peoples of non-bloc countries and their governments by fostering the line that these governments do not represent their citizens because they are the puppets of the United States.

Campaigns to sell these three themes to the world are planned by the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Staff units of the party's central committee work out the details. If the plan includes forgeries, they are prepared by a Soviet or satellite intelligence service.

During the past 4 years we have discovered no fewer than 32 forged documents designed to look as though they had been written by or to officials of the American Government. We are investigating others.[22]

THE PATTERN of Soviet forgeries has not changed; the apparatus, however, has been upgraded. In a 1980 report to the US Congress, the CIA stated:

> The KGB provides a nonattributable adjunct to the overt Soviet propaganda network. Service A of the KGB's Foreign Intelligence Directorate plans, coordinates and supports operations which are designed to backstop overt Soviet propaganda using such devices of covert actions as forgeries, planted press articles, planted rumors, and controlled information media. In particular, the number of Soviet forgeries has increased dramatically in recent years. In the early 1970s, this section of the KGB was upgraded from "department" to "service" status—an indication of its increased importance. Service A maintains liaison with its counterparts in the Cuban and the East European services, and coordinates its overall program with theirs.[23]

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[22] *Communist Forgeries, Hearings Before The Subcommittee To Investigate The Administration Of The Internal Security Act And Other Internal Security Laws Of The Committee On The Judiciary United States Senate*, 2 June 1961 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1961), pp. 5 and 6.

[23] *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), Hearings Before The Subcommittee On Oversight Of The Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence House Of Representatives*, 6 and 19 Feb. 1980

The most widespread forgery of recent years is the "US Army Field Manual, FM 30-31 B." In September 1976, a photocopy of this forgery appeared on the bulletin board of the Philippine Embassy in Thailand together with a letter addressed to President Marcos. The forgery said that the United States planned to use leftist terrorist groups in Western countries to promote US objectives. It reappeared in 1978 in two Spanish publications where it had been planted by a Spanish Communist and a Cuban intelligence officer. The next year, copies of a Portuguese language translation were circulated among military officers in Lisbon.[24]

The forged field manual had worldwide distribution in the late 1970s. In January 1979, *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, published in the United States by CIA defector Philip Agee, reproduced the forgery as if it was an authentic document. While the original forgery was a typescript, the magazine reset it in type giving the impression that it was a printed document.

In 1983, the KGB began to replay the story. In the new version the manual had been discovered in the possession of the Italian Masonic organization P2, which was involved in an important scandal at the time. This was an attempt both to link the United States government to the scandal and to authenticate the forgery.[25]

On 17 September 1980, White House press spokesman Jody Powell announced that an unidentified group had sought to sow racial discord by circulating a forged Presidential Review Memorandum on Africa that suggested a racist policy on the part of the United States.[26] The first surfacing of the forgery appears to have been in the San Francisco black newspaper the *Sun Reporter*, in its issue of 18 September 1980. As this is a weekly newspaper, it was actually distributed several days earlier. The *Sun Reporter*'s political editor, Edith Austin, claims in that issue of the paper to have received the document from an "African official on her recent visit on the continent." Edith Austin has been affiliated with the *Sun Reporter* since at least 1958, and has a long record of radical activities in the San Francisco area including collaboration with the Black Panther Party. The publisher of the *Sun Reporter* is Dr Carlton Goodlett. Dr Goodlett is a long-

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(US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1980), pp. 61 and 62. See also *Soviet Active Measures, Hearings Before The Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence House Of Representatives*, 13 and 14 July 1982 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1982) and *Soviet Active Measures, Hearings Before Subcommittee On European Affairs Of The Committee On Foreign Relations United States Senate*, 12 and 13 Sept. 1985 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1986).

[24] Ibid. 1980 pp. 86 to 101.

[25] *Political Terrorism—an Indictment Of Imperialism* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983), pp. 213 and 262; *International Terrorism And The CIA* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983), pp. 225 to 227; *The CIA In The Dock* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983), p. 106f.

[26] *New York Times*, 18 Sept. 1980.

time supporter of Communist causes. At that time, Goodlett served as a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council, the major international Soviet front organization. The forgery was replayed by the Soviet news agency TASS on 18 September 1980, and thereby distributed worldwide. It is interesting to note that the method used in surfacing this forgery was through a publication owned by a long-time Soviet collaborator.

JEANNE Kirkpatrick has been the target of more than one Soviet forgery. On 6 February 1983, the pro-Soviet Indian weekly, *Link*, published the text of a supposed speech by Ambassador Kirkpatrick outlining a plan for the Balkanization of India. The speech was never given, of course, and was, in fact, made up out of whole cloth. This forgery has subsequently been replayed many times by Soviet-controlled propaganda outlets. Its most recent appearance was in the book *Devil and His Dart* published in 1986. The author, Kunhanandan Nair, is the European correspondent of *Blitz*, another pro-Soviet publication.[27]

On 5 November 1982, the British weekly the *New Statesman* published a photostat of a letter supposedly from a South African official to Mrs Kirkpatrick. He was supposedly sending her a birthday gift. The US Mission to the UN wrote to the magazine on 19 November branding the letter a forgery. The *New Statesman* responded by printing a different photostat of the forgery with entirely different spacing between the lines. They claimed, however, that the letter was authentic and that they had received it from a source in the State Department. A comparison of this forgery with a letter sent by the South African official to a number of US journalists announcing his appointment as Information Counsellor at the embassy revealed that this letter was the exemplar. The real letter had been typed on a computer. The forgery based on it was typed on a typewriter and contained a number of misspellings.

In the summer of 1984, two bizarre leaflets were mailed to African and Asian participants in the Los Angeles Olympics. Signed by the Ku-Klux Klan they threatened the lives of these athletes. They were Soviet forgeries, written in incredibly poor English—worse English than even the Klan is capable of. When the US government exposed them and pointed out that there is no organization in the United States called simply the Ku-Klux Klan (they have names like White Knights of the Ku-Klux Klan or Invisible Empire of the Ku-Klux Klan), TASS responded on 12 July 1984 by claiming that the leaflets were signed "the Invisible Empire, The Knights of the Ku-Klux Klan." TASS was trying to correct the error made by the KGB.

During the summer of 1986, West European journalists received a copy of the text of a supposed speech by US Secretary of Defence Casper

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[27] Kunhanadan Nair, *The Devil And His Dart* (Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1986), p. 14.

Weinberger on the Strategic Defence Initiative. No such speech was ever made. The forgery contained the following falsehoods:

Falsehood 1: That the US wants military "prevalence" (superiority) over the Soviet Union in order to be able to achieve victory in a "controlled nuclear exchange" (limited nuclear war) or a protracted war.

Falsehood 2: That the US would use SDI to "prevent the development of unfavourable tendencies" in NATO, and to control its allies.

Falsehood 3: That SDI will enable the US "to threaten the Soviet Union with a knock-out blow."

Falsehood 4: That SDI would enable the US "to coerce the Soviet Union and make a practical contribution to the liberation of all nations enslaved by Communist totalitarianism, including, possibly, even the Russians themselves."

Falsehood 5: That SDI will enable the US to maintain a technological lead over its "rivals" in the free world.

Falsehood 6: That the Soviets do not have their own form of SDI.

Soviet attempts to delay or destroy SDI are in the forefront of Soviet active measures. The Weinberger forgery was intended to assist that campaign. However, it was exposed by the US government and has not served Soviet purposes.

IN JULY 1985, an Italian journalist found a copy of a letter signed with the name of General Robert Schweitzer, the head of the Inter-American Defence Board. The letter was a forgery addressed to President Pinochet of Chile asking him to provide troops to fight on behalf of the United States in Central America. The journalist contacted the US Embassy and within the day received evidence that the letter was a forgery. He did not write a story based on the letter. A few days later, however, another Italian press service ran a story, datelined Mexico City, based on the letter. When they were advised it was a forgery, they investigated and discovered that the letter had been provided to one of their writers by the public relations man for the Guatemalan insurgency, which is supported by Cuba and Nicaragua. The news service then ran an exposé of the forgery, attributing it to the Cubans and Nicaraguans. This incident points to a problem the Soviets have in surfacing forgeries. On the one hand, the common technique of using a plain, unmarked envelope to surface the forgery creates suspicion in the mind of the recipient. On the other hand, the use of a human being to pass on the forgery provides a trail leading back to the forger.

The present writer, Herbert Romerstein, wrote a letter to General Schweitzer on 16 August 1985 providing background on the forgery. I then made a copy of this letter to send to the United States Senate for printing in a Congressional report on Soviet active measures, which was later printed by the Senate. I wrote the word "copy" on the top of the letter. At the

request of a Czech diplomat, Vaclav Zluva, I provided him with a copy of this letter. As a precaution, I drew a line under the word "copy" on the original from which all subsequent copies were made, which made Zluva's letter unique and identifiable.

In August 1986, *The Washington Post* and *US News and World Report* received a xerox of a forgery in a plain white envelope. The forgery was on the letterhead of the United States Information Agency and was signed with the name Herbert Romerstein. At the top of the forgery was the word "copy" with no line under it. This made it clear that the exemplar for the forgery was the letter I had given to the Czech. When I confronted Zluva about this, he admitted sending the exemplar to Prague.

In the forgery, I am made to appear as if I had organized a USIA effort to spread all of the false stories that had appeared around the world after the Chernobyl disaster. In fact, the false stories were generated by Soviet reluctance to reveal information about the accident. On 26 April 1987, the Soviet publication *Moscow News* admitted:

> The formulation: Not for the press, is being used more and more often. Why cannot our press use what is being regularly reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency? There are some who do not understand that rumours and hearsay are generated not by summaries and figures, but by their absence.

In November 1985, a Greek Cypriot newspaper received copies of a forged letter supposedly signed by General Lawrence Skantze to Secretary Weinberger. The forgery indicated that the US needed bases in the Turkish area of Cyprus in order to have a place for the evacuation of US soldiers in the event of nuclear war in Europe. In order to make such nonsense appear credible, and to avoid the problems connected with surfacing, the Soviets produced another forged letter. This one, a covering letter on the letterhead of the British House of Commons, was supposedly signed by Sir Frederic Bennett, MP.

The Soviets have also published forged letters attributed to the Afghan Mujahadin. The letters supposedly referred to the Mujahadin receiving chemical substances that they could use to pretend that the Soviets had engaged in chemical warfare against them. (There is evidence that this is indeed what the Soviets had been doing.) These letters are as crude as many of the forgeries directed against the United States, in some cases using incorrect words for common Afghan terms. One example was the use of the word "Artish" for Army, which is proper usage in Iran or Soviet Tajikstan but not in Afghanistan. In addition, the same typewriter was used for letters supposedly written by different resistance groups.

President Reagan's signature has appeared on a number of forgeries. The most recent appeared in May 1987. It was a supposed memorandum to the

Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the CIA. In this forgery, which bore the date 10 March 1983, the President was supposedly ordering the establishment of a US military force called the "Permanent Peace Forces" to intervene in Latin America. This forgery received wide circulation in Latin America and was designed to inflame nationalist and anti-American feelings.

THE usual path of a Soviet forgery is from the KGB to a target newspaper. When the target is a legitimate publication it is very difficult for the Soviets to succeed in planting the forgery. They therefore often use publications that they control or influence for the initial surfacing. One publication often used this way is the Indian newspaper *Patriot*. In testimony before a British court on 24 March 1987, Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former officer of the KGB, revealed that in 1962 on KGB orders he participated in setting up this newspaper.[28]

After a forgery appears in a publication such as the *Patriot*, it is then replayed by the Soviet press agencies TASS or Novosti. This provides copies in every language for KGB officers to plant in the world press through their agents.

A few forgeries are not meant for publication. They are passed by KGB agents of influence to officials of a target government in the hope that they would believe forgeries designed to increase anti-American feeling. Such forgeries are often unknown to American officials, and can lie festering in the files of the target government. The US has no opportunity to refute many of them.

Forgery remains a significant weapon of Soviet active measures. Even in the era of *glasnost*, when much of the Soviet active measures apparatus is adopting new and innovative methods of influence, the KGB, TASS and Novosti continue to spread forgeries and disinformation stories.

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[28] Testimony of I. Dzhirkvelov, 24 March 1987, in the case of Boblas and Anor. vs. *The Economist Newspaper Limited*: excerpts may be found in *Disinformation—Soviet Active Measures And Disinformation Forecast* (Washington DC, Sept. 1987), pp. 7 to 11.

Glasnost: Fiction or Reality?

Edward J. Rozek

GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA refer to changes in Soviet practice brought about by Gorbachev as a way of saving the Soviet system from rapid disintegration. It is an operation aimed at rescuing the archaic and ailing economic system and making minor reforms in the rigid and inefficient Soviet bureaucracy. The peoples of the USSR have been the main victims of the Communist totalitarian system since 1917. They deserve a better quality of life. Is Gorbachev's *glasnost* the answer to their prayer?

Close examination of Gorbachev's reforms indicates that he merely wants to improve the efficiency and productivity of the system, not to replace it with democracy. This is not the first time that Soviet rulers have attempted to modify totalitarian practices. The Kronstadt Rebellion forced Lenin to initiate reforms in 1922 in the form of the New Economic Policy (NEP). He opened banks, encouraged people to open private accounts and enrich themselves, established semi-private enterprise and invited investment from abroad in order to save the régime. In the mid-1930s, Stalin introduced limited elections (within the top echelons of the Party) which gave him greater control over the membership of the Politburo and Central Committee.

When Khrushchev took over, he introduced more extensive reforms than Gorbachev has as yet promulgated. Khrushchev arranged the elimination of the head of the secret police, the dreaded Lavrenti Beria, and removed three of Beria's top lieutenants. He appointed a committee to review the sentences of all Stalin's political prisoners and many thousands were released. He purged Stalin's top associates—Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Shepilov and Marshal Zhukov. Following the advice of Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, Khrushchev decentralized the Soviet economic system. He introduced some measure of incentives and rewards. He authorized the publication of Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, which exposed Stalin's system of terror. Khrushchev did not allow any top policeman to be a member of the Politburo. He allocated more money for light industry in order to increase the output of consumer goods and raise the Soviet standard of living. He delivered a blistering attack on Stalin before the Twentieth Party Congress, in which he acknowledged that Stalin was the greatest murderer ever.

Yet those internal reforms did not stop him from invading Budapest, smashing the Hungarian Revolution and killing many students and workers. They did not prevent him from building the Berlin Wall and giving an ultimatum to the Western allies to abandon West Berlin or from sending missiles to Cuba.

On 14 October 1964 Khrushchev's comrades in the Politburo removed him from all his official positions, stripped him of Party membership and banished him to oblivion. He became a non-person. When Khrushchev died, he was buried in a remote and obscure cemetery with few but his family present.

Apart from *glasnost*, Gorbachev's reforms have not yet gone as far as Khrushchev's did. The former head of the KGB, a four-star general, Viktor M. Chebrikov, has remained a member of the Politburo. Gorbachev spends about 15 per cent of his GNP on the military as compared with the 6 per cent spent by the United States on defence. To advise him on the most effective policy vis-à-vis the United States, Gorbachev brought back from Washington Anatoly Dobrynin, who served for 25 years as the Soviet Ambassador and who knows the United States extremely well; Gorbachev was even said to have retained a public relations firm in New York. The results are readily apparent.

Gorbachev has not introduced a multi-party system, a truly free press or free elections in the Soviet Union or in the Soviet empire as a whole. He has not abolished the criminal use of psychiatry against dissidents. He has not fully withdrawn Soviet troops from Afghanistan. He does not allow free trade unions. His agents are relentlessly penetrating Central and South America, Africa and Asia.

Gorbachev is anxious to eliminate the Strategic Defence Initiative, but seems determined to retain the Soviet version, on which they have been working for some years. He released Andrei Sakharov from his Gorky exile, but there still remain numerous political prisoners inside jails and camps. He has not yet allowed Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* to be printed in the Soviet Union.

At this stage, Gorbachev needs time in order to transform the Soviet Union from an industrial to an electronic and high technology society. His willingness to negotiate the removal of short- and medium-range missiles from Europe does not necessarily indicate the abandonment of the Soviet goal of world domination. He is not willing to remove the causes which led to armament, but he wants to remove nuclear armaments so that his superior conventional forces will not encounter meaningful opposition.

The Western world cannot afford to be too trustful. We are not interfering with Soviet domestic policies. Of course we should applaud the genuine conversion of the Soviet Union into a democratic system with freedom and justice. But we must be alert and cautious and not lower our guard. Gorbachev and his friends are making every effort to eliminate fear of Soviet aggression and to confuse and divide Western sentiment about long-term Soviet intentions. Although there have been six General Secretaries since Lenin, the fundamental nature of Soviet totalitarianism remains the

same. Contrary to wishful thinking in the West, the Soviet regime has not shed its police state characteristics.

The West cannot disregard the 70-year history of the Soviet Union and embrace pie-in-the-sky promises as a substitute for deeds. Gorbachev is reforming the economy and bureaucracy. He is not changing the essence of the Communist system, but is attempting in dramatic fashion to make it more powerful and efficient.

Glimpses of Glasnost

This letter appeared in the magazine *Smena* (No. 15, 1988):

Red Square . . . What could be closer to our hearts? One is at once caught up by the glorious names on the granite slabs: Frunze, Dzerzhinsky . . . But then beside them—Stalin, and not far from him—Vyshinsky.

How can this be? The grave of a man who has killed a whole pleiad of talented military leaders (including my great-grandfather, a Lieutenant-General of the Border Guards, Mikhail Konstantinovich Voitenkov), the grave of Stalin—just five steps from the Lenin Mausoleum? Some of the tyrant's henchmen have rightly been condemned. Beria was executed. But the ashes of the hangman Vyshinsky still remain in place beside the niches containing the ashes of genuine fighters, true heroes and communards: L. Krasin, A Lunacharsky, N. Krupskaya.

In the Pioneers we were taken to Red Square. Standing before the Mausoleum, we swore to love the Motherland. But I could not have imagined then that the square in which we were given our red neckerchiefs contained not only the body of the greatest humanist, but also the body of the greatest tyrant.

I propose the following: since the names of Stalin and Vyshinsky profane Red Square which is so dear to every Soviet person, take away the urns that hold their ashes. But after they have been removed, do not allow them to be buried anywhere else. They were criminals. They were not punished during their lifetime. So let justice prevail after their death. They are not worthy of the earth, the earth which they themselves orphaned.

On Stalin's grave there should be set a granite stone with the inscription "Here from 1957 to 1988 was buried the body of the great butcher of the people, Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin (Dzhugashvili)." And a detailed account of his crimes should be given. Above Vyshinsky's empty niche there should also be a plaque, though somewhat smaller, with an account of his evil-doings.

I believe that my proposals will be supported by all those whose fates have been indelibly marked by Stalinist repression, by those whose near and dear ones were carried away for ever one night in the "black raven" [police van].

Aleksandr Voitenkov,
aged 14, Moscow

The Stalinist Experience in Eastern Europe

George Schöpflin

FOR THE WHOLE of Eastern Europe, Stalinism has been the central formative experience since the war—the benchmark against which all subsequent developments must be measured. Stalinism must, therefore, be understood in all its different manifestations and at all its different levels. Its extraordinary quality derives in the first place from its breathtaking political scope. It is hard to muster a precedent for the experiment conducted by the Soviet Union over eight wholly alien and culturally rather diverse polities over such a short period of time. It is this concentration of time and the compression of the process involved that gave Eastern Europe's experience of Stalinism its second striking quality. The third was the breadth, depth and intensity of the process. All institutions, all organizations, all forms of communal activity, all individuals were expected to conform to a predetermined set of norms or suffer the consequences of failing to do so. It was in this sense that Stalinism represented an attempt at totalitarian control, although even at its height it was nowhere successful in actually establishing the total penetration of individuals, their motives and activities—it was successful only in as much as it was able to exact conformity to a set pattern of behaviour as far as the majority was concerned.

Stalinism functioned at a variety of levels—in ideology, institutions, structures, the exercise of power, its impact on social groups and society as a whole. At its centre was a proposition derived from Stalin's transformation of Marxism–Leninism, to the effect that this ideology represented perfection—the distillation of all human wisdom in its final form—by which these societies were marching towards a secular utopia. It was perfect, it was claimed, because it was rational in all respects and in all its manifestations. The advantage of this proposition was that it inherently excluded the possibility of all argument over alternatives, different strategies, policies and their implementation—it is, after all, logically impossible to disagree with perfection.

Consequently disagreement or debate was antagonistic, hostile activity or thought and, therefore, open to punitive counteraction. The implications of the ideology of perfection are very far-reaching and the way in which it was applied sought to extend it as far as possible. Thus, if Marxism-Leninism is perfect, then it is capable of providing the answers to questions not just of politics and economics, but also of technology or the natural sciences or any other branch of human knowledge. Conversely, that which

Stalinism declared to be a non-existent or reactionary area of human knowledge could simply be discarded. In this way, it was logical to assert that there could exist a Marxist–Leninist way of building a bridge or performing an appendectomy or catching fish. This was indeed political reductionism of epochal proportions.

No activity, however apolitical it might appear, can escape the purview of the ideology because, by its own definition, everything is political and capable of being understood only through politics. It follows from this, too, that there could be no political neutrality. Neither individuals nor groups could stand back and say, as it were, "We neither approve nor disapprove of the system: we are apolitical." The political system driven by the ideology had to insist that everyone should be seen to give it his or her overt and continuous support, otherwise he or she was a potential doubter and how can perfection be doubted?

Again, the ideology of perfection logically established itself as omniscient. There could by definition be no problems to which there was no solution. And should the solutions derived from the ideology fail, then this failure could not be attributed to the ideology but to its antagonists, the proponents of other ideologies all of which were hostile. Consequently, the system excluded the possibility of error. When something went wrong, as it often did, someone was responsible. There could be no such phenomena as accident, chance or an honest mistake. All actions were invested with some political aim and all were categorized as "progressive" or "reactionary." By the same token, criticism could not exist independently of the ideology, but had to be integrated into its imperatives—only the criticism actually permitted or rather, more properly, directed by the political authority could find expression.

The political structure constructed by the criteria of this ideology was strictly hierarchical, disciplined and regimented. At its centre was Stalin himself. His will was the supreme political (and thus every other) imperative. On Stalin depended the individual East European party leaders, the party politburos, the central committees and members. The East European parties, acting as ever on directives from above, controlled all state and social institutions, which they permeated with the new body of thought. Parallel structures of control existed via the Soviet advisers strategically placed in all East European countries (Yugoslavia being the exception); they were particularly active in the instruments of coercion—the secret police and the military.[1] Thus in Poland, of the 20 departments in the Ministry of Security, eight were headed by Soviet advisers and at least five

[1] Karel Kaplan, *Political Persecution in Czechoslovakia 1948–1972* (Research Project "Crises in Soviet-Type Systems," No. 3, 1983), p. 17 gives details for Czechoslovakia. These can be regarded as having been paralleled throughout Eastern Europe.

more departmental heads had worked for the NKVD or the Soviet armed forces.[2] In this way an identity both of form and of content was imposed on Eastern Europe. Also noteworthy was the remarkable concentration of power demanded by the system. While it would be an exaggeration to claim that all Stalin had to do was to press a button and simultaneously in every East European state there would be an identical response, nonetheless the degree of homogeneity imposed on the area and the extension of Soviet norms were very far-reaching indeed. At the time, when viewed from the outside, the appearance of identity was complete. It was only later that it emerged that conformity to externals did not automatically transform content, although it did not leave content unaffected.

The Purpose of Stalinism

THE purpose of Stalinism is open to several possible interpretations. It could be regarded as the creation of socialism by the export of Soviet-style revolutionary communism to areas which had lagged behind the Soviet Union by reason of the travails of capitalism. Alternatively, the imposition of Stalinism on Eastern Europe can be seen in terms of pure realpolitik. Stalin devised a new model of securing his wartime conquests and his Western glacis, that of exporting a revolution of a type identical to that developed in the Soviet Union. This was done by creating a political system that could exist only through dependence on the Soviet Union and by which the new rulers of Eastern Europe would give their loyalty to Stalin, or else be swept from power. A third view is to regard the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe as a new variant of the age-old Russian drive to the West or simply as a function of Stalin's power mania. All these interpretations contain elements of validity. However, the political development of Eastern Europe since the war is best understood by interpreting Stalinism as a highly contradictory and even counterproductive modernizing revolution. The proposition here is that an analysis of the interplay between the traditional norms of political development in the region and those of Stalinism constitutes the best explanation for subsequent patterns of development in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe.

Hence the definition of Stalinism adopted here is that it did amount to a modernizing revolution, but essentially one highly inappropriate to Eastern Europe and, paradoxically, its effect was as much to reverse or slow down the process of modernization already being experienced rather than to enhance the process. This proposition demands a definition of the modernity towards which modernization is supposedly leading. The concept of modernization is a notoriously elusive one, which, when boiled down to

[2] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, 2nd edition (Harvard, 1967), pp. 120–121.

its essentials, often looks suspiciously like the patterns developed in the United States or Western Europe. This need not mean, however, that the concept is made entirely useless by cultural bias. Rather, it demands a closer analysis of the relationship between the goals of modernity and the particular culture in which the process of modernization is taking place. This implies that each culture—however defined—has its own more or less autonomous model of modernity and these may well be closely influenced by the example (positive or negative) of other "modernities." If the United States variant of modernity is taken as one example, it is evident that this has been highly influential throughout the world; but this does not as such mean that by its mere existence it invalidates other modernities. In the same way, there are British, French, German and, by extension, East European models of modernity.[3]

The specific problem with the Stalinist model of industrialization lay in a number of broad areas. In the first place, Stalin for his own reasons, contingent on the particular military and technological needs of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, took a set of economic targets and methods and declared these to be the immanent truths of socialism. This served its purpose in that it helped Soviet society to live with the trauma of industrialization and to endure the privations Stalin required of it, but these targets had limited relevance to the needs of Eastern Europe after 1945. Eastern Europe had already embarked on a process of industrialization to a greater or lesser degree and was on the way to becoming a more complex social, economic and political organism.

Second, the Soviet model was heavily determined by specifically Soviet conditions like easy access to apparently unlimited quantities of raw materials (energy, iron ore, labour) and by the utterly different spatial relationships there. In respect of population density, Eastern Europe was much more like Western Europe than Russia. Furthermore, the particular targets selected by Stalin for "socialist industrialization" tended to rely on relatively simple technologies of manufacture and extraction. Plan targets could be expressed in straightforward, comprehensible terms, viz. so many tons of coal or steel, and the level of skills required for their production was commensurate with those of the Soviet labour force of the time. Conditions in Eastern Europe, especially in Central Europe, were very different and the Soviet model of first stage heavy industrialization had little to recommend it. By and large, Eastern Europe did not need a steel manufacturing capacity or at the next stage, heavy chemicals capacity, but its economic strategies would have been much better served by an emphasis on light industry, processing and the tertiary sector. The whole process of the imposition of the Stalinist

[3] The concept of modernization has generated a major debate. See *inter alia* Cyril E. Black (ed.), *Comparative Modernization: a Reader* (New York, 1976).

model was further distorted by a contingent factor—the fear of imminent war between East and West. This war scare, which spilled over into hysteria at times (e.g. during the Korean War), was also used as a justification for constructing heavy industry, particularly heavy metallurgy, to serve the needs of the military capability.

Third, the Soviet model was characterized by a very specific and again contingent model of egalitarianism. In essence, it postulated that the worker in heavy industry, above all the male worker in heavy metallurgy, constituted a kind of ideal proletarian and that all other social categories should be homogenized until their members came to resemble him. To this end, the party adopted a strictly exclusive and one-dimensional concept of equality, from which not only were members of the former ruling élites, the bourgeoisie and other middle strata excluded, but so were most peasants—anyone farming any land at all independently—and to an extent even other workers, like craftsmen or those deemed "lumpenproletarian," the weakest sections of the urban poor.[4]

The East European Response

THE East European model was backward by the criteria of Western Europe (though ahead of, say, the Middle East by the same criteria and, for that matter by the East Europeans' own criteria). The determinants of the East European model must, therefore, be sought in both autonomous East European patterns and in how East Europeans perceived the West. Hence as far as Eastern Europe was concerned, the Western patterns of change, complexity and choice were valid, albeit these were never as intensively propagated as in the West.

East European aspirations after 1945 were varied and this variety, which was to be found as among polities and within them, was in itself the potential guarantor of a complex pattern of modernization. The various social groups had different interests and sought to articulate them in different ways. Whether this variety contained sufficient centripetal forces to have permitted the establishment of political systems with the capability to survive the strains of modernization is another matter and the precedents were not good. Nevertheless, there is no doubt whatever that the Stalinist model was unacceptable to the great majority.

This was so essentially for three reasons. In the first place, the Soviet model was recognized for what it was—an enforced rehomogenization of politics.[5] Whatever their shortcomings, East European political systems had

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[4] Csaba Gombar, *A politika parttalan vilaga* [The boundless world of politics], (Budapest, 1986), pp. 35ff.

[5] Bela Pokol, "Alternativ utak a politikai rendszer reformjara" [Alternative paths to the reform of the political system], *Valosag*, Vol. 29, No. 12 (December 1986), pp. 32–45.

begun to develop increasingly complex institutions, which allowed for conflicts of interests and some open debate (with whatever limitations) with greater latitude than was permitted by the Soviet-type model. The East European system as it emerged after 1945 (even if there were enormous variations) looked as if it would move towards greater rather than lesser complexity and choice. In this connection, the imposition of Stalinism represented a major step backwards towards a simpler, less demanding system, where individual and group choices were almost wholly eliminated and where decisions were imposed on society from above.

Obviously the degree to which individual East European societies pursued this aim of creating institutions to match complexity varied considerably from country to country. Albania, say, was a largely undifferentiated society in terms of function—people's roles were determined not so much by what they did, but by birth into one or other kinship network. In Czechoslovakia or East Germany, on the other hand, roles were defined much less by status (ascription) and much more by function. An individual at one and the same time could and did play a wide variety of roles and have a wide variety of interests, some of them mutually contradictory. Thus, he or she could simultaneously be a producer and a consumer; or someone looking for higher wages (entailing the faster use of resources) and for better environmental conditions (demanding greater care for the environment); or someone sternly insisting on personal freedom from supervision by the state and insisting equally that the state do something to curb the activities of groups of which he or she disapproves.

The codes of conduct in society and politics, the criteria for determining issues and the methods of arbitration are, on the one hand, sufficiently varied to take account of this differentiation and, on the other, are widely enough acceptable to all major sections of the population to create a degree of integration which would keep the polity together. Stalinism attempted to replace this by establishing a single, homogenized, centrally directed set of imperatives, which sought to eliminate rather than to reconcile these variations and this differentiation. The fact that this project could not succeed meant that Eastern Europe was saddled with a political system inappropriate to its patterns of social, economic and political development and trajectories of its future aspirations. Or, as Stalin put it to Gomulka, the Polish communist leader, it was like trying to put a saddle on a cow.

The Stalinist system attracted criticism from another, to some extent related, quarter. For the majority of East Europeans, it represented an alien political system and was resented as such. Whether this concerned the names of new institutions (like "central committee" or "politburo") or their actual functioning, they were felt to be "not ours" and for that reason to be rejected. This process was exacerbated by the way in which many felt Stalinism to be illegitimate, as deriving not from the desires of society

or a section of it, but from the naked exercise of Soviet power. This led, further, to the rejection of Sovietization because it was Russian, bringing into play the traditional anti-Russian sentiments which characterized the national identities of several East European polities, notably in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Romania; anti-Russian feelings were rather weaker in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (in the last until 1948).

It is worth speculating, however, that Sovietization was rejected not merely because it was of Russian origin: in other words, if, say, an American political system had been imposed on Eastern Europe under similar conditions, it would have encountered an analogous response. Another factor in this complex was the speed of change and the appearance of its irreversibility, generating feelings of frustration and helplessness. The changes which these societies underwent were pushed through at a breakneck pace, and that in itself caused disorientation and rejection. Arguably change, particularly rapid change, invariably gives rise to difficulties of adjustment, but this is at the very least made easier if the direction and the speed of change are based on a measure of consent.

Much the same applied to the depth and extent of change. The remarkably far-reaching transformation effected by the Stalinist revolution—a term properly used in this context—had its impact on virtually every inhabitant of Eastern Europe. Whether in towns or in the countryside, old-established patterns were transformed and each individual was in some way forced to come to terms with the new order. It was, after all, during the Stalinist period that electrification was completed or extended, the transport network was developed to stretch into the countryside and heavy industrialization was launched using rural labour, thus giving the rural population access to mass communication. It was in this overall sense that the forcible adoption of Stalinism constituted a revolution, whether this revolution was legitimate in the eyes of East Europeans or not. This was the dynamic aspect of Stalinism. Its static aspect was that once the process was supposedly completed—in a very short period of time—it would immediately have reached its final form. The consequence of this was to endow Stalinism—and to some extent all the successors of Stalinism—with an oddly unchanging, unmoving quality. There was a surface appearance of movement, but often underneath pre-existing patterns were simply frozen.

The Supporters of the System

WHILST THE majority of East Europeans, in so far as these propositions can be validated, were probably in some respect or other antagonistic to Stalinism, there was a minority which either supported it or was sympathetically neutral towards it or simply accepted it passively. Those who flocked into communist parties were not all simple time-servers

or opportunists. Some of them were genuinely motivated by the idealism derived from their faith in creating a better world. They believed that by the application of rationality and endeavour—and its reverse, the elimination of other patterns of thought—they could create a new Jerusalem in short order. Their beliefs gave them a sense of certainty and an intolerance towards other opinions, but they also endowed them with the energy to perform the transformation and to impose the new system on a sullen population.

The supporters of the system included the genuine believers, therefore, the radicals of the left and also of the right from the pre-war era. They frequently overlapped with the beneficiaries of the new system, Milovan Djilas's New Class. These people, often of working class or peasant background, were promoted into positions of power by the party as reliable on the grounds of their class origins, and discovered the pleasurable taste of power and the privileges that went with it. This one-off promotion of a generation of such activists constituted a source of support for the system and was enormously influential both then and in later years in structuring the value system of society.

There was some support for the communist ideal from sections of the intelligentsia as well, at any rate in theory. For some, the attraction of unlimited power to plan a new society, to impose a "rational" order, to create "scientifically" devised projects for the benefit of all proved a heady mixture. The proposition that all the resources of society, which had lain dormant until then, could be mobilized in a new, gigantic and perfectly functioning enterprise was enormously attractive; so too was the scale on which planning was to take place. The "romance of size," the idea that mankind could effect a major transformation of the material base by the application of human resources in a perfectly rational way, was highly seductive for a section of the intelligentsia, especially those involved in technology. In this connection, the old-established étatist tradition of Eastern Europe, the distrust of society as reactionary and the belief in the state as progressive also played a role in generating support for the party. The attractions of the prospect of unlimited power never entirely faded away for this section of the intelligentsia and explained, at least partially, its persistence.[6]

A further source of stability for the new order were the mobilized peasantry who were also its indirect beneficiaries. Although for many of

[6] Pavel Kohout, *Diary of a Counter-revolutionary* (New York, 1969). See also the discussions between Erno Gero, the then economic boss of Hungary, and the technocrats, concerning the regulation of the Danube in 1953. In this, the latter argued in favour of the most grandiose projects and Gero, rather ironically in view of his record, emerged as the moderating force. The full text appeared in *Beszelo*, No. 12 (1985); a partial translation was published in *East European Reporter*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1985).

them the trauma of leaving the land was devastating, it was not a wholly negative experience. At first sight, therefore, it might appear contradictory that the uprooted peasants, who formed the bulk of the new working class and who could have been expected to respond to their new environment with hostility, did not do so completely. They may have found their new fate disagreeable, for conditions were generally primitive and unpleasant in the mushrooming new industrial centres, and the provision of infrastructure (houses, main drainage, hospitals) lagged far behind social need. The industrial revolution in Eastern Europe was as harsh as in any other part of the world. Yet in as much as their yardstick of comparison was the village, where their horizons were limited and their standard of living appeared inescapably low, even the harshness of Soviet-type industrialization seemed preferable. Their standard of living was somewhat higher, wage packets were regular, access to collective consumption was superior and the prestige gained from working in industry proved to be sufficient compensation for leaving the familiarity of the village. This did not, as such, mean that their loyalty to the new order was firm, and generally their response to crises was volatile, but it did have the result that this first generation of workers was by and large satisfied with the greater economic choice which it gained from the industrialization process and did not look for direct political participation.

The Shape of the New Order

THE NEW political order created by Stalin's epigoni in Eastern Europe was given the name of monolithism. This concept was the political reflection of the ideology of perfection and omniscience; it meant the denial of the possibility of error and of political neutrality. It was neatly summed up in the slogan proclaimed by Hungary's Stalinist leader, Matyas Rakosi: "He who is not with us—is against us!" It meant that the party—the leader of the party in practice—had the right to absolute and untrammelled power and required no further legitimation for this. The monolithic system, however, retained the outward shape of other political systems. The institutions of state and society—government, parliament, local government, the judiciary, trade unions, professional associations—were not abolished immediately, but were to function exclusively under the guidance and direction of the party. The party would determine strategy and the institutions would implement it. In practice, these two functions proved impossible to separate and the party took over the day-to-day running of everything. The degree of centralization that this involved was very high and, in consequence, there was a steady increase in bureaucratization, overregulation and bureaucratic overload. The result was the growing difficulty of implementing plans.

Stalinism had one further aspect. Although, as argued earlier, Eastern Europe was backward by West European criteria, nevertheless the idea of there being separate public and private spheres did exist. Whilst traditionally the state in Eastern Europe did regulate much more of the private sphere than in the West, it never sought to encompass it entirely. With the advent of Stalinism, this changed. Stalinism sought to effect a total merger of the public and private spheres—more correctly to absorb the latter into the former—as a way of enhancing its claim to total control. This even came to include the family, which, in common with all other institutions, was expected to serve the goals of perfection and the self-styled agent of perfection, the Party. Indeed, as one commentator puts it: "Stalinist society expected of its citizens extraordinarily far-reaching allegiance to the state."[7] This was legitimized by the argument that the fellowship of man—the agent of which was the party—transcended all other loyalties, including loyalty to the family.

The imposition of monolithism on Eastern Europe had as its immediate result the liquidation of whatever institutions already existed or their absorption into the monolithic façade. In this way, all existing institutions and the ways in which conflicts of interest were regulated—the outcome of many years of effort to create them—were submerged and transformed into transmission belts. A transmission belt is, essentially, an institution which supposedly carries out the task of the party. Other institutions were abolished.

An example of the first, an existing body which became a transmission belt, was the trade unions. In a communist system, autonomous trade unions which genuinely attempt to represent the interests of their members were self-evidently superfluous. It was inconceivable that the worker could have any interests which could in any way cut across those of the party. After all, in a system of perfection, the party could logically insist that it simultaneously represented the interests of the employer and the worker as well as carrying out the functions of economic and social signalling performed in a capitalist society by the market (supply and demand). The party aggregated all interests and there could be no conflicts of interest; if these existed, they were antagonistic, the result of hostile conspiracies or the relics of the previous system and fit only to be eliminated by the severest measures. This approach completely ignored the fact that the interests of the workers and their employers were not identical and could not be made so. Attempts to enforce it resulted in a harsher exploitation of the workers than by the market, given that even with all its imperfections the market could offer the worker some protection against a rapacious employer.

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[7] Katerina Clark, "Utopian Anthropology as a Context for Stalinist Literature," in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation* (New York, 1977), pp. 180–198.

An example of the second phenomenon—the complete abolition of institutions—was the liquidation of all political parties other than the Communist Party. Thus in Hungary and Romania, the non-communist parties were absorbed into the ruling party, on the argument that they were superfluous. There could be no interests requiring representation through a competing party system. In the other states (except Albania and Yugoslavia), the relics of older parties remain in being, but they are, predictably, no more than façades.

It follows from the foregoing that all autonomous action from below suffered the same fate. There could be no pluralism and no bodies representing any view other than that which was laid down by the party. In this way, all the various institutions created for the articulation of this or that interest were suppressed and transformed into organs serving the leading role (the phrase used to describe the party's monopoly) of the party. The mass media, for example, became the party's advertising agency. They were used solely for the purpose of propagating whatever the party's view of the situation happened to be at that time. Any unsanctioned attempt at organization, or the expression of opinions not acceptable by the party, or even the failure to express opinions required by the party, brought the instruments of coercion into play.

Society and polity, whether as individuals or as groups, were to be as far as possible wholly insulated from alternative and thus deviant values, whether these were pre-existing or non-Soviet. All unsanctioned values were to be extirpated and replaced by the new value system of Marxism-Leninism.

The Impact of Stalinism on Social Groups

TO ENSURE the party's rule over societies where it was recognized that legitimacy—the sense of being accepted by the population as rightful—was weak, the party systematically engaged in a process of levelling down. It deliberately destroyed the bases, especially the economic bases, of social groups which it regarded as a potential source of autonomy. The hardest hit was the middle stratum, predictably, for this group—the survivors of the old élite, the remnants of the entrepreneurial class, some sections of the intelligentsia—was recognized by the party as likely to constitute the greatest obstacle to the exercise of its power. Various devices were used to this end. Salaries were equalized, so that the gap between white collar and blue collar wages virtually disappeared.[8]

In many cases, members of the old élite were dispossessed of their property, either by actually being thrown out of their homes or by being

[8] Jaroslav Krejci, *Social Change and Social Stratification in Postwar Czechoslovakia* (London, 1972) discusses levelling down in Czechoslovakia.

obliged to share their dwellings. The savings of the middle stratum, which could have given them a certain immunity, were as far as possible eliminated by currency reforms, punitive taxation and other devices. This could not, of course, exhaust all their reserves, notably of valuables, but dealing on the black market—selling valuables to make ends meet—was severely punished. The party was able to achieve this not just by the exercise of terror, but through its control of the state, which had for all practical purposes become the sole employer (which it very largely remains). This monopoly position gave it the power to dismiss individuals it regarded as "unreliable" or "class alien elements" and either to prevent them from working at all or to oblige them to do menial labour at the lowest end of the scale.

THE WORKING CLASS as a whole did not do much better from the revolution made in its name, although certain sections of it unquestionably benefited. New wage categories were introduced and this placed some occupations well above others, regardless of the actual value of the work done: this meant that miners and metal-workers, regarded as the citadels of support for the party, were given high wages. Others, like printers, who had generally given their backing to Social Democracy, were treated in a less generous fashion. But what was much more important was that all categories of workers were obliged to work to new norms over which they had no control, for these were set by the party according to its requirements. Working conditions were frequently primitive and, with some variations from country to country, the standard of living fell during the Stalinist years, sometimes to below the pre-war level. Supervision in factories, draconian disciplinary measures, inadequate housing (often in hostels with minimal facilities) were backed up by severe penalties for "sabotage." Sabotage was essentially anything defined by the party as such—it was a classic example of a politically defined crime. Many thousands found themselves penalized arbitrarily in this fashion.

THE FATE OF the peasantry was similar, indeed, if anything it was worse because of the animosity in the Marxist legacy towards the peasant. Whereas the worker was at the very least the agent of the Marxian utopia, the peasant was doomed to disappearance anyway, so that no real harm would be done by giving history a bit of a push in this respect. Had not Marx, after all, referred to the idiocy of rural life? Secondly, the peasant, by virtue of being an independent entrepreneur, on however small and inefficient a basis, acquired thereby a degree of autonomy which the party was determined to break. Perhaps most strikingly, the peasant, despite his poverty and low intellectual status, was master of his own timetable to a far greater degree than an industrial worker. From the party's standpoint,

this situation was scandalous. Thus, the party launched its assault on the peasantry because it could not tolerate that the countryside should be exempt from its penetration of society. Third, the peasantry—at least in part—was to bear its part in the financing of industrialization, so that for the few years, supposedly, while the industrial base was being constructed, the peasant would have to work for a low return, in common with everyone else. And because the peasantry was notorious (in the party's eyes) for its conservatism, the only solution was to coerce it to produce. Finally, the party's vision of the future of the agricultural population was that it would in a relatively short period of time become identical to the urban population, that there would be no difference between working on a farm and at a workbench. The fact that industrial and agricultural labour inescapably require different approaches and that efficient agriculture demands a good deal of autonomous decision-making by the farmer was simply ignored by the party. This, too, could be interpreted as an aspect of the party's determination to homogenize and to simplify processes and diminish the number of interactions in society.

The means by which the party intended to achieve its goal was collectivization. This was not, in itself, necessarily undesirable. The small plots of land resulting from land reform were rather inefficient and starved of capital; the level of skill used by many peasants was low; and the tradition of subsistence farming rather than commodity production for the market was still strong. Some kind of cooperative agricultural production could have beneficial effects and before the war there had been a tradition of this, but this had been based on consent and not coercion.[9] The imposition of forcible collectivization in the 1950s, therefore, and notably the fact that those sent to carry it out were neither particularly refined in their methods nor knowledgeable about agriculture, resulted in chaos merging into catastrophe. Ignorant activists would order peasants to plant a particular crop, regardless of suitability,[10] and when the crop failed, the peasant found himself penalized for criminal conspiracy. The net result of the party's agricultural and rural policy was to drive the peasantry into sullen passive resistance and to production for subsistence, and to instil a deep detestation of communist rule into the rural population, thereby reinforcing the age-old gap between the peasant and the state.

THE RELATIONSHIP between the party and the intelligentsia was not quite as straightforward. Although at the ostensible level, the party needed the intelligentsia even less than it did the workers and peasants, in

[9] A. Balawyder (ed.), *Cooperative Movements in Eastern Europe* (London, 1980).

[10] This was the policy satirized by the Hungarian film "The Witness" (*A tanu*), in which a campaign with the inspiring title "For the Hungarian Orange" was launched.

reality things were more complex. The ostensible superfluity of the intelligentsia derived from the party's claim to incorporate perfection. If the party already knew everything, then both the intelligentsia (the possessors of specialized knowledge) and the intellectuals (the creators of new values and of alternative visions of the future) had no reason to exist in these terms.[11] In reality, of course, even the perfect party had need of doctors or engineers or teachers in order that—at least in what was supposedly a transitional period—the services they performed should be carried out. From the party's standpoint, however, the problem was that much of the intelligentsia was inherited from the old régime and was for that reason alone untrustworthy. Even worse, members of the intelligentsia by virtue of their specialized knowledge, had it in their power to devise alternatives at variance to the party line, to argue with party directives on specialized grounds and generally to raise technical questions with political implications. If these dangers were unacceptable to the party, those raised by autonomous intellectuals were significantly greater. Intellectuals, whether cultural (like novelists, artists and the like) or scientific (like historians, economists, sociologists etc), actually had as their *raison d'être* the portrayal and criticism of the present, the analysis of social reality as they saw it and the formulation of alternatives for the future. In this respect, the very existence of autonomous intellectuals challenged the monopoly of the party.

The solution was to deprive both categories of their autonomy, as far as this could be achieved, and to enlist them by force, threat of force or by incentives to serve the goals of the party. The new function of both was to act as yet another transmission-belt—at the intellectual and scientific level. Their new task was to propagate the perfect world of the party's ideology, to sing its praises, to disguise its shortcomings, to encourage the population to work harder and to believe in the party's vision of the future. In a word, they would be apologists. They would act as one of the many instruments in the hands of the party with the role of socializing the population into acceptance of "perfection."

The first step in this direction, therefore, was to suppress all lingering claims to autonomy. The second was to resocialize the new socializers themselves. To this end, both categories—members of the intelligentsia and intellectuals—were required to undergo a kind of conversion to the newly obligatory ideology and to be seen to do this publicly and continuously. They were obliged to attend Marxism–Leninism classes, to perform rituals demonstrating their loyalty to the system, to turn out at mass ceremonies organized by the régime and, most importantly, to learn and

[11] Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (London, 1979). See also Michael Shafir, *Political Culture, Intellectual Dissent and Intellectual Consent: the Case of Rumania* (Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1978).

use the new language of politics, the language of Marxism–Leninism. The imposition of this language constituted an essential aspect of monolithism and, indeed, still forms a vital instrument of political control decades later. It functioned as a repeated public expression of the pervasiveness of the system, it prevented the expression of alternatives, it stultified independent thought and in particular generated the belief that the power of the system was invincible.[12]

The Rituals of Stalinism

EVERY POLITICAL system lives to some extent by rituals. Rituals, ceremonies, political liturgies, symbols—all serve a vital purpose in giving order to complex, possibly inexplicable phenomena; they celebrate the familiar and promote a sense of community; they also make it easier for communities to resolve some of the stresses associated with the process of change, especially rapid change; but above all, rituals are about political loyalty and the structuring of the relationship between rulers and ruled.[13] Every post-revolutionary régime tries either to capture the rituals of the one it has replaced or to abolish them and replace them with rituals of its own. This was very much the pattern pursued by the communists; there are examples of both processes. Thus in an act of conscious syncretism, the Hungarian party promulgated the new "socialist" constitution on the 20 August, with the objective of undercutting the attraction of Saint Stephen's day, the day of the saint venerated as the founder of the Hungarian state. An illustration of how the communists actually took over old folk festivals and emptied them of their former content is that narrated by Milan Kundera, who describes what happened to the ancient rite of the Ride of the Kings, which had as its aim the celebrating of the seasons and the reinforcement of village communities in Moravia.[14] Self-evidently, village communities of this kind were unacceptable from the party's point of view, as constituting centres of autonomous patterns of behaviour.

More important were the entirely new rituals instituted by the régime. The most obvious of these were the show trials, but these were far from having been the only such innovation. There were, for example, the mass parades, at which attendance was obligatory, although in theory it was entirely a matter of choice as to whether one went or not, except that failure to be present could entail sanctions. Enormous crowds were marshalled to

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[12] Adam Michnik, "Ce que nous voulons et ce que nous pouvons," *L'Alternative*, No. 8 (Jan.–Feb. 1981), pp. 5–14.

[13] Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (New York, 1971).

[14] Milan Kundera describes the entire process of how this particular festival was taken over by the régime in his novel *The Joke* (London, 1983); Josef Skvorecky recounts something similar regarding folklore and folk dancing in *The Engineer of Human Souls* (London, 1985).

celebrate events deemed positive by the party, like the 1 May anniversary—actually devised as a festival of the labour movement in the 19th century—or liberation anniversaries, as well as demonstrations in favour of peace or merely to greet some visiting celebrity. The purpose of these parades was to create the external appearance of mass participation, to give the particular event weight by the sheer presence of numbers and to make the inevitability of compliance with régime's objectives evident by demonstrating the party's ability to organize vast crowds.

Other rituals had analogous political objectives. Stakhanovism, as the campaigns of "socialist emulation" were known after the Donbas miner, Stakhanov, who purportedly cut 102 tons of coal single-handedly on one shift,[15] had as its aims to show the superiority and exemplary quality of the Soviet proletarian, to encourage the East European workers to emulate these supposedly heroic feats and more prosaically to increase output. It is noteworthy that the supposed superiority of the Soviet worker over his East European counterpart did not incorporate any concept of mastery of higher technological skills. If anything, the content of the Stakhanovite myth was that of an untutored worker who achieved his feat intuitively and by physical strength.[16] Once a particular target had been reached—often by entirely spurious means—it became easier to raise the norm, the output demanded of each worker before he was paid his basic wage.

The cult of personality was, again, a newly introduced ritual. Its centre, naturally enough, was Stalin, but Stalin's cult was paralleled, if at a marginally less exalted level, by the cults of local leaders. The objective of promoting this cult was to reinforce the message that all truth stemmed from the single leader, that he had heroic, superhuman qualities incorporating wisdom, knowledge and control of the future and that these transcended all pre-communist political liturgies, like the veneration of Tomas Masaryk in Czechoslovakia or the lingering regard for Pilsudski in Poland (which was to gather great strength in the 1980s). The lengths to which communist personality cults were taken appear ludicrous in retrospect. Stalin was referred to in the most extraordinary terms as the fount of all human knowledge and so on.[17] Thus, the Hungarian periodical devoted to the natural sciences, *Elet es Tudomany*, stated: "The teaching of Stalin embraces all the universal principles of nature in its smallest details. He solves all the

[15] Stakhanov achieved this because all other work at the mine was halted and because he was assisted by a team of auxiliaries who did the work which would normally have been done by the man at the coal face; see Geoffrey Hosking, *A History of the Soviet Union* (London, 1985), p. 158.

[16] Katerina Clark, op. cit.

[17] As far as is known, however, Stalin never had himself formally deified; that particular innovation was left to Nicolae Ceausescu in the 1970s, who allowed himself to be described in the press as our Romanian "lay God." (The distinction between a "lay God" and a religious deity is unclear to me.)

practical problems of understanding natural science."[18]

In every East European country (except, obviously, Yugoslavia), cities, mountain peaks, factories, boulevards and the like bore the Great Leader's name, as a kind of symbolic re-enactment of his ubiquity; the ever-present posters, to be found in all public places, bearing his likeness, together with those of Marx, Lenin and the local leader, had the same function. The odes to Stalin, praising him for his wisdom, humanity etc., however absurd and embarrassing they may sound today, were also part of the same pattern.

The glorification of the Soviet Union and of the Red Army, coupled with the constant reiteration of the aggressive hostility attributed to the West, had as their function the socialization of the population into a new set of loyalties and, equally, the breaking of older, often very deeply rooted, attachments. This was regarded as all the more necessary given the currents of hostility to Russia and the bitter resentment generated by the behaviour of the liberating Red Army. Hence the constant emphasis on the sacrifice made by the Soviet Union in liberating these countries from Axis occupation, which was real enough, but it omitted the other aspect of the Soviet enterprise, namely its own interest in defeating Nazi Germany. Also striking were the campaigns to show the Soviet Union as the source of all progress, knowledge and scientific invention. An entire pseudo-historical industry was established with the purpose of demonstrating that Russian or Soviet inventors had been the first to invent electricity, radio, the internal combustion engine and so on—possibly even the wheel was claimed as a Russian invention.

With this process went the wholesale rewriting of history. Whereas in pre-communist history writing—which was not without its distortions, of course—the existence of the nation and its glories formed the pivot of historical perspectives, all this was now jettisoned. Kings and nobility were declared to have been an unmitigated curse, to have been nothing but parasites living on the backs of the toiling masses; and, in general, the concept of the class struggle was projected backwards. The intellectual endeavour involved was relatively straightforward. Whereas until then the nobility was deemed to embody the exemplary virtues, now an undifferentiated, mythicized "people" had taken over this role and all events were viewed through this prism. Where a particular event could be given a Russian connection, this was all the better. The practitioners of this industry could occasionally surpass themselves and actually add an obligatory but fictitious Russian figure to events, presumably to lend verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative. The 1784 rising of Romanian peasants in Transylvania, a genuine popular movement led by Horia, Closca and Crisan, three peasants, was furnished with a new, until then unknown,

[18] Quoted by Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 115.

leader, a Russian officer called Mikhail Popensky, who happened fortuitously to be on the spot to lend fraternal Russian assistance to the benighted Romanians.[19]

The Show Trials

THE STALINIST institution that has attracted the greatest attention, however, is the show trial. With the exception of Poland and the GDR, every East European country staged a major trial of a leading figure in the communist party and selected acolytes. The fascination which these "trials" have exercised over Western imagination derives in part from their conscious perversion of a key aspect of legality, the fair trial, which has rightly been regarded as a guarantee of freedom. Why, the question might be asked, did these states choose to liquidate their opponents by pursuing the form of a trial and thereby instituting a ghastly mockery of a valued institution? The answer lies in the politicization of everything, including the administration of justice (a term which strictly speaking has no meaning under Stalinism). Second, the show trials had a symbolic function. They were a very high profile enactment of the party's claim to omniscience and omnipotence, not just in the past and the present, but projected forward into the future. By insisting on the veracity of charges which were patently absurd—the accusations of simultaneously Zionist, Cosmopolitan, Trotskyist, Imperialist, Capitalist motivations were manifestly ridiculous—the party was emphatically stating that all its enemies were identical and that it would deal with all of them in exactly the same way.

Third, the trials were a way of demonstrating the party's omniscience and ever-vigilance. If the accused in these trials could confess to having committed the most heinous crimes against the party, the people and the state and if it was the protector of the proletarian revolution—the watchful secret police—which uncovered (unmasked) these malefactors, clearly nothing could escape the party's eye. All resistance was, therefore, useless. The party knew everything, perhaps even before it had happened. Hence the cruel sophistry of "objective" and "subjective" guilt, that an individual may have been perfectly innocent when he committed a particular action—there was no *mens rea*, to use the technical term—but by the criterion of class justice, he had objectively committed an offence for which punishment would be exacted. Fourthly, the trials should also be seen as a purification ceremony. The concepts of "pure" and "impure," that which is acceptable and that which is not, in socio-political terms are determined by an interaction between rulers and ruled.[20] In a post-revolutionary order, however, the new rulers are determined to impose their own views of

[19] As related by Dionisie Ghermani, quoting *Istoria RPR* (1955).
[20] Mary Douglas, 19 September 1980, *The Times Literary Supplement*.

impurity on society. In the Stalinist case what was noteworthy was how far the party's claim to determine the boundaries of pure and impure extended and the extremely elaborate way in which these were made manifest. What is also noteworthy about these Stalinist show trials is that they appear to have roots or analogues in Eastern Orthodox religious rites. Thus whereas in Western Christianity, confession is a strictly private communion, in Orthodoxy there is a tradition of the public confession of sins. Finally, of course, the trials had a direct political objective, that of ridding the party of elements regarded as potentially untrustworthy or as potential rivals for the existing leadership (this aspect will be dealt with in greater detail below).

The Political Impact

THE direct impact of Stalinism on East European politics has already been discussed in the context of the destruction of existing institutions. The other side of the coin was the creation of new institutions and the formulation of new political, economic and social strategies. At the centre of the Stalinist concept of politics was a form of dynamism, which was both real and synthetic.[21] It was real in that very far-reaching changes were instituted, but it was also synthetic as far as the actual internalization of the new belief system by society was concerned. The result of Stalinist policies was, in practice, external compliance with the new codes of conduct rather than genuine acceptance of the tenets of Marxism–Leninism. Attendance at rituals, the mouthing of the obligatory slogans, the passive acceptance of the new order were sufficient in day-to-day terms. This was inevitable, given that the entire post-revolutionary panoply was at variance with the real aspirations of society.

The party sought to compensate for this by its endeavour to achieve the complete penetration of every aspect of life, to exercise its power in all spheres and to regulate all forms of behaviour in the expectation that a successful "breakthrough" into the consciousness of society would be the end result. It embarked, therefore, on a very far-reaching campaign of controlling both the day-to-day lives of the population and their longer-term perceptions of the future by using the organization of the party to supervise all possible activity. In theory, of course, the role of the party was to devise the current strategy to be pursued, even while other bodies were actually responsible for implementing policy. In practice, the party supervised all other institutions and ran policy down to the smallest detail of which it was capable. The party thereby enveloped the state and sought to draw all activity into itself. This was paralleled by the heightened tempo

[21] Michael Shafir uses the term "simulated change" in his book *Romania: Politics, Economics and Society—Political Stagnation and Simulated Change* (London, 1985).

of activity in all spheres and the extraordinarily ambitious targets that were set up by national economic plans.

Every East European country began the construction of a vast, high-prestige project—steel mills being the favourite—and of other heavy industrial plant. The extraction of coal or other energy carriers, heavy engineering and similar projects accompanied this. The figures, even if they related to gross output and were thus virtually meaningless, looked spectacular. Thus the Hungarian Second Five Year Plan (1950–1954), originally intended to raise industrial output by 204 per cent, was later raised to an unbelievable 380 per cent.[22] The underlying philosophy of this industrial expansion imitated Soviet precepts also in their leaning towards autarky, despite the economic irreality of forcing small countries into industrial self-reliance.

The political implications of this strategy of economic development were several. Each East European country would henceforth be obliged to rely on its own resources and either limit its exchanges to the Soviet Union or pursue them under Soviet supervision. In this sense autarky could be regarded as the international equivalent of domestic atomization. Second, Soviet-type industrialization would have irreversible consequences, not only of tying Eastern Europe to Soviet supplies, but equally of ensuring that a section of every East European country's industry would be locked into a client relationship with the Soviet partner, making it near impossible to use those resources for any other purposes. Third, the formulation of a strategy centred on heavy industry, resulted in its perpetuation by the emergence of what might be called a heavy industry lobby, those who had grown up in the shadow of this particular pattern of industrialization and who regarded it as the most effective means of running an economy and thus were determined to defend and extend it. This heavy-industrial slanting of Soviet-type systems has remained one of its most tenacious and ineradicable features, which continues to influence its development by using up excessive funds in terms of cost-effectiveness.[23]

Another significant aspect with enduring consequences was to shift the nature of political discourse in Soviet-type systems towards an overconcentration on economics. There is a marked inclination in these systems nominally to discuss all issues as if they were economic, to perceive solutions to non-economic problems in economic terms and generally to use the prism of the economy as the determinant one. This is all the more ironical in the light of the politically determined reality of Soviet-type systems, but in fact does make a certain kind of sense. In as much as the language of public

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[22] Janos Berecz, *Ellenforradalom tollal es fegyverrel* [Counter Revolution by Pen and Arms], 2nd edition (Budapest, 1981), p. 30.

[23] Ota Sik, *Czechoslovakia: The Bureaucratic Economy* (White Plains, 1972).

discourse is heavily influenced by economics, it makes political issue lacking an obvious economic aspect—like representation or accountability—that much more difficult to raise. The pseudo-scientific language introduced by Stalinism, by which all phenomena can notionally be reduced to statistics is similarly perpetuated. This can give rise to a perception of inchoate issue as much clearer than they may be and encourage a kind of dogmatism in the way problems are approached.

Soviet-type industrialization, furthermore, was irreversible in as much as it precluded certain economic options for the future. Once carried through, it would be costly, at the very least, to formulate an alternative strategy of industrialization based on, say, tertiary production. The creation of large industry was for all practical purposes something that could not be uncreated. This had its social repercussions as well. It led to the emergence of sections of the working class with a vested interest in the survival of these industries and in the avoidance of using purely economic criteria for their evaluation; equally, numbers of administrators would have a personal stake in keeping these industries going. In this respect, the Stalinist revolution constructed a stratum of its own beneficiaries, which remains committed to some variant of it.

Stalinism, in addition, spawned a massive new bureaucracy, again dependent on the party that set it up. The numbers of administrators in Poland, for example, increased from 172,000 before the war to 362,400 in 1955.[24] These bureaucrats had to justify their existence, to put it at its lowest, so that the state became markedly more intrusive. In this, it drew on the official ideology for justification, in as much as the distinction between the public and private spheres in practice was severely weakened and largely proclaimed to be abolished. At the same time, the system spewed forth a continuous stream of decrees, directives, instructions, regulations, resolutions and the like, which intensified arbitrariness and undermined predictability. The objective was political—to serve the officially determined goals by whatever means were to hand. The power placed in the hands of the administrator over the individual was all but boundless; it was limited only by hierarchical constraints and fear of the superior's opinion.

Two further long-term aspects of Stalinism are of importance. First, there is the anti-agrarian bias of Stalinist strategy, something that had its roots in Marx and was perpetuated by his successors. Agriculture, as suggested earlier, was to be transformed into a branch of industry and the techniques appropriate to industry were imposed on it regardless. This is

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[24] Jan B. de Weydenthal, *The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline* (Stanford, 1978), p. 62, quoting Brzezinski, *Soviet Bloc*, and Maria Turlejska, *Zapis pierwszej dekady 1945–1954*, p. 183.

typical reductionism and it failed; agriculture functions according to its own rationalities which differ from those of industry. Attempts to force one into the mould of the other have proved to be misperceived. But as this was not self-evident to those guided by Stalinism, agriculture suffered and is still, to some extent, a Cinderella in terms of status and value.

Second, the classical Marxist attitude towards nature and natural resources is to treat them as limitless and cost-free. Whether in Stalin's day or after, the constraints of nature were on the whole ignored as irrelevant, with far-reaching consequences for environmental damage, which had no meaningful place in Soviet-type political culture. This was undoubtedly coupled with the "romance of size" discussed above. Linked to this is a certain propensity to treat issues in black-and-white, exclusive terms, to deny that issues may be too complex for ready-made solutions, to incline towards a certain intellectual arrogance, namely that the élite will know better, that the demands of society are a pettifogging nuisance best ignored because the consumer (say) will come to his or her senses anyway. There is in the core of this a kind of exclusivism, that rejects debate and compromise as superfluous, for ultimately the élite is, after all, in possession of the supreme rationality, is it not?

THE TERROR is widely regarded as the most characteristic of all Stalinist innovations. Its purpose was to enforce compliance, to destroy all pre-existing values, to break down preconceptions and to make it easier for the new revolutionary values to take root. Equally, the role of terror was to facilitate the politicization of the system by giving completely free rein to the power of the party through the destruction of competing institutions and the horizontal links that underlay them. The scope of terror was supposedly total—not a single action escaped it in theory, even if in practice such perfection was never achieved. But in Hungary, in the 28 months after 1 January 1950, some 850,000 persons were punished, mostly fined, by the police. In the three-and-a-quarter years from 1950 onwards, the courts looked at 650,000 cases and sentenced 387,000 persons; finally, during the four years 1952–1955, some 1,136,434 persons were subjected to police investigation and of these, 516,708 or 45 per cent were actually sentenced.[25] A significant part of those affected were peasants, caught up in the collectivization drive, but it must also have included workers sentenced for "sabotage," i.e. failure to fulfil the norm. It is not clear if these figures include the 100,000 plus persons, members of the old middle classes, who were deported to the countryside from 1950 onwards. The terror in Hungary encompassed at least a tenth of the population and probably not a single family was left untouched by it. The scope of the

[25] Berecz, op. cit., p. 29.

terror may have been greater in Hungary than elsewhere—though the absence of anything like reliable figures make comparisons difficult—but the objective was similar throughout Eastern Europe.

The effectiveness of terror is less clear-cut however. It can certainly enforce compliance with the letter of the law, but fear is not efficient in promoting loyalty. Rather, those affected will tend to take refuge in passivity, in obeying the minimum, in paying lip-service, but in reality not in any way internalizing the values of the revolutionary system. Indeed, the experience of putting a society through the mangle tends to promote "immune reactions" on the part of those affected.[26] People are forced to come to terms with a sudden and harsh intervention in their lives by an external agency, the state, which not only acts with complete opacity, but is unpredictable and arbitrary and whose actions are at variance to its proclaimed goals. Hence, they lose their social bearings and will incline towards distrust of the newly promoted values, preferring instead to recall older concepts even when they had previously been opposed to them. The role of religion was a classical example of this. By the 1940s, to varying degrees, Eastern Europe was slowly moving towards secularization. The communist revolution, by declaring religion, together with all other value systems, to be impure, endowed religion with an attractiveness that it had begun to lose. In this sense, the Stalinist revolution halted a particular secularizing trend and actually acted as an anti-secularizing force.

The Achievements of the Stalinist Revolution

APOLOGISTS for the Stalinist revolution will argue that although the cost was appalling in human terms, it did drag Eastern Europe into the 20th century by modernizing it. As argued, this claim to have constructed "modernity" needs severe modification if it is tenable at all. By concentrating all power into the political sphere, and subjecting the area to an extraordinary reductionist squeeze, energies were concentrated and an industrial base of sorts was built. This historic achievement, which had eluded the communists' predecessors (Czechoslovakia and the GDR excepted), was reached without significant inputs of foreign capital, other than Soviet know-how and technology. The Soviet-type approach to primitive capital accumulation, avoiding the supposed irrationality of the market, had worked, this line of argument would have it. Yet this claim is vulnerable on two grounds. First, such "forced marches through history" are achieved at a price and the price went beyond human terms. Second, Eastern Europe was saddled with an outdated, distorted economic structure that was too intimately bound up with the equally distorted political structure to make remedy

[26] Laszlo Bogar, *A fejlodes ara* (Budapest, 1983).

possible. Indeed, whatever may have been the intention of the Stalinists—and there is no need to assume that they were without exception power-hungry monomaniacs—they actually succeeded in constructing a political system that was and remains superbly efficient at concentrating power and at ensuring that this is never seriously diluted.

The political agenda has been firmly controlled by the élite which runs the polity through the all-encompassing party and which subordinates all other imperatives to those of power. Other rationales were outlawed in Stalin's day, though they were permitted to return to the intellectual spectrum in the 1960s, but in effect only in a subordinate role. The equal competition of rationalities and the separation of different spheres (political, economic, legal, aesthetic etc.), which are characteristic of liberal democracies, have never been permitted to re-emerge. This enracination of communist power and the construction of a political system to secure it have been the most lasting legacy of the Stalinist revolution. Challenges to that system have been fought off by the application of superior force in order to preserve the system or a recognizable variant of it. Yet there is much to be said for the argument that conflict over the redistribution of power has been the central feature of East European politics ever since, and that each time a seemingly irreversible redistribution was made, the *status quo ante* was speedily restored.

The Bolsheviks Dissolve the Constituent Assembly

Richard Pipes

Although they had carried out the October coup *under the slogan "All power to the Soviets," the Bolsheviks immediately proceeded to free their party from all control by the Soviets and their executive organs. This they accomplished within weeks of their* coup. *The only issue which still remained was the Constituent Assembly, elections to which had been scheduled by the overthrown Provisional Government for the middle of November and to the convocation of which the Bolsheviks were committed. The account which follows traces the manner in which the Bolsheviks dealt with the Assembly and its consequences.*

TO FREE themselves completely from institutionalized democratic forces, the Bolsheviks had to deal with the Constituent Assembly: an issue which, according to one contemporary, "stuck like a bone" in their throat.[1]

By the middle of November, the Bolsheviks had succeeded in (1) shunting aside the legitimate All-Russian Congress of Soviets and unseating its Executive Committee, (2) depriving the executive organ of the soviets of control over legislation and senior appointments, and (3) splitting the legitimate Peasant Congress, and replacing it with a hand-picked body of soldiers and sailors. They had been able to carry out these acts of subversion because they involved institutional manipulation in far-away Petrograd which the country at large could not readily follow. But the Constituent Assembly was another matter. This was to be a body chosen by the entire nation, the first genuinely representative gathering in Russian history. To prevent it from meeting or to disperse it after it had met would constitute the most audacious *coup d'état* of all, a direct challenge to the nation's will.

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* The essay is an excerpt from the author's multi-volume *History of the Russian Revolution*. Published with permission of Alfred A. Knopf and Clarendon Press, Oxford. All dates are Old Style.

[1] I. Steinberg, *Als Ich Volkskommissar war* (Munich, 1929), p. 42.

the disenfranchisement of tens of millions of men and women who had gone to the polls. And yet, until and unless the Constituent Assembly was disposed of, the Bolsheviks could feel no security because their legitimacy, grounded in the resolutions of the 2nd Congress of Soviets, was conditional on the approval of the Assembly—approval which it was certain to deny to them. The 2nd Congress had passed all its revolutionary acts on a strictly conditional basis: the cabinet which it had authorized Lenin to form was called "Provisional" and the decrees on land and peace were also passed provisionally, subject to the Assembly's concurrence.

To make matters worse, the Bolsheviks had explicitly committed themselves to the convocation of the Assembly. Historically, the Constituent Assembly was identified with the Socialist Revolutionary Party which made it the centrepiece of its political programme, being confident that with its hold on the peasants, who dominated the electorate, it would enjoy in this body an overwhelming majority: this the SRs intended to use to transform Russia into a republic of "toilers." Had they had more political sense, they would have pressed the Provisional Government to hold elections to the Assembly as soon as possible, even on an imperfect franchise. But they procrastinated like everyone else, handing the Bolsheviks the opportunity to pose as champions of free national elections. From the late summer, 1917, onwards, the Bolsheviks kept on accusing the Provisional Government of deliberately delaying the elections on the alleged grounds that as a "bourgeois" government it feared the people's revolutionary mood. In launching the slogan "All Power to the Soviets," they argued that the Provisional Government would never keep its promise and that only the soviets could guarantee that the Constituent Assembly met. Bolshevik propaganda in September and October 1917 shouted loud and clear that the transfer of power to the soviets alone would save the Constituent Assembly.[2] As they prepared to seize power, the Bolsheviks sometimes sounded as if their sole objective was safeguarding the Assembly from the designs of the "bourgeoisie" and other "counter-revolutionaries." As late as 27 October, *Pravda* told its readers that:

> the new revolutionary authority will permit no hesitations: under conditions of social hegemony of the interests of the broad popular masses, it alone is capable of leading the country to a Constituent Assembly.[3]

There could be no question, therefore, that Lenin and his Party were committed to holding elections to the Assembly, convening it, and

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[2] See, for example, Trotsky's speech in the Petrograd Soviet as reported in *Novaia zhizn*, No. 138/132, 27 Sept. 1917, p. 3.

[3] *Pravda*, No. 170/101, 27 Oct. 1917, p. 1.

submitting to its will. But since this Assembly was almost certain to sweep them out of power, they had a problem on their hands, torn as they were between the knowledge of what they had to do and the fear of doing it. In the end, they gambled and won: and only after this triumph, which destroyed the Constituent Assembly, could they feel confident of never again facing serious competition from the democratic forces.

In getting rid of the Constituent Assembly, they could find justification in Social Democratic theory. The RSDRP programme, adopted in 1903, did call for the convocation of a Legislative Assembly, elected by the people on the basis of universal, equal and direct vote: but neither the Bolsheviks nor the Mensheviks made a fetish of free elections. They were prepared to argue long before the revolution that the ballot box was not necessarily the best indicator of the people's "true" interests. The founder of Russian Social Democracy, Plekhanov, delivered at the Second Party Congress in 1903 some remarks on the subject, with which the Bolsheviks were later to taunt their Menshevik opponents:

> Every given democratic principle must be viewed not abstractly, on its own merits, but in its relationship to that principle which may be called the basic principle of democracy: *salus populi suprema lex*. Translated into the language of a revolutionary, this means that the success of the revolution is the supreme law. And if, for the sake of the revolution, it should become necessary temporarily to restrict the action of one or another democratic principle, then it would be criminal not to do so. As a personal opinion I shall state that one must view even the principle of universal vote from the point of view of the above-mentioned fundamental principle of democracy. Hypothetically, one can conceive of a situation where we, Social Democrats, would oppose the universal vote . . . If in an outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm the people would elect a very good parliament . . . then we should try to transform it into a *Long Parliament*; and if the elections turned out unfavourably, then we should try to disperse it—not in two years, but, if possible, in two weeks.[4]

Lenin fully approved of these sentiments in 1903, and in 1918, when dispersing the Constituent Assembly, quoted them with relish.[5]

The Provisional Government had finally set the date of the elections for 12 November 1917. The Bolsheviks hesitated momentarily whether to adhere to this date, but in the end decided to do so, and issued a decree to

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[4] *Vtoroi S"ezd RSDRP: Protokoly* (Moscow, 1959), pp. 181–82. Trotsky in 1903 said something similar: "All democratic principles must be subordinated exclusively to the interests of the party." M. Vishniak, *Bolshevizm i demokratiia* (New York, 1919), p. 67.

[5] N. Krupskaia, *Vospominaniia o Lenine* (Moscow, 1957), p. 74: V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii*, Vol. 35 (Moscow, 1962), p. 185, henceforth referred to as Lenin, *PSS*.

this effect (drafted by Iurii Larin) two days after their October *coup*.[6] But what were they to do next? While pondering this question, they interfered with the ability of rival opponents to campaign. This was perhaps the principal intention behind the Press Decree and of an ordinance issued concurrently by the Military-Revolutionary Committee (1 November) placing Petrograd under a State of Siege: one provision of this ordinance outlawed outdoor assemblies.[7]

In Petrograd, the voting for the Assembly began, as scheduled, on 12 November, and continued for three days. In Moscow, the elections were held on 19–21 November. The rest of the country cast ballots in the second half of November. Voting took place in the entire territory of what had been the Russian Empire except for areas under enemy occupation, that is, Poland and regions along Russia's western and northwestern frontiers. Central Asia voted, but the results were not tabulated: the same lapse occurred in a few remote regions. According to the most reliable count, 44·4 million citizens cast votes. The franchise, which had been determined by the Provisional Government, was extended to male and female citizens of 20 years and over. The franchise met the traditional "four-tail" criterion of the democratic parties: it was universal, equal, direct, and secret. The voters turned out in impressive numbers: in Petrograd and Moscow about 70 per cent of those eligible went to the polls, and in some rural areas the turnout reached 100 per cent, the peasants often voting as one body for a single ticket, usually the Socialist Revolutionaries. Here and there, observers noted minor irregularities: the garrison troops, which favoured the Bolsheviks because they promised them quick peace, sometimes intimidated spokesmen of the other parties. But by and large, especially if one considers the difficult conditions under which they were held, the elections to the Assembly proceeded smoothly. Lenin, who had no interest in praising them, stated on 1 December:

> If one views the Constituent Assembly apart from the conditions of the class struggle, which verges on civil war, then we know as of now of no institution more perfect as a means of expressing the people's will.[8]

Voting was very complicated, given that many splinter parties participated, often in blocs with other parties: the configuration differed from region to region becoming especially complex in such borderland areas as the Ukraine, where, alongside Russian parties, parties of the local minorities also appeared on the ballot.

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[6] *Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti*, Vol. I (Moscow, 1957), pp. 25–26, henceforth referred to as *Dekrety*.

[7] *Izvestiia*, No. 213, 1 Nov. 1917, p. 2.

[8] Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 35, p. 135.

Of the socialists, the Bolsheviks alone campaigned without a formal platform. They apparently counted on winning votes by making broad and vaguely worded appeals to workers, soldiers and peasants, centred on the slogans "All Power to the Soviets," immediate peace, and the confiscation of landlord properties. In their electoral appeals they sought to broaden the class basis of their constituency, borrowing for the purpose from the SRs their un-Marxist term, "the toiling masses." In evaluating the results of the elections, therefore, it must be borne in mind that many and perhaps even most of those who cast ballots for the Bolsheviks were expressing approval not of the Bolshevik platform—which they knew nothing of because it did not even exist—let alone of the hidden Bolshevik agenda of a one-party dictatorship, never mentioned in Bolshevik pronouncements, but they were expressing approval of the rule of soviets, an end to the war, and the abolition of private landholding in favour of communal redistribution, none of which figured among ultimate Bolshevik objectives.

Lenin, hoping against hope, for a while deluded himself that the Left SRs would so tear apart the SR Party that they would enable the Bolsheviks to win a victory in the election.[9] The strong showing which the Left SRs made at the Petrograd City Conference in November gave some substance to this hope.[10] But Lenin's expectations proved unfounded: although the Bolsheviks made a strong showing, especially in the cities and among the military, they came in second, trailing far behind the Socialist Revolutionaries. This outcome sealed the fate of the Assembly.

The results of the elections cannot be precisely determined because in many localities the parties and their offshoots ran in coalitions, sometimes of a very complicated nature. The problem is exacerbated by the practice of the Communist authorities, who control the data, of lumping together under the categories "bourgeois" and "petty bourgeois" parties and groupings that ran on separate tickets. As best can be determined, the results were as follows (in thousands):[11]

Socialist parties: 68·3 per cent
Socialist Revolutionaries: 17,943 (40·5 per cent)
Bolsheviks: 10,661 (24·0 per cent)
Mensheviks: 1,145 (2·6 per cent)
Other socialists: 506 (1·1 per cent)

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[9] 27 Sept. in Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 34, p. 266.
[10] P. Scheibert, *Lenin an der Macht* (Weinheim, 1984), p. 418.
[11] Based on L. M. Spirin, *Klassy i partii v grazhdanskoi voine v Rossii (1917–20 gg.)* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 416–425, as supplemented by O. H. Radkey, *The Election to the Constituent Assembly* (Cambridge, MA, 1950), pp. 16–17.

Liberal and Conservative parties: 7·5 per cent
Constitutional Democrats: 2,088 (4·7 per cent)
Other Russian non-socialist parties: 1,261 (2·8 per cent)

Minority parties: 17·1 per cent
Ukrainian parties & parties in the Ukraine: approx. 5,000 (11·3 per cent)
Muslim parties: 943 (2·1 per cent)
Other national minorities: 1,678 (3·7 per cent)

Unclassified: 7·3 per cent

The elections gave the Bolsheviks 175 out of 715 seats in the Assembly: together with the SR deputies who identified themselves as Left, they controlled 30 per cent of the seats.[12]

The Bolsheviks were disappointed with these results. One cause of their disappointment was the failure of the peasants, whom they had hoped to win over by stealing from the SRs their land programme, to vote for the Bolshevik ticket. The peasants did not even vote for the Left SRs who at this time worked hand in glove with them. One of the arguments the Bolsheviks later used to challenge the validity of the elections was that the split in the SR Party had occurred too late for the Left SRs to run on separate ballots, so that the peasants had no chance to vote for them. But there exist figures which demonstrate that this argument had no substance. In several electoral districts (Voronezh, Viatka, and Tobolsk) the Left SRs and the mainstream SRs did run on separate tickets. In none did the Left SRs win significant support: the tally of these districts showed 1,839,000 votes cast for the SR Party and a mere 26,000 for the Left SRs.[13]

The Bolsheviks were also displeased and worried by the strong showing of the Kadets, the opposition party they feared the most. Though they had gained overall less than five per cent of the vote, the Bolsheviks viewed the Kadets as their most formidable rival: they had the largest number of active supporters and the most newspapers; they were far better organized and financed than the SRs; and, unlike the Bolsheviks' socialist rivals, they did not feel constrained by a sense of comradeship with them, dedication to a common social ideal, and fear of the "counter-revolution." As the only significant non-socialist party still functioning in late 1917, the Kadets were likely to become a magnet attracting the entire spectrum of opinion to the right of centre, including conservatives and monarchists. If one looks at the overall election results one may indeed conclude that the Kadets "had

[12] O. N. Znamenskii, *Vserossiiskoe Uchreditelnoe Sobranie* (Leningrad, 1976), p. 338. Much of the Left SR support came from Petrograd workers and from very radicalized units of the Navy in the Baltic and Black Seas.
[13] *Delo naroda*, No. 2/247, 4 Jan. 1918, p. 1.

experienced not so much a walloping as a washout."[14] But this would be a superficial conclusion, refuted by the seriousness with which the Bolsheviks viewed the matter. The nationwide figures concealed the important political fact that the Kadets did very well in the urban centres which the Bolsheviks needed to dominate to offset their weakness in the countryside and viewed as the decisive battleground in the coming civil war. In Petrograd and Moscow, the Kadets ran a strong second to the Bolsheviks, winning 26·2 per cent of the vote in the one, and 34·2 per cent in the other. If one subtracted from the Bolshevik total in Moscow the vote of the military garrison, which was in the process of falling apart, the Kadets had 36·4 per cent of the vote as against the Bolshevik 45·3 per cent.[15] Furthermore, the Kadets bested the Bolsheviks in 11 out of 38 provincial capitals, and in many others ran a close second. They thus represented a much more formidable political force than the undifferentiated electoral returns indicated.

These disappointments notwithstanding, the outcome held for the Bolsheviks some consolation. Lenin, who analyzed the figures with the detachment of a commander surveying the order of battle—he even referred to the various electoral blocks as "armies"[16]—could take comfort in the fact that his party did best in the centre of the country: the large cities, the industrial areas, and the military garrisons.[17] The victorious SRs drew their strength from the Black Earth zone and Siberia. As he was later to observe, this geographic distribution of votes foreshadowed the front lines in the civil war between Red and White armies,[18] in which the Bolsheviks would control the heartland of Russia, and their opponents its rimlands.

Another source of satisfaction for the Bolsheviks was the support of soldiers and sailors, especially from units stationed in the garrison cities. These troops only wanted to get home, the quicker the better, to share in the ongoing repartition of land. Since the Bolsheviks alone of all the parties promised to open immediate peace negotiations, the men in uniform showed them strong preference. The Petrograd and Moscow garrisons cast, respectively, 71·3 and 74·3 per cent of their votes for the Bolsheviks. The front-line troops in the north-west, near Petrograd, also heavily supported them. The Bolsheviks did not do as well at the more remote fronts, less affected by their propaganda, but even so, in the four field armies for which records are available, they won 56 per cent of the vote.[19] Lenin had no illusions about the solidity of this support which was bound to evanesce as

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[14] Radkey, *Election*, p. 15.
[15] Znamenskii, *Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*, Tables 1 and 2.
[16] Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 40, p. 7.
[17] Radkey, *Election*, p. 38.
[18] Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 40, pp. 16–18.
[19] Znamenskii, *Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*, p. 275, p. 358.

the units kept on breaking up and the troops headed for their villages. But for the time being the backing of the military was decisive: unreliable as they were, the pro-Bolshevik troops constituted a power that even in small numbers could intimidate the democratic opposition. Analyzing the election results, Lenin noted with satisfaction that in the military the Bolsheviks possessed "a political striking force which assured them of an overwhelming preponderance of forces at the decisive point in the decisive moment."[20]

The People's Commissars discussed the Assembly at a meeting of 20 November. Here several important decisions were taken.[21] The opening of the Assembly, which the Provisional Government had scheduled for 28 November, was postponed indefinitely. The ostensible reason for this action was the difficulty of gathering a quorum by that date:[22] the true reason was that the Bolsheviks needed time to gather their forces and decide what to do next. Instructions went out to provincial soviets to report on all "abuses" accompanying the elections: they were to provide a pretext for promptly holding "re-elections."[23] Dybenko, the Commissar of the Navy, received orders to assemble in Petrograd between 10,000 and 12,000 armed sailors.[24] And perhaps most significantly, it was decided to hold the 3rd Congress of Soviets on 8 January: as events were to show, the Bolsheviks viewed this Congress, which they meant to pack solidly with their supporters and Left SRs, as a surrogate for the Assembly which would give them the kind of final legitimization they could not obtain from it. Although the available sources do not provide a clear picture of the circumstances in which these various decisions were taken, in their totality they bode no good for the Assembly.

The government's announcement indefinitely postponing the opening of the Assembly evoked strong protests from socialist parties as well as deputies to the Peasant Congress: many now concluded that the Bolsheviks, having lost the election, would prevent the Assembly from meeting, which is very likely what would have happened were it not for the pressures on them of the Left SRs. On 22–23 November, a Union for the Defence of the Constituent Assembly came into being which had among its members representatives of the Petrograd Soviet, the trade unions and all the socialist parties, except the Bolsheviks.[25]

The Bolsheviks, pressing their attack, now chose as their next target the Electoral Commission of the Assembly (*Vsevybor*). Under orders of the

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[20] Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 40, p. 10.

[21] A. L. Fraiman, *Forpost sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii* (Leningrad, 1969), p. 163, citing archival sources.

[22] *Dekrety*, Vol. I, p. 159.

[23] I. N. Liubimov, *Revoliutsiia 1917 goda: Khronika Sobytii*, Vol. VI (Moscow–Leningrad, 1930), p. 187.

[24] Fraiman, *Forpost*, p. 163.

[25] Liubimov, *Revoliutsiia*, p. 192.

Sovnarkom, on 23 November Stalin and Petrovskii ordered the Commission to hand over to them its files: when it refused, the Cheka took its staff into custody. On 29 November, without levying formal charges against it, the Bolshevik authorities closed the Electoral Commission. In an even more ominous move, on 23 November they appointed M. S. Uritskii, who later was to head the Petrograd Cheka, head of the Electoral Commission for the Assembly in which capacity he had broad authority to determine its composition.[26]

In response to these measures, which presaged the Assembly's demise, the Union for the Defence of the Constituent Assembly decided to disregard Bolshevik orders and to open the Assembly on the original date, 28 November.[27] On the morning of that day, journalists gathered at the Taurida Palace. Uritskii made an appearance, but no one paid him any attention. At 1:00 p.m. the members of the Electoral Commission, who in the meantime had been freed from prison, arrived and began their deliberations. Uritskii informed them they could meet only in his presence, but his instructions were ignored. From 1:00 p.m. onwards supporters gathered in front of the Taurida; they kept on coming until the evening hours, among them students, workers from Obukhov and other factories, soldiers, striking civil servants. The crowds carried banners emblazoned with the slogan "All Power to the Constituent Assembly." One paper estimated the crowd at 200,000.[28] On Bolshevik orders Latvian riflemen surrounded the building, but did not, as yet, interfere: some of them told the demonstrators that they had been sent to protect the Constituent Assembly. Inside, 45 deputies, most of them from Petrograd and vicinity, elected a Presidium.

The next day, armed troops formed a solid ring around the Taurida: the Latvian riflemen were back, augmented by soldiers from the Lithuanian Reserve Regiment, detachments of sailors, and a machine-gun company. These troops kept the crowds at a safe distance, allowing into the building only delegates and accredited journalists. Toward evening, sailors ordered the deputies to leave. The following day, 2 December, the troops barred entrance to all comers. The supporters of the Assembly had demonstrated to the Bolsheviks that they intended to carry on. The Bolsheviks showed that it was they who would decide whether the Assembly would operate normally. The events of 28 November–2 December proved a rehearsal for the real trial of strength on 5–18 January.

During these skirmishes, the Bolsheviks outlawed the Constitutional-Democratic Party. Already on the opening day of the elections in Petrograd,

[26] Liubimov, *Revoliutsiia*, p. 199.

[27] *Nash vek*, No. 1, 30 Nov. 1917, pp. 1–2, and 1 Dec. 1917, p. 2; *Pravda*, No. 91, 20 April 1924, p. 3; and Znamenskii, *Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*, pp. 309–310.

[28] *Nash vek*, No. 1, 30 Nov. 1917, p. 2.

they had sent out thugs to smash the editorial offices of the Kadet daily, *Rech*; it resumed publication under the name *Nash vek* at the end of November. On 28 November, the authorities issued an ordinance, written by Lenin, which bore a typically propagandistic title: "Decree concerning the arrest of the leaders of the civil war against the revolution."[29] It declared the leaders of the Constitutional-Democratic Party "enemies of the people" and ordered them to be seized and turned over to Revolutionary Tribunals. That night and the next day, Bolshevik detachments took into custody every prominent Kadet they could lay their hands on, among them several delegates to the Assembly (A. I. Shingarev, P. D. Dolgorukov, F. F. Kokoshkin, S. V. Panina, A. I. Rodichev, and others). All were subsequently released (Panina after a brief and rather comical trial) except for Shingarev and Kokoshkin whom Bolshevik sailors murdered in a prison hospital. Officially designated as "enemies of the people," the Kadets henceforth could neither function in the open nor take part in the Constituent Assembly. They were the first political party to be outlawed by the Bolshevik government. Neither the Mensheviks nor the Socialist Revolutionaries seemed very upset by these outrages, presumably because in common with the Bolsheviks they saw the Kadets as representatives of the "counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie" and, as such, expendable.

THESE acts of harassment did not solve for the Bolsheviks the problem of what to do about the Assembly. Some proposed a resort to force: as early as 8 November, V. Volodarskii, a member of the Central Committee, told party members that "the masses never suffer from parliamentary cretinism," least of all in Russia, and hinted that the Constituent Assembly might have to be dispersed.[30] Bukharin thought he had a better idea. At a meeting of the Central Committee on 29 November he proposed that the Kadets be thrown out of the Assembly, following which the Bolshevik and Left SR deputies would proclaim themselves a Revolutionary Convention: he was referring to the French Convention of 1792 which had replaced the Legislative Assembly and paved the way for the reign of terror. "If the others open [a rival body] we shall arrest them," he explained. Stalin made short shrift of this proposal on grounds of impracticability.[31]

Lenin had another solution: placate the Left SRs by letting the Assembly convene, then manipulate its membership in such a way as to obtain a more compliant body. This would be accomplished by resorting to the right of "recall" which he called "a basic, essential condition of genuine democ-

[29] *Dekrety*, Vol. I, p. 162.
[30] Znamenskii, *Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*, p. 231.
[31] *Protokoly Tsentralnogo Komiteta RSDRP (b): Avgust 1917–Fevral 1918* (Moscow, 1958) pp. 149–150.

racy."[32] By this device, voters in districts which had chosen "petty bourgeois" or other undesirable delegates would be persuaded to "recall" them and send in their stead Bolsheviks and Left SRs. But this was at best a slow procedure and, while it was being realized, the Assembly could pass all manner of hostile resolutions.

Lenin finally made up his mind on this issue on 12 December, immediately after reaching an accord with the Left SRs, and published his decision the following day in *Pravda* under the title "Theses on the Constituent Assembly."[33] It was a death sentence on the Assembly. The thrust of Lenin's argument was that changes in party alignments, notably the split in the SR Party, the shift in class structures, and the outbreak of the "counter-revolution," all of which had allegedly occurred since 25–26 October, had rendered the elections invalid as an indicator of the popular will:

> The march of events and the development of class war in the revolution has produced a situation in which the slogan "All Power to the Constituent Assembly" . . . has, in effect, turned into a slogan of the Kadets, the followers of Kaledin, and their accomplices. It is becoming clear to the whole people that this slogan, in fact, means the struggle for the elimination of soviet authority and that the Constituent Assembly, if separated from soviet authority, would inevitably be condemned to political death . . . Any attempt, direct or indirect, to view the question of the Constituent Assembly from a formal juridical point of view . . . signifies betrayal of the cause of the proletariat and a transition to the point of view of the bourgeoisie.

Nothing in this argument made sense. The elections to the Assembly had taken place not before 26 October, but in the second half of November, that is only days before Lenin wrote these words: in the interim, little had changed. The principal champions of the Assembly were not the Kadets and certainly not the followers of Kaledin, who wanted to topple the Bolshevik régime by force of arms, but the Socialist Revolutionaries. The "whole people," on whose behalf Lenin pretended to speak, had shown not that they regarded the Assembly as anti-soviet, but that they looked up to it with hope and respect by voting for it in large numbers. And as for the claim that the Assembly was antithetical to the rule of the soviets, only people with very short memories could have forgotten that a mere seven weeks previously, as they were reaching for power, the same Bolsheviks had insisted that soviet rule alone would guarantee the convocation of the Assembly. But here, as always, Lenin used arguments not to

[32] Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 35, p. 106.
[33] Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 35, pp. 164–65, p.166.

convince but to threaten: the key phrase occurred toward the end of the "argument," which made it clear that further support for the Assembly was tantamount to high treason.

Lenin went on to say that the Assembly could meet only if its deputies were subject to "recall," i.e. if it consented to its composition being arbitrarily altered by the government, and if it further acknowledged, without qualifications, "Soviet authority," i.e. the Bolshevik dictatorship:

> Outside these conditions, the crisis connected with the Constituent Assembly can be solved only in a revolutionary manner by means of the most energetic, rapid, firm and decisive measures on the part of Soviet authority . . . Any attempt to tie the hands of Soviet authority in this struggle would signify complicity with the counter-revolution.

To wit: unless the non-Bolshevik majority in the Assembly allowed itself to be reduced to a minority and then ratified the Bolshevik dictatorship, the Assembly would be treated as a counter-revolutionary body and dispersed by force.

On these terms, the Bolsheviks consented to have the Assembly convene on 5–18 January 1918, provided that at least 400 deputies turned up. At the same time they issued formal instructions for the convocation three days later (8–21 January) of the 3rd Congress of Soviets.

The Bolsheviks now launched a noisy propaganda campaign the theme of which Zinoviev stated in a speech to the Central Executive Committee on 22 December:

> We know very well that behind the pretext of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, under the celebrated slogan "All Power to the Constituent Assembly", lies concealed the cherished slogan "Down with the soviets."[34]

This proposition, contrary to their own slogans before and during the October coup, the Bolsheviks made official by having the Central Executive Committee adopt it on 3 January 1918.[35]

As the battle lines were drawn, the protagonists of the Assembly rallied their supporters. They had been put on notice. But in responding to Bolshevik threats, they suffered under a grievous, indeed fatal, handicap. In their eyes, the Bolsheviks had subverted democracy and forfeited the moral right to govern: but they had to be removed only by the pressure of popular opinion, never by force, because the only beneficiary of a conflict among the socialists would be the "counter-revolution." By December,

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[34] *Protokoly Zasedanii Vserossiiskogo Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Rabochikh, Soldatskikh, Krestianskikh i Kazachikh Deputatov* (Moscow, 1918), p. 175.

[35] *Znamia truda*, No. 111, 5–18 Jan. 1918, p. 3.

Petrograd knew that on the Don a Russian "Vendée" was forming, as generals began to assemble troops with the aim of overthrowing the revolution, dissolving the soviets, arresting its leaders, and, who knows, perhaps even restoring the monarchy. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, were genuine if misguided revolutionaries: undeniably too impetuous, too lustful for power, too brutal, but even so they were "comrades" struggling for the same cause. Nor could one ignore the support they still enjoyed among the "popular masses." The democratic left felt convinced that the Bolsheviks sooner or later would come to their senses and realize they could not govern Russia alone: once that happened, they would share power and the progress toward socialism and democracy would resume.

This maturing process would take time, but nothing could prevent it. On these grounds, resistance to the Bolsheviks had to be confined to propaganda and agitation among the masses, coupled with peaceful demonstrations: it could never take the form of armed resistance which would unleash a fratricidal war and open the gates to the "counter-revolutionaries." The notion that the Bolsheviks were perhaps the real counter-revolutionaries occurred only to a handful of left-wing intellectuals. The leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary and Menshevik parties never ceased to view the Bolsheviks as deviant comrades in arms: in the months and years that lay ahead, whenever outside forces threatened to topple the Bolsheviks, they would bury their differences with them and rally to their defence. Such an attitude could have been, of course, nothing more than a rationalization of indecisiveness and fear. But whatever the reason, by preventing the democratic left from responding to force with force, it proved fatal to the cause of democracy in Russia.

The Union for the Defence of the Constituent Assembly now initiated its own propaganda campaign. It printed and dispatched throughout the country hundreds of thousands of daily newspapers and pamphlets[36] in which it explained why the Assembly was not anti-soviet and why it alone had the right to give the country a constitution. It also staged demonstrations in the capital and provincial cities calling for "All Power to the Constituent Assembly." It sent agitators to garrisons and factories, where they secured the signatures of many soldiers and workers, including those who had voted for the Bolsheviks, to appeals upholding the Assembly. The SRs and Mensheviks, who organized these activities along with the trade unions and striking civil servants, evidently hoped that evidence of such massive support for the Assembly would inhibit the Bolsheviks from using force against it.

A few socialists thought this was not enough: they came from the SR revolutionary underground, and felt that only a resumption of the means

[36] N. Rubinstein, *Bolsheviki i Uchreditelnoe Sobranie* (Moscow, 1938), p. 76.

of combat traditionally used against despotism—terror and street violence—would restore democracy in Russia. The leader of this group was Fedor Mikhailovich Onipko, an SR delegate from Stavropol and a member of the Military Commission of the Union for the Defence of the Constituent Assembly. With the help of other experienced conspirators, Onipko penetrated Smolnyi, planting there four of his men, two disguised as officials and two as chauffeurs. While following Lenin's movements they discovered that he almost daily left Smolnyi to visit his sister; after this discovery, they placed an agent disguised as a caretaker in her block of flats. Onipko wanted to capture or kill Lenin, and after him, Trotsky. He scheduled the action for Christmas Day. But when he approached the SR Central Committee for approval, it was horrified at the very idea, arguing that if the SRs murdered Lenin and Trotsky they would be lynched by infuriated workers and only help the counter-revolution. Onipko was ordered immediately to dissolve his terrorist group.[37] He obeyed, but some officers not connected with the SR Party carried out a clumsy attempt on Lenin's life on 1 January, shooting at his car while it was crossing a bridge. Their only victim was the Swiss radical, Fritz Platten, who rode with Lenin and received a slight wound in the hand.[38]

Onipko next turned his attention to organizing armed resistance against the anticipated Bolshevik assault on the Constituent Assembly. His plan, worked out jointly with the Military Commission of the Union for the Defence of the Constituent Assembly, called for a large-scale, armed demonstration in front of the Taurida on 5 January to intimidate the pro-Bolshevik military units and thereby ensure that the Assembly could carry on its work. Onipko and his aides managed to secure impressive backing for their plans. At the Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii Guard Regiments between eight and ten thousand men volunteered to march, arms in hand, in the 5 January demonstration and fight back if fired upon. A batallion (*bronedivizion*) of the Izmailovskii Guard Regiment promised help as well. Possibly as many as 2,000 workers, mainly from the Obukhov Plant and the State Printing Office, also pledged to come. This was a formidable military force which the Bolsheviks were unlikely to challenge.

All stood in readiness. Before setting its plans in motion, the Military Commission went back to the Central Committee of the SR Party for authorization. The Committee again flatly refused to give it. In justification of its negative stand it gave vague explanations, all, in the ultimate analysis, inspired by fear. No one had defended the Provisional Government, its members argued: what had changed? Bolshevism was a disease of the

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[37] B. F. Sokolov in *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii*, Vol. XIII (Berlin, 1924), p. 48; Fraiman, *Forpost*, p. 201.

[38] V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, *Tri pokusheniia na V. I. Lenina* (Moscow, 1930), pp. 3–77.

masses which would take time to overcome. This was no time for risky "adventures."[39]

The Central Committee reconfirmed plans to hold on 5 January an unarmed demonstration. It felt confident that the Bolsheviks would not dare to open fire: backed by work stoppages throughout the city's factories and offices, such a show was bound to paralyze them. When, however, Onipko and his aides returned to the garrisons with the news and requested the troops to come to the projected demonstration unarmed, they were met with derision: "Why are you laughing at us, comrades?" They responded in disbelief: "You are inviting us to a demonstration but tell us to come without weapons. And the Bolsheviks? Are they little children? They will most certainly fire at unarmed people. And us: are we supposed to open our mouths and give them our heads for targets, or will you order us to run, like rabbits?"[40] The soldiers firmly refused to confront Bolshevik rifles and machine-guns with bare hands, and decided to spend 5 January in their barracks. By their refusal to resort to arms, the supporters of the Constituent Assembly doomed their cause.

The Bolsheviks, who got wind of these preparations, took no chances, and prepared for the decisive day as they would for battle. Lenin took personal command, unwilling to entrust an operation that could decide the fate of the October *coup* to his lieutenants.

The first step was to win over or at least neutralize the military. Bolshevik agitators fanned out to the garrisons. They did not dare to attack the Constituent Assembly which was exceedingly popular, preferring to argue that "counter-revolutionaries" directed the demonstrations planned in its support on 5 January. With this tactic they managed to neutralize the Finnish Infantry Regiment, which passed resolutions rejecting the slogan "All Power to the Constituent Assembly" and agreed to support the Assembly only on condition that it closely cooperated with the soviets. The Volhynian and Lithuanian regiments also voted to support the Constituent Assembly only to the extent that it cooperated with the soviets.[41]

It appears that no military unit of any size actually agreed to Bolshevik plans to condemn the Constituent Assembly as "counter-revolutionary." The Bolsheviks thus apparently did not succeed in winning over to their side any military units of the garrison, for they either backed the Assembly or preferred to stay on the sidelines. They were compelled, therefore, to rely on hastily organized armed units of Red Guards and sailors. Lenin did not trust them very much and gave instructions for the Latvians to be brought in: "the *muzhik* may waver if anything happens," he said.[42] This

[39] Sokolov in *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii*, Vol. XIII, p. 50, pp. 60–61.
[40] Ibid., p. 61.
[41] *Pravda*, No. 3/230, 5–18 Jan. 1918, p. 4.
[42] Trotsky in *Pravda*, No. 91, 20 April 1924, p. 3.

marked the beginning of the involvement of Latvian riflemen in the Revolution on behalf of the Bolsheviks in which role they were to render them invaluable services and more than once save them from disaster.

On 4 January, Lenin appointed N. I. Podvoiskii, the Chairman of the Bolshevik Combat Organization, which had seized Petrograd in October, to form an Extraordinary Military Staff.[43] Podvoiskii once again placed Petrograd under martial law and forbade, under threat of force, any public demonstrations and gatherings. Proclamations to this effect were posted throughout the city. Uritskii announced in *Pravda* on 5 January that any gatherings in the vicinity of the Taurida Palace were forbidden and would be dispersed, with weapons if necessary.

Bolshevik agitators also fanned out to the industrial establishments in search of worker support. Here they ran into hostility and incomprehension. In the largest factories, including Putilov, Obukhov, Baltic, the Nevskii shipyard and Lessner, workers had signed petitions of the Union for the Defence of the Constituent Assembly and could not understand why the Bolsheviks, with whom many of them sympathized, had suddenly turned against the Assembly.[44]

As the decisive day approached, the Bolshevik press kept up a steady drumbeat of warnings and threats. On 3 January, it informed the population through the Petrograd Soviet that on 5 January all workers were expected to stay in their factories and soldiers in their barracks. The same day Uritskii announced that Petrograd was in danger of a counter-revolutionary *coup*, allegedly organized by Kerensky and Savinkov who, he said, had secretly returned to Petrograd for that purpose.[45] On 5 January, *Pravda* carried a banner headline: "TODAY THE HYENAS OF CAPITAL AND THEIR HIRELINGS WANT TO SEIZE POWER FROM SOVIET HANDS."

ON FRIDAY, 5 January, Petrograd, and especially the area adjoining Taurida Palace resembled an armed encampment. The SR Mark Vishniak who went to the Taurida with a procession of deputies describes the sight as follows:

> We began to move at noon, a spread-out column of some 200 people, walking in the middle of the street. With the deputies were a few journalists, friends and wives, who had obtained entry tickets to the Taurida Palace. The distance to the Palace did not exceed one kilometre: the closer one approached, the fewer pedestrians were to be seen and the more soldiers, Red Army men and sailors. They were armed to

[43] Znamenskii, *Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*, pp. 334–335: Fraiman, *Forpost*, p. 204.

[44] E. Ignatov in *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia*, No. 5/76 (1928), p. 37. The author claims that these worker signatures were forged but furnishes no proof for this accusation.

[45] *Pravda*, No. 2/229, 4–17 Jan. 1918, pp. 1 and 3.

> the teeth: guns slung over the shoulder, in front and on the side bombs, grenades, and bullets, everywhere, wherever they could be attached or inserted. Individual passers-by on the pavement, upon encountering the unusual procession, rarely greeted it with shouts: they more often followed it sympathetically with their eyes and then hurried on. The armed men approach, inquiring who goes and where, and then return to their stations and bivouacs . . .
>
> The entire square in front of the Taurida Palace is filled with artillery, machine guns, field kitchens. Machine gun cartridge belts are piled up pell mell. All the gates to the Palace are shut, except for a wicket gate on the extreme left, through which people with passes are allowed in. The armed guards study one's face attentively before permitting entry: they inspect one's rear, feel the backside . . . After going through the left door, more controls . . . The guards direct across the vestibule and Catherine's Hall into the Assembly Hall. Everywhere are armed men, mostly sailors and Latvians. They are armed, as are those on the street, with guns, grenades, munition bags and revolvers. The number of armed men and weapons, the sound of clanking, create the impression of an encampment that is getting ready either to defend itself or to attack.[46]

The Bolshevik delegation, headed by Lenin, arrived at the Taurida at 1:00 p.m. Lenin wanted to be on the spot to be able to make quick decisions as the situation unfolded. Sitting in what during the Duma period had been the "government loge," he personally directed Bolshevik actions for the next nine hours. According to Bonch-Bruevich, Lenin "was excited and pale as a corpse, as never seen before. In this extreme white paleness of his face and neck, his head appeared even larger, his eyes were distended and aflame, burning with a steady fire."[47]

The Assembly was to open at mid-day, but Lenin, through Uritskii, refused to allow it to begin its deliberations until he knew what was happening on the streets of Petrograd, where in defiance of Bolshevik orders, a massive demonstration had been gathering all morning. Although its organizers stressed in the appeals that the demonstration would be "peaceful" and avoid any confrontation,[48] Lenin could not be certain that there would be no bloodshed and that his forces would not fold at the first sign of armed resistance. He must have had a contingency plan in mind in the event of the demonstrators overwhelming his forces, although what it was is not known: the SR Sokolov believed that in such a case Lenin

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[46] M. V. Vishniak, *Vserossiiskoe Uchreditelnoe Sobranie* (Paris, 1932), pp. 99–100.

[47] V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, *Na boevykh postakh fevralskoi i oktiabrskoi revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1930), p. 256.

[48] *Delo naroda*, No. 2/247, 4 Jan. 1918, p. 2.

intended to cooperate with the Assembly.[49]

The Union instructed the demonstrators to gather by 10:00 a.m. at nine locales scattered throughout the city and from there proceed to the central gathering place, the Champs de Mars. Around noon, the whole mass was to move under banners calling for "All Power to the Constituent Assembly" along Panteleimon Street toward Liteinyi Prospect, immediately turn right onto Kirochnaia Street, left on Potemkin Street and right on Shpalernaia which ran in front of Taurida Palace. After promenading in front of the Palace, they were to turn right onto Taurida Street and proceed to Nevsky, where they were to disperse.

The crowd which gathered that morning throughout Petrograd was impressive (some counted as many as 50,000 participants), but neither as large nor as enthusiastic as the organizers had hoped: the troops stayed in their barracks, fewer workers than expected turned up, with the result that the demonstrators consisted mainly of students, civil servants and other intellectuals, all rather dispirited. The Bolshevik threats and displays of force obviously had made an impression.[50]

Podvoiskii knew the route the procession was to take, since the organizers had widely advertised it, and deployed his men in such a way as to bar its way soon after it had moved out of the Champs de Mars. The forward detachment of his troops, with loaded guns and machine guns, occupied the streets and rooftops at the crossing of Panteleimon Street and Liteinyi Prospect. As the head of the procession approached Liteinyi, it ran into an armed detachment. Shouts went up "Hurrah for the Constituent Assembly!" whereupon troops from nearby rooftops opened machine gun fire. Some demonstrators fell, others ran away. But the procession soon reformed and continued on its way. Because troops barred access to Kirochnaia Street, it continued northward along Liteinyi, until it again ran into volleys of gunfire as it was about to turn into Shpalernaia. At this point, the demonstration broke up in disorder. Bolshevik soldiers pursued the demonstrators and snatched their banners, which they tore into shreds or tossed on bonfires. A different procession in another part of the city composed mostly of workers, also met with gunfire. The same fate befell several smaller demonstrations.[51]

Russian troops had not fired on unarmed demonstrators since that fateful day in February 1917 when they obeyed the directives of the city's governor to disperse crowds defying orders against public gatherings: that violence had sparked the mutinies and riots which marked the start of the Revolution.

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[49] Sokolov in *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii*, Vol. XIII, p. 66.

[50] A. S. Izgoev in *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii*, Vol. X, pp. 24–25; Znamenskii, *Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*, p. 340.

[51] Descriptions in *Delo naroda*, No. 4, 7 Jan. 1918, *Griadushchyi den*, 6 Jan. 1918, p. 4; *Pravda*, No. 5, 6–19 Jan. 1918, p. 2.

As far as is known, machine guns had never been previously turned in Russia against civilians. So it is not unreasonable to assume that the victims of this shooting thought it could unleash yet another violent outburst of mass protest. The parallel that at once came into many minds was Bloody Sunday, 9 January 1905, the day when the massacre of peaceful petitioners in St. Petersburg had set in motion country-wide protests that culminated in the tsar surrendering autocratic power. The dead—according to some accounts there were eight, according to others 21[52]—received a demonstrative funeral on 9 January, the anniversary of Bloody Sunday, and were buried at the Preobrazhenskii Cemetery, near the victims of the earlier massacre. Worker delegations carried wreaths, one of which was inscribed: "To the victims of the arbitrariness of the Smolnyi autocrats."[53]

In an outraged editorial Gorky expressed the reaction of many citizens to this carnage:

> On 9 January 1905, when the downtrodden, ill-treated soldiers were firing into unarmed and peaceful crowds of workers by order of the Tsarist régime, intellectuals and workers ran up to the soldiers—the unwilling murderers—and shouted point-blank in their faces:
>
> > What are you doing, damn you? Who are you killing? Don't you see they are your brothers, they are unarmed, they bear no malice toward you, they are going to the Tsar to beg his attention to their needs. They are not even demanding, but begging without threats, without anger, with humility. Come to your senses, what are you doing, idiots!
>
> It seemed that these simple, clear words which were provoked by anguish and pain for the innocently killed workers should find their way to the heart of the dear "meek" Russian peasant in a grey overcoat.
>
> But the dear meek peasant either beat these people of conscience with the rifle butt or stabbed them with the bayonet, or shouted, quivering with rage: "Break it up, we'll shoot!" They did not break up and then he fired accurately, piling tens and hundreds of corpses on the pavement.
>
> However, the majority of the Tsar's soldiers answered the reproaches and persuasions with dismal and slavish words: "We've got our orders. We know nothing, we've got our orders . . ." And, like machines, they fired at the crowds of people. Reluctantly, with a heavy heart perhaps, but—they fired.
>
> On 5 January 1918, unarmed Petersburg democracy—factory and white-collar workers—demonstrated peacefully in honour of the Constituent Assembly.

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[52] *Novaia zhizn*, No. 7/23, 11–24 Jan. 1918, p. 2; and Scheibert, *Lenin*, p. 19.
[53] *Novaia zhizn*, No. 7/23, 11–24 Jan. 1918, p. 2.

For almost 100 years the finest Russians have lived by the idea of a Constituent Assembly, a political institution which would give the entire Russian democracy the opportunity freely to express its will. In the struggle for this idea, thousands of the intelligentsia and tens of thousands of workers and peasants have perished in prisons, in exile and at hard labour, on the gallows, and by soldiers' bullets. Rivers of blood have been spilled on the sacrificial altar of this sacred idea, and now the "People's Commissars" have given orders to shoot the democracy which demonstrated in honour of this idea. I shall remind you that many of the "People's Commissars" themselves, throughout all their political careers, kept inculcating in the working masses the need to fight for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. *Pravda* lies when it writes that the demonstration of 5 January was organized by the bourgeois, the bankers, etc. and that it was precisely the "bourgeois" and "Kaledinites" who marched on the Taurida Palace.

Pravda lies, it knows full well that the "bourgeois" have no reason to rejoice over the opening of the Constituent Assembly, they can do nothing among 246 socialists of one party and 140 Bolsheviks.

Pravda knows that the workers of the Obukhov, Patronny, and other factories took part in the demonstration, that the workers of the Basil Island, Vyborg, and other districts, marched on the Taurida Palace under the red banners of the Russian Social-Democratic party.

It was precisely these workers who were shot, and however much *Pravda* lies, it cannot hide this shameful fact.

The "bourgeois" probably rejoiced when they saw how the soldiers and Red Guards tore the revolutionary banners out of the workers' hands, trampled them with their feet, and burned them on bonfires. But perhaps even the pleasant spectacle no longer enthused all the "bourgeois," for even among them there are honest persons who sincerely love their people and their country.

One of these was Andrei Ivanovich Shingarev, who was basely murdered by some beasts.

Thus, on 5 January the Petrograd workers were mowed down, unarmed. They were mowed down without warning that they might be fired on, they were mowed down from ambush, through cracks in fences, in a cowardly fashion, as if by real murderers.

And just as on 9 January 1905, people who had not lost their conscience and reason asked those who were shooting: "What are you doing, idiot? Aren't they your own people marching? You see there are red banners everywhere, and not a single poster hostile to the working class, not a single utterance hostile to you!"

And just as on 9 January 1905, the man in the street, indifferent to everything and always merely a spectator of the tragedy of life,

> exclaimed admiringly: "They are shooting like hell!" And he shrewdly reflected: "They will quickly finish each other off this way!"
>
> Yes, quickly. Rumours are circulating among the workers that the Red Guards from the Erickson factory shot at the workers from the Lesnoi factory and the workers of the Erickson factory were fired upon by the Red Guards from some other factory.
>
> There are many of these rumours. They may not be true, but this does not prevent them from having a very definite effect on the psychology of the working masses.
>
> I ask the "People's Commissars" among whom there must be decent and sensible people: Do they understand that by putting the noose around their own necks they will inevitably strangle the entire Russian democracy and ruin all the conquests of the revolution? Do they understand this? Or do they think, on the contrary: Either we have power or let everyone and everything perish?[54]

As soon as news reached him that the demonstrators had been dispersed and the streets were under Bolshevik control—this happened around 4:00 p.m.—Lenin gave a signal for the meeting to begin. On hand were 463 deputies, slightly more than one-half of those elected, among them 259 SRs, 136 Bolsheviks, and 40 Left SRs.[55] From the opening bell, the Bolsheviks set off pandemonium, their deputies and the armed guards having been told to jeer, boo and threaten non-Bolshevik speakers. Many of the uniformed and armed men who filled the corridors and the balcony did not have to be encouraged to behave in this fashion for they had helped themselves generously to the vodka dispensed at the buffet. The official minutes of the Assembly open with the following scene:

> A member of the Constituent Assembly, belonging to the SR fraction, exclaims from his seat: "Comrades, it is now 4:00 p.m., we suggest that the eldest member open the meeting of the Constituent Assembly." (Loud noise on the left, applause in the centre and on the right, whistles on the left . . . Inaudible . . . Loud noise and whistles continue on the left and applause on the right. The eldest member of the Constituent Assembly, Mikhailov, ascends [the podium].
>
> Mikhailov rings. (Noise on the left.) Voice: "Down with the usurper!"

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[54] *Novaia zhizn*, No. 6/220, 9 Jan. 1918, p. 1. The Bolsheviks, afraid of a possible backlash, ordered an inquiry into the shooting. It revealed among other things that troops from the Lithuanian Regiment had fired on the demonstrators in the belief that in so doing they were defending the Assembly from "saboteurs" (*NZh*, No. 15/229, 3 Feb. 1918, p. 11). The Commission of Inquiry discontinued its work at the end of January, as could have been expected, without issuing any report.

[55] Znamenskii, *Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*, p. 339. The exact number of the deputies present is not known: it could have been as low as 410: Ibid.

(Continuing noise and whistles on the left, applause on the right.)

Mikhailov: "I declare an intermission."[56]

The Bolshevik delegation had worked out beforehand a simple strategy. It would present the Assembly with a programmatic statement which would ask the Assembly to concede that it did not have the authority to legislate: in the almost certain event that it would refuse to approve, the Bolsheviks would walk out, and then, without formally disbanding it, make the Assembly's further work impossible. Following this plan, Raskolnikov presented early in the session the Resolution of the Bolshevik Party. Although called "Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited Masses," unlike its 1789 model, it had more to say about duties than rights: it is in this document that the Bolsheviks introduced the universal labour obligation. The Resolution proclaimed Russia a "Republic of Soviets" and reaffirmed a number of measures which the Bolsheviks had previously passed, including the Land Decree, worker control over production, the nationalization of banks and the annulment of state loans. The critical article demanded the Assembly to renounce its authority to legislate—the very authority for the sake of which it had been elected. "The Constituent Assembly concedes," the article read, "that its tasks are confined to working out in general the fundamental bases of reorganizing society on a socialist basis." The Resolution further called on the Assembly to ratify all decrees previously issued by the Sovnarkom and then adjourn.[57]

Put up for a vote, Sokolnikov's "Decree," in the form of a resolution was defeated 237 to 136: the vote indicates that all the Bolshevik delegates, but only they, voted for it, the Left SRs apparently abstaining. At this point, the Bolshevik delegation declared the Assembly to be controlled by "counter-revolutionaries" and walked out. The Left SRs stayed put for the time being.

Lenin remained in his loge until 10:00 p.m., at which time he too left: he had not addressed the meeting so as not to give it any semblance of legitimacy. The Bolshevik Central Committee now met in another part of the Palace and adopted a resolution declaring the Assembly dissolved. Out of deference to the Left SRs, however, Lenin instructed the Taurida Guard to engage in no violence against the deputies. He ordered that any deputy who wished to leave the building be allowed to do so, but no one was to be let back in.[58] At 2:00 a.m., satisfied he had the situation under control, he returned to Smolnyi.

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[56] I. S. Malchevskii, *Vserossiiskoe Uchreditelnoe Sobranie* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1930), p. 3.
[57] *Dekrety*, Vol. I, pp. 321–23.
[58] *Vladimir Ilich Lenin: Biograficheskaia khronika*, Vol. 5 (Moscow, 1974), pp. 180–81; Malchevskii, *Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*, p. 217.

Following the departure of the Bolsheviks, the hall of Taurida resounded with interminable speeches, frequently disrupted by the guards who had descended from the balcony and filled the seats vacated by the departed Bolsheviks: many of them were drunk. Some Bolshevik soldiers amused themselves by aiming their guns at the speakers. At 2:30 a.m. the Left SRs walked out, at which point Dybenko, in charge of security, ordered the commander of the guard, a sailor named Viktor Zhelezniakov, to close the meeting. Shortly after 4:00 a.m., as the chairman of the Assembly, Viktor Chernov, was proclaiming property in land to be abolished, Zhelezniakov ascended the tribune and touched him on the back. The following scene ensued, as recorded in the minutes:

> **Citizen Sailor:** I have been instructed to inform you that all those present should leave the Assembly Hall because the guard is tired.
> **Chairman:** What instruction? From whom?
> **Citizen Sailor:** I am the Commandant of the Taurida Guard. I have an instruction from the Commissar.
> **Chairman:** The members of the Constituent Assembly are also tired, but no fatigue can disrupt our proclaiming a law for which all of Russia has been waiting.
> (Loud noise. **Voices:** Enough, enough!)
> **Chairman:** The Constituent Assembly can disperse only under the threat of force.
> (Noise)
> **Chairman:** You declare it.
> (**Voices:** Down with Chernov!)
> **Comrade Sailor:** I request that the Assembly Hall be immediately vacated.[59]

While this exchange was taking place more Bolshevik troops from the corridor crowded into the Assembly Hall, looking very menacing. Chernov managed to keep the meeting going for another 20 minutes, and then adjourned it until 5:00 p.m. that same day (6 January). But the Assembly was never to reconvene, for in the morning Sverdlov had the Bolshevik-dominated CEC ratify and publish the Bolshevik resolution, drafted by Lenin, dissolving it.[60] *Pravda* on that day appeared with banner headlines:

> THE HIRELINGS OF BANKERS, CAPITALISTS AND LANDLORDS, THE ALLIES OF KALEDIN, DUTOV, THE SLAVES OF THE AMERICAN DOLLAR, THE BACKSTABBERS—THE

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[59] Malchevskii, *Vserossiiskoe Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*, p. 110. Zhelezniakov was killed the following year, according to some sources as a member of a bandit gang.

[60] J. Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1918: Documents and Materials* (Stanford, CA, 1934), pp. 384–86.

RIGHT SRS—DEMAND IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ALL POWER FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR MASTERS—ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE.

THEY PAY LIP SERVICE TO POPULAR DEMANDS FOR LAND, PEACE, AND [WORKER] CONTROL, BUT IN REALITY THEY TRY TO FASTEN A NOOSE AROUND THE NECK OF SOCIALIST AUTHORITY AND REVOLUTION.

BUT THE WORKERS, PEASANTS AND SOLDIERS WILL NOT FALL FOR THE BAIT OF LIES OF THE MOST EVIL ENEMIES OF SOCIALISM. IN THE NAME OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND THE SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC THEY WILL SWEEP AWAY ITS OPEN AND HIDDEN MURDERERS.[61]

The Bolsheviks had previously linked Russian democratic forces with "capitalists," "landlords" and "counter-revolutionaries," but in this inflammatory headline they for the first time connected them also with foreign capital.

Two days later (8 January) the Bolsheviks opened their own counter-Assembly, labelled "3rd Congress of Soviets." Here they knew they could have anything they wanted because they had reserved for themselves and their Left SR allies 94 per cent of the seats:[62] more than three times the number they were entitled to, judging by the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The little left over they allocated to the opposition socialists—just enough to have a target for abuse and ridicule whenever the latter dared to raise their voice in protest. The 3rd Congress duly passed all measures presented to it by government spokesmen, including the "Declaration of Rights." It proclaimed Russia a "Federation of Soviet Republics," to be known as the "Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic" or RSFSR, which name it retained until 1924, when it was renamed "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The Congress also acknowledged the Sovnarkom as the country's legitimate government, removing from its title the adjective "provisional." It also approved the principle of universal labour obligation, contained in the "Declaration."

THE dissolution of the Assembly met with surprising indifference in the country: there was none of the fury which in France in 1789 had greeted rumours that the King contemplated dissolving the National Assembly and precipated the assault on the Bastille. After a year of ceaseless anarchy, Russians were tired, hungry, and cold: they yearned for peace and order, no matter how purchased. The Bolsheviks had gambled

[61] *Pravda*, No. 4/231, 6–19 Jan. 1918, p. 1.
[62] *Nash vek*, No. 7, 12–25 Jan. 1918, p. 3, in Bunyan and Fisher, *Bolshevik Revolution*, p. 389.

on that indifference and won. After 5 January, no one could seriously expect that Lenin's men could be talked into abandoning or even sharing power. And since there was no effective armed opposition to them in the central regions of Russia, and what there was the socialist intelligentsia refused to use, common sense dictated that the Bolshevik dictatorship would govern for a long time to come.

An immediate effect of this realization was the collapse of the strike of civil servants and other office employees which until then had displayed remarkable steadfastness. Following 5 January the white-collar personnel began to drift back to work, some driven by personal need, others by the hope that from inside the government they would be better able to influence the course of events. The psychology of the opposition now suffered a fatal break: it is as if the ruthless brutality to which the Bolsheviks resorted legitimized their dictatorship by persuading many Russians, that, like it or not, after a year of chaos and endless talk, they now at last had a "real" government.

Paradoxically, Bolshevik disregard for the popular will especially attracted well-to-do and conservative elements, *Pravda*'s "hyenas of capital" and "enemies of the people", who despised the socialist intelligentsia and the street mob even more than the Bolsheviks.[63] In a sense, therefore, the Bolsheviks may be said to have assumed control of the Russian government not so much in October 1917 as in January 1918. In the words of one contemporary, who was closely involved in the convocation and dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, "authentic, genuine Bolshevism, the Bolshevism of the broad masses, came only after 5 January."[64]

Indeed, the events of 5 January were in many respects more important for the future of Russia than the October *coup* which had been carried out behind the smoke-screen of "All power to the Soviets." If the meaning of October remained concealed from nearly everyone, including rank-and-file Bolsheviks, there could be no doubt about Bolshevik intentions after 5 January when they made it resoundingly clear that they intended to pay no heed to the popular will or "formal democracy." They did not have to listen to the voice of the people because, in the literal sense of the word,

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[63] In May 1918, Vladimir Purishkevich, one of the most reactionary pre-revolutionary politicians in Russia and a virulent anti-Semite, published an "Open Letter" in which he wrote that after half a year in a Soviet prison he remained a monarchist and would not apologize for the Soviet government which was transforming Russia into a German colony. However, he went on to say, "Soviet authority is firm authority—alas, not from that direction which I would prefer to have firm authority over Russia, whose pitiful and cowardly intelligentsia is one of the main culprits of our humiliation and of the inability of Russian society to produce a healthy, political scale, [and] firm governmental authority": letter dated 1 May 1918, in *Vechernye ogni*, No. 36, 3 May 1918, p. 4.

[64] Sokolov in *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii*, Vol. XIII, p. 54.

they were the "people" and could speak for them.[65] As Lenin was to formulate it later: "The dispersal of the Constituent Assembly by Soviet authority [was] the complete and open liquidation of formal democracy in the name of the revolutionary dictatorship."[66]

The response to this historic event on the part of the population at large and the intelligentsia augured ill for the country's future.

Russia, events confirmed once again, lacked the sense of national cohesion capable of moving its population to sacrifice immediate, personal interests for the sake of democracy, legality and fundamental human rights. The "popular masses" demonstrated that they understood only private and regional interests, the heady joys of looting, which the soviets and factory committees for the time being could satisfy. In line with the Russian proverb "He who grabs the stick is corporal," they were prepared to leave the field of high politics to him who showed the courage to claim power and to use it in a way that left no doubt who was in charge.

The evidence indicates that the industrial workers of Petrograd, even while casting their votes for the Bolshevik ticket, expected the Assembly to convene and shape the country's political and social system. This is attested to by the signatures which their chosen representatives affixed to petitions of the Union for the Defence of the Constituent Assembly, *Pravda*'s complaints about workers' support for it,[67] and the frenetic appeals combined with threats which the Bolsheviks directed at the workers on the eve of the Assembly's convocation. And yet, when confronted with unflinching determination of the régime to liquidate the Assembly, backed with guns that did not hesitate to fire, the workers quietly folded. True, they were betrayed by the intelligentsia, which had refused to meet force with force: but could they not have overruled the timid intellectuals and taken matters into their own hands? They would behave in this irresolute manner time and again in the next three years: cry out for democracy, protest Bolshevik high-handedness and brutality, and then meekly submit to a show of force. Were they reacting differently from the way they had done in 1905 or 1917 because the intelligentsia, out of fear of the counter-revolution, no longer incited them to fight? Or was it because the Bolsheviks displayed greater determination in defending their authority than either the tsarist or the Provisional governments? The answer is far from clear.

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[65] This Bolshevik attitude was pointed out by Martov in the Spring of 1918. Stalin, accusing Martov of slander, brought a suit against him before a Revolutionary Tribunal. Noting that these Tribunals had been set up to try exclusively "crimes against the people," Martov asked: "Can an insult against Stalin be considered a crime against the people?" And he answered his own question: "Only if one considers Stalin to be the people." "Narod eto ia," *Vpered*, 1/14 April 1918, p. 1.

[66] Trotsky in *Pravda*, No. 91, 20 April 1924, p. 3.

[67] Ignatov in *Proletarskaia Revoliustiia*, No. 5/76, pp. 28–29.

As for the peasants, they could not have cared less what went on in the big city. SR agitators told them to vote, so they voted: and if some other group of *beloruchki* or "white hands" now took over government, so be it. Their concerns did not extend beyond their districts or *volosti*.

That left the intellectuals, that is, the socialist intelligentsia which, having gained a solid electoral victory, could act in confidence that the country stood behind it. But their refusal under any circumstances to resort to force doomed them. Trotsky later taunted the socialist intellectuals that they had come to the Taurida Palace with candles, in case the Bolsheviks cut off power, and with sandwiches, in case they were deprived of food.[68] But they refused to carry guns. On the eve of the convocation of the Assembly, the SR Pitirim Sorokin (later professor of sociology at Harvard), discussing the possibility of it being dispersed by force, commented:

> If the opening session is met with "machine guns," we will issue an appeal to the country informing it of this, and place ourselves under the protection of the people.[69]

But they lacked courage even for such a gesture. When, following the dissolution of the Assembly, a group of soldiers approached some socialist deputies with the offer to restore it by force of arms, the horrified intellectuals told them to do nothing of the kind: the Menshevik Tsereteli said that it would be better for the Constituent Assembly to die a quiet death than to provoke a civil war.[70] Such people no one could risk to follow: they talked endlessly of revolution and democracy, but would not defend their ideals with anything other than words and empty gestures. To borrow a phrase from Clemenceau, they were vegetarian tigers. This contradictory behaviour, this fatalism disguised as respect for the forces of history, this unwillingness to fight and win, is also not easy to explain. Perhaps its rationale has to be sought in the realm of psychology, namely the traditional attitude of the old Russian intelligentsia so well described by Chekhov, with its dread of success and belief that inefficiency was "the cardinal virtue and defeat the only halo."[71]

The collapse of the socialist intelligentsia on 5 January was the beginning of its demise. "The inability to defend the Constituent Assembly marked the most profound crisis of Russian democracy," observed one who had tried in vain to organize armed resistance:

> It was the turning point. After 5 January there was no place in history,

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[68] Trotsky in *Pravda*, No. 91, 20 April 1924, p. 3.
[69] Znamenskii, *Uchreditelnoe Sobranie*, p. 323.
[70] V. I. Ignatev, *Nekotorye fakty i itogi chetyrekh let grazhdanskoi voiny* (Moscow, 1922), p. 8.
[71] D. S. Mirsky, *Modern Russian Literature* (London, 1925), p. 89.

in Russian history, for what had been the idealistically dedicated Russian intelligentsia. It was relegated to the past.[72]

Unlike their opponents, the Bolsheviks learned a great deal from these events. They learned that in areas under their control they need fear no organized armed resistance: their rivals, though backed by at least three-fourths of the population, were disunited, leaderless, and, above all, unwilling to fight. This experience accustomed the Bolsheviks to resort to violence as a matter of routine whenever they ran into opposition, to "solve" their problems by physically annihilating those who caused them. The machine gun became for them the principal instrument of political persuasion. The boundless brutality with which they henceforth ruled Russia stemmed in large measure from the knowledge, gained on 5 January, that they could do so with impunity.

[72] Sokolov in *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii*, Vol. XIII, p. 6.

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

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

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

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